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ABSTRACT
This work consists of a study of the historical, philosophical and political elements
determining the essence of freedom and subjectivity in contemporary society. It
identifies the origin of subjectivity in Renaissance Humanism, and demonstrates that
Humanism's definition of individual freedom and subjectivity became a base upon
which the Anglo-Germanic Romantics grounded their intellectual and political
framework. The philosophical parallel between Humanism and Romanticism, the
projects of which express subjectivity and freedom in terms of 'creation' and
'individualism', establishes a basis from which a study of postmodernism (French
post-structuralism) shows that postmodernists, in spite of their critique of modernity,
continue to define freedom and subjectivity along the same lines. It contends that the
postmodernist critique of society espouses a severely limited notion of subjectivity,
i.e. one which is basically negative and anti-social, and whose effect on the way
individuals view themselves as socio-political agents is detrimental. This study is not
one which aims to discount the importance of the postmodernist critique altogether.
Rather, it shows that there are many elements which enter into the definition of
freedom and subjectivity as a 'lived' experience in the world, such as those present in
Hegelian philosophy, which are often concealed, or negated by postmodernism's
rejection of dialectics in history. The study takes as central the Hegelian definition of
the elements constituting the process of actualisation of subjectivity and freedom in
society, and argues that all three identified intellectual movements, Humanism,
Romanticism and Postmodernism, fail to recognise that the other, the means, is not a
thingness, a whatness, nor is it other individuals, but is itself an activity the base of
which is social, and whose telos is present in the objective order. The work argues
that although postmodernism defends individual rights against a visibly declining
social, political and ethical order, it does not present individuals with alternatives that
are feasible and desirable in today's social and political context.
Preface
The primary objective of the present work is to demonstrate that contemporary
social and political thought bases its definition of freedom and subjectivity on
Humanist conceptions, themselves the product of Medieval Christian thought. At
first glance, such a contention may appear implausible due to the stark contrast which
exists between the power structures of these societies. According to the Medieval
tradition, God is all powerful, and the Church is God's instrument, the only
institution capable of assuring individuals of the possibility of reaching heaven, i.e.
freedom, in the hereafter. All individuals, including Kings, were at the mercy of the
Church. By contrast, contemporary society has long separated the realm of political
power from religious power, to the extent that the latter was made to stand outside the
power structure altogether. However, this superficial distinction fails to recognise that
the very separation between Church and state allowed the presence of Medieval
Christian concepts of freedom and subjectivity to go unchecked.
Given the analysis that will be provided of the nature of the Humanist project
for liberty, one may conclude that in contrast to the classical Greek notion of
'reason', the type of reason which developed during the Renaissance was not
teleological. Reason was used to obtain knowledge of the end, but did not constitute
the end as such. In this respect, Renaissance reason, and indeed Enlightenment
reason, whilst able to transcend 'religious' control of reality in what was immediate
and palpable, were unable to do so in terms of finality. It is difficult to state whether
it was the nature of reason itself, or one acquired through practice, that was
responsible for the failure of the philosophers of the past to break away from the
dependency of reason on divinity. Nevertheless, the application of reason in the
modern age, once the state became separate from the Church and value from morality,
appeared purposeless, leaving many philosophers in this century to condemn it as the
very instrument of oppression and self-delusion.1 This study makes clear that reason
as such is not a concept that can be taken in isolation from the social, political and
ideological aspects which combine to define its nature and purpose.
Hegel demonstrates this fact clearly in his definition of a type of liberty that he
believed was both possible and desirable. Hegel's definition of freedom as action
which begins, in the first instance, in thought does not differ entirely from the
postmodernist definition of freedom, but nevertheless goes beyond it in its adherence
to the idea that only in action is freedom to be actualised. For Hegel, the idea of
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freedom was necessarily one which combined the attributes of the past with the
means of the present. Hegel sought to impart to us the benefit of knowledge of the
past with a heightened understanding of the present, and of the self in the present.
For Hegel, individuals, once aware of their dissociation from the earlier tyranny of
the Church (which he took to be exemplified in the French Revolution's success in
separating Church from State), will abandon the belief in freedom as realisable only
and conditionally in the hereafter, and will seek their freedom in the here-and-now.
Hegel believed in the idea that freedom is a product of this lifetime and can be enjoyed
by the individual who is able to recognise that freedom is not necessarily 'absence of
restraint', but in fact a product of 'necessary' choice and hence self-limitation.
Thomas Mann defines freedom in a manner that is reminiscent of Hegel: "freedom
always inclines to dialectical reversals. She realises herself very soon in constraint,
fulfils herself in the subordination to law, rule, coercion, system - but to fulfil herself
therein does not mean she therefore ceases to be freedom."2
Of course, it is in and through dialectics that Hegel is able to conceive of the
possibility of making of freedom an experience to be enjoyed in the present. As is
noted in chapter I of Part III, Hegel acquired his understanding of dialectics from
earlier philosophical teachings, most of which were pagan.3 By identifying each
attribute with its negation, Hegel was able to introduce a theory of liberty that
endowed its definition with the need for both absence of restraint, and restraint.
However, unlike the earlier Humanists, freedom as absence from restraint constitutes
for Hegel the freedom of thought and that of the will, and freedom as restraint is
necessary in terms of the social and political system which establishes the laws of the
state. Hegel maintains that freedom as self-determination depends on both elements
for its actualisation. Free thought conceives of, and indeed empowers, the will, but
only restrictions, i.e. choice, make self-determination possible. This conception is
also not peculiarly Hegelian. Machiavelli in the Discourses made clear that the ordini,
the laws and ordinances, were the necessary tools for the securing of liberty;
individuals need to be coerced in order to act virtuosi, according to virtue, and hence
maintain their liberty, which they would have abandoned without such constraint.4
Machiavelli did not believe in the natural inclination of individuals to virtue, and
therefore maintained that freedom for self-determination would only be available at a
cost, that of coercion of the law without which individuals would always find a way
to act in a cowardly way, and hence give up their liberty. However, unlike
Machiavelli, Hegel did not believe in the power offortuna, but rather in the power of
reason and self-knowledge which he deemed capable of guiding individuals toward
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the proper choice. For Hegel, unlike the individuals in need of coercive ordini,
modern individuals will not need to be coerced into following the laws, but will
recognise them as the direct expression of their own free will.
It should certainly be emphasised that the present work does not seek to
blindly advocate the Hegelian solution as the one system holding the 'ultimate'
definition of 'freedom as subjectivity', but rather that, by demonstrating Hegel's
awareness of the bi-polar position of the concepts of freedom and subjectivity in the
philosophy of his age, one is able to recognise the existence of an alternative which
seeks to go beyond this bi-polarity in order to establish a doctrine which exemplifies
their synthesis. The benefit of this is heightened when this alternative seeks to take
into account the elements constituting the ideology and teleology of its age. Hegel's
definition of freedom as teleological self-determination, that is based on the
predominance of 'reason', posits itself as a project of liberty that responds to the
needs of the individual of the modern age. It does so as it seeks consciously to break
away from the elements which have kept humanity enslaved for many centuries. It
has also to be emphasised that the present work does not advocate that one should
take Hegel's work as the Medievalists did the Bible. But neither would it suggest that
one reject, as do the postmodernists, Hegel's system because it may be proven in one
aspect or another as untenable. The present work would warn against both extremes.
It argues that there is much to be learned from Hegel's approach, especially in how it
defines the elements constituting the present.
Hegel's work makes clear that we are in need of establishing clear definitions
of our common purpose as humanity, and as actors in the world. He points to the
fact that we have gone beyond the point of seeking to wrench the power from an
unearthly deity through our will-to-knowledge, and that we are at a stage that
demands clear and decisive action. We can no longer pursue our freedom as flight
from and negation of the self, but must direct our purposes to the establishment of a
truly free society. Contrary to Hegel, the postmodernists have shown a clear
resistance to overcoming the Humanist and Romantics' stratification of humanity
according to a particular system of 'value'. However, oddly enough, they have been
equally instrumental in breaking down institutional and thought structures which were
responsible for discriminating against particular groups and individuals in the multi¬
national state. This study hopes that in seeking to demonstrate that the tendency to
define freedom as flight from the present and from the self is itself a product of past
tradition, it has equally pointed the way towards establishing a project of freedom that
is a product of this age and this tradition. In this sense, the postmodernist emphasis
on originality and creativity is essential and necessary, yet it would be advisable that a
vigilant and discriminating eye should follow the process of such creation. We
would no longer need to live in a 'bubble' separated from space and time, but would
seek to live within the limits of both, actively defining our sense of self not in terms
of flight, but of actual self-determination. Once it is clear that freedom is not about
the active nihilation of the other, the other that is indeed our own self,5 and that
freedom is a possible experience in the here-and-now, then maybe we would seek to
actualise freedom in our daily lives and project it as our purpose and end.
Finally, I should like to extend my warmest thanks to the individuals who
have helped make this work possible. I wish to thank Mr. Richard Gunn for
supervising the first half of my dissertation, and for introducing me to Hegel. Also I
extend my deepest gratitude to Dr. Stanley Raffel and Professor Russell Keat whose
help was instrumental in making the accomplishment of this work possible. My
warmest thanks goes equally to the staff and secretaries of the Politics Department
who can always be counted on for enthusiastic help and support. I extend my
warmest thanks especially to Craig Johnston, Leda Vlachou, and Robert Mahoney
whose unfailing support and advice have gone beyond the call of friendship. I wish
to give my deepest gratitude and warmest thanks to Professor Douglas Moggach and
Professor Andre Vachet at the University of Ottawa, Political Science Department,
whose continued support, encouragement and enthusiasm have had a tremendous
effect on me throughout my graduate years. Finally, I want to thank my family for its
support and love, and especially my father Mr. Taha Hawa to whom I dedicate this
work.
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In the mono-theistic traditions, it has been established that the year two
thousand shall herald the onslaught of the apocalypse, the end of the world, the day
of judgement, etc.. Western individuals, long freed from the influence of religion,
would hasten to add that belief in the apocalypse has faded away, that individuals are
indeed the makers of their universe, and that no 'heavenly clock' is capable of
changing the course of events. They claim that today's individual is living in a
'disenchanted' world which functions according to the laws of science and in terms
of human reason. To question this statement is to put in question the state of affairs
that has developed since the Copernican revolution, i.e. it means questioning the
effect of the victory of science over religion. Yet, question we must, for it appears
that an 'apocalyptic' sentiment is expressed daily, even by these philosophers and
intellectuals who are supposed to be the most resistant to religious influence.1
Furthermore, although a product of 'religion-free' society, contemporary thought
finds itself incapable of dealing with issues previously dealt with by the church, and
with which science, as a 'value-free' form of knowledge, claims itself incapable of
addressing.2
Contemporary society finds today's individual often defined as the unhappy
individualist, product of capitalist society. For authors like Christopher Lasch, the
capitalist mode of life appears in the throws of death, and "in its decadence has
carried the logic of individualism to the extreme of a war of all against all, the pursuit
of happiness to the dead end of a narcissistic preoccupation with the self."3
Likewise, others like Baudrillard, regard the quality of the life lived as the product of
a "decomposition"4 of an earlier, more authentic life. This concept of
'decomposition' is critical of the modern liberal state, expressed in terms of Hobbes'
Leviathan, i.e. the collective body directed politically and socially by one 'Head'. In
this social and political context, decomposition does not occur simultaneously with
death, but signifies the coming-into-being of the life of each heretofore conceived part
of the collective political body. As such, this 'decomposition' is not death, but, as
Bauman puts it, "disappearance,"5 or dissolution of the promises of a quality of life
originally posited by modernity. Bauman defines this preoccupation clearly when he
states that the modern project did not fail, but that "its undoing was its success - too
overwhelming, too complete. The quest for order has produced a hygroscopic,
sanitized, hygienic bubble - odourless and germless; the inside of the bubble has lost
immunity, capacity to be alerted by incoming danger, to defend itself: to tell danger
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from happiness, evil from the norm."6 Within this 'bubble' the process of
decomposition is at hand. This break down is exemplified in the manner with which
the old social and political body saw its members dispersed, seeking their freedom in
the launching of "projects of collective emancipation."7 They seem to have fallen
today into a "loose heap of non-additive personal tragedies,"8 where each
'decomposed' part of the old collective body is left to pursue games, the rules of
which are rarely if ever put into question. Postmodernists claim that these rules were
left to us as legacies from the Enlightenment, and constitute the foundations upon
which this 'decomposed' state of affairs is based. This world, which "makes
freedom into necessity (having first made necessity feel like freedom),"9 thrives on
the estrangement of its members. It is the world of the unfree, and, in virtue of being
thus, is also the world of the non-subject.
Decomposition is unlike death, because it denotes a triumph over the latter: it
is immortality in so far as it is simply disappearance. There is no dead body to bury
and put away once and for all. This is possible because "it is not a challenge to be
taken up, a task to be performed, a reward to be earned. Neither is it a project that
can give meaning to the being-in-the-world. In the B-World [the world of
decomposition], immortality dissolves in the melancholy of presence, in the
monotony of endless repetition."10 Unlike death, decomposition is reversible,
revocable. In Baudrillard's terms, it is "cyclical reversal, annulment," which "puts an
end to the linear time."11 The cycle, unlike the linear form, signifies return to the
beginning, starting anew, whereas linear time is metaphorically understood as the
idea of 'no return'. As such, decomposition is unlike death, because it is not final,
not 'forever'. There is no certainty of its permanence. It is a state in and through
which the past, in terms of its thought and fashion, comes crowding in, becomes part
of the present while remaining distinctly 'retro'. Bauman describes this aptly in his
depiction of the B-World: "Objects come and go, but then come again, never to
overstay their visit. They are condemned to the nomadic existence of commercial
travellers. Last year's rubbish becomes the cherished antique, the last generation's
fallen star turns into the idol of nostalgic dream, the killing fields of yore are invaded
by pilgrims searching for 'our glorious heritage' of industrial or military triumphs.
What was obsolete yesterday becomes a rage of today, and is doomed to slip once
more into oblivion even before it has forced its way, with a fanfare, into the centre of
today's attention. Mortality daily rehearsed turns into immortality; everything
becomes immortal, and nothing is. Only transience is durable."12 In social and
political terms, the B-World depicts the fragmentation of the liberal state. However,
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postmodernism does not propose an alternative order that will put the pieces together
within the 'bubble' itself, nor does it present a radical, revolutionary viewpoint that is
capable of bursting it, thereby allowing a totally new order to come into being.
Postmodernism depicts today's society as suffering from a twofold affliction. It can
neither cure itself within its own social and political sphere, nor is it prepared to
abandon this virtually 'eternal' cycle of decomposition.
Postmodernists,13 as we shall see in Part III, agree with Bauman's and
Lasch's definitions of the present. However, unlike them the postmodernists are not
critical of this 'bubble-like' society and its on-going cyclical repetition. Rather, they
claim that this type of time-circularity, decomposition and recomposition, is indicative
of a distinct type of freedom and subjectivity, one that is achievable in terms of
'textuality' and the 'word'. For example, Derrida believes in the ahistorical content
of a text, claiming that by de-constructing it, its contents not only yield specific
knowledge bound within epoch and context, but point to a third dimension present in
and through the words used. This third dimension is posited as a novelty, a
dimension of reality that has heretofore eluded writers and readers of past
generations. Textual deconstruction intends to 're-view' conceptualisations of reality,
and therewith become capable of bringing into being new possibilities to perceive the
past, live the present and conceive of the future. However, is this activity truly an
original one? Is it simply the reaction of those thinkers and intellectuals disillusioned
by the influence that scientific rationality enjoyed since the Enlightenment? Or is it
perhaps instead an instance of a repeated pattern of intellectual movements of the past
- indeed, did not the 'Renaissance' itself (the concept of rebirth which heralded the
birth of the modern era) equally indicate the striving after the repetition of a past
tradition? For as we shall see in Part I, the Italian Humanists' return to the Classics
issued with it a re-interpretation of these earlier works and debates in a form that was,
at the time, both a repetition and an innovation. For them, this return to the pagan
Classics provided the medium and the elements to break away from the all-
encompassing control of medieval clergy and stultifying community relations.
Through the Classics and their medieval Muslim interpreters, the Humanists were
able to grasp the idea of individuality, not only in terms of the state of being separate
from the community, but also, and more importantly, as self-determining
subjectivity. In this process of deconstruction and repetition, Humanism was able to
take flight from the limits of its reality in order to establish human primacy over all
earthly life.
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Inasmuch as Humanism sought to establish the distinctness of humanity and
thereby give it form, postmodernism seeks to redefine humanity not in terms of its
constitution as a superior life-form (i.e. in terms of physiological and rational nature),
but in terms of its ontology (i.e. these elements which cannot be measured in and
through science, but which constitute the essence of every individual and make of
him or her a unique being). Postmodernists are concerned to save the human value of
life from the fetishism which accompanied modernity and scientific reason. In
essence, they appear as seeking to reverse the results of the seventeenth century's or
the scientific revolution's move from an essentially qualitatively based physics and
metaphysics to a Platonic and Pythagorian quanitatively [geometrically] based physics
and metaphysics.14 With the quantification of all reality, characteristic of the
Enlightenment, the universe appears essentially indifferent,15 that is to say, the
universe would appear to be made of substance that is wholly and utterly distinct
from the human ego, and with that remain outside the definition of human ontology.
This indifference is the result of the refusal to acknowledge that the free subject is
'finite', 'mortal', and that this perceived feeling of 'immortality' is an illusion.
For this reason, today's individual is identified as the "economic man [who]
himself has given way to the psychological man of our times - the final product of
bourgeois individualism, ... the new narcissist, ... haunted not by guilt but by
anxiety; ... liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of
his own existence ... His sexual attitudes are permissive rather than puritanical, even
though his emancipation from ancient taboos brings him no sexual peace. ... He
extols cooperation and teamwork while harboring deeply antisocial impulses. He
praises respect for rules and regulations in the secret belief that they do not apply to
himself."16 This particular preoccupation with the self, and seemingly socially
estranged behaviour, cast the postmodern individual as one who is unaware of the
conditions which constitute his/her social and political reality, and therefore is equally
unaware of his/her personal identity. This loss of identity reflects "on the emptiness,
isolation, loneliness, and despair experienced by the borderline personality,"17 often
expressed in the plays of Albee, Beckett, Ionesco, and Genet. The work of these
playwrights describes to a great extent the type of mental illnesses observed in
Western society since World War II,18 which may be broadly defined as "'fear of
close relationships', 'attendant feelings of helplessness, loss, and rage', 'fear of
destructive impulses', and 'fixation to early omnipotence'."19 In these plays, one is
struck by the sparseness of stage and dialogue, the vague reference to time and place,
a greater reliance on the subjective feelings of the characters, and the utter disregard
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of any social or political setting. The characters are those of individuals who do not
know who they are within a given period and a given society, but seek to know who
they are outwith both time and space, i.e. they seek to identify a 'pure, and
impassive' nature which would substantiate its 'immortality' through a narrow and
self-centred dialogue with nature.
This pursuit of immortality, or at least, that of the will to recognise 'being' in
a manner which defies both time and space, can be traced back to the Renaissance.20
In his quest for self-knowledge, Montaigne, for instance, "looked for himself in the
given experience of antiquity," for he solemnly believed that an individual was
capable of "selfmaking in the knowledge of the other,"21 In his library, Montaigne
retreated from a reality which was threatening to him, and chose to recover a sense of
authority, or valour and epic grandeur, through the history of Greece and Rome. In
his seclusion, Montaigne's present was saved from its past captivity, it
acknowledged itself as the present by evoking the past. The consciousness of what
was brought to consciousness what is: it added to the conscience a new dimension;
even more importantly, the restitution of the past brought about the hope of a
different future.22 It was in pursuit of this hope that Montaigne came to see his own
image through the heroes of the past. His own worth, that of his subjectivity and his
soul, soared as he walked in the footsteps of the great men of antiquity.
Thus, the Renaissance witnessed the first step taken toward the establishment
of human ontology which defines itself in terms of a universal identity. In and
through the sea of centuries of texts, the human spirit sought a universal essence
which defies time and space, breaks away from the finiteness of theologically and
scientifically defined human ontology, and embraced the infinity found in the cyclical
form of time. This appears as a plausible form of self-positing that is capable of
promoting a flight from the here-and-now. For Montaigne, the present, in its limiting
and limited circumstances, accorded the individual little in terms of freedom. By
contrast, when positing himself in terms that were independent of his space and time,
he succeeded in extending to himself a type of freedom that, although not grounded
in the reality of the here-and-now, was nevertheless present in a different space and a
deferred time.23 Freedom is therefore a possibility as flight from the present, and is
also subjectivity as the capacity to create one's personal circumstances outside of the
social and political environment. Seen in this light, twentieth century's playwrights'
belief that reality is an illusion, and that the essence of life and human nature lie
within the realm of the invisible and the remote, appears as a direct expression of this
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belief in freedom as the flight from the limitations of the present.
The concept of freedom as flight refers back to the medieval Christian belief
that life on earth is itself a prison of the soul, the release of which can only occur in
the instance of death. Following the death of the body, the soul of the good will find
a heavenly dwelling, and that of the sinful will dwell until eternity in a yet more
terrifying prison, hell. In this sense, freedom is a. flight from the present, not simply
in terms of fleeing one's disagreeable circumstances, but also and more importantly,
of a flight from the prison of the earthly body. Similarly, according to this medieval
Christian view, subjectivity is not a state of being that is available to the individual on
earth or in heaven because Subjectivity is the attribute of God, the only Subject, the
ultimate Creator. Made in God's image, humans can simply imitate the act of
creation, but may not be 'Subjects' as such. Human beings' means to be 'creators'
are thereby limited to 'flights of imagination', and in later instances, the will to know
God's designs, i.e. in and through knowledge (science and philosophy) of what God
has created. Through this knowledge, reason appears as means to know God's
ends. This understanding of subjectivity develops a bi-polar and un-bridgeable gulf
between the finite and infinite, individuals and God. It appears as if one can only be
the one or the other, but never both. Furthermore, any attempt to become the 'Other'
implies a transgression24 against nature and the order of things. In this case,
however, the 'evolution' implied in the process of becoming cannot take place, for
there appears to be no 'logical' means, or medium, which allows the transition from
one state of being to the other. In their interpretation of the pagan Classics, the
Humanists posited reason as a possible medium. In so far as it is a mental faculty,
and hence separate from the physical plane, reason appeared as the only means that
can establish the transition of the disembodied individual 'soul' to its flight toward
the purity of the Holy 'Spirit'.
Unlike the teleological 'reason' of the Classics, the Humanists' reason is
instrumental. In a world based on the belief that all human purpose is directed
toward the achievement of freedom in the after-world, reason cannot be otherwise.
This is because reason, or rational thought, cannot be an end in itself. According to
the medieval Christians, no earthly achievement of freedom is possible. If reason is
to help achieve any type of freedom, it should be in terms of its capacity to 'guide'
individuals to 'know' what God 'intends', thereby making it easier for them to act
according to His 'will' in order to secure their salvation. Ironically, this view of
reason implies a certain type of freedom as self-determination, i.e. subjectivity, since
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for the believer action-in-the-world would ultimately determine his/her future after
death. However, this type of subjectivity, or freedom as self-determination,
demands equally, and in the first instance, that the individual perish, and as such it is
not a state of freedom that is actualisable in the here-and-now. Freedom as self-
determination in the present must therefore take the shape of flight from the body, a
'temporary death', a state which indulges in dreams, flights of fancy, imagination
and sexuality.25 Montaigne in his flight from reality, for instance, was able to
experience a freedom that he himself had created, that he imposed upon himself, and
thereby acquired an identity.
This dissertation contends that this medieval Christian doctrine which posits
freedom as wholly distinct and separate from subjectivity has radically influenced
intellectual movements since the Renaissance, and hence shaped the struggle for
freedom and self-determination exemplified in the social and political developments
which have taken place since. It argues that both the Romantic movement and
today's postmodern movement define freedom and subjectivity in these medieval
Christian terms. Although postmodernism introduces, through the method of de-
construction and self-creation, new methods of obtaining freedom and self-
determination, it nevertheless fails to de-construct the very notion of the type of
freedom and subjectivity it seeks. Postmodernism argues that freedom can only be
achieved through flight from the present, pointing to the failure of all other means to
experience freedom in the here-and-now, but neglects to point out the nature of the
freedom it acknowledges itself to be seeking. As individuals living in the present, the
very moment which defines our existence, it behoves us to ask ourselves the question
whether this is the type of freedom that we truly aspire to obtain, or whether we
should be seeking to establish a social and a political system that is able to secure us a
type of freedom that is equally self-determining in the present, in the actions we
undertake in everyday life. Do we need to continue the struggle of past epochs
blindly, never recognising whether it relates to our needs and aspirations, or should
we not aspire to define the type of liberty we want to seek, establish it as a telos, and
pursue it with enlightened minds and hearts? In this dissertation, I argue for the latter
by seeking to propose an alternative definition of freedom, freedom as subjectivity.
The title of this dissertation, Toward a Redefinition of Freedom and
Subjectivity in Contemporary Society, indicates a 'will' to 'redefine' both concepts,
and to do so it introduces the concept of 'freedom as subjectivity' thereby blending
both concepts into a united doctrine. This doctrine is based upon the premise that the
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concepts of freedom and subjectivity have long been separated, or made bi-polar,
specifically because they were originally defined in terms of Christian medieval
thought which expressed human freedom in purely physical terms, and subjectivity in
purely divine, metaphysical terms. 'Freedom as subjectivity' is a definition of
freedom which goes beyond the pure physical realm extending to ethical concerns,
but is equally the product of lived experience. It is the product of activity, not merely
that of the efficient-cause (God), but also that of everyday individuals. It is the
expression of a freely willed determination of the self, posited within a social and
political context and telos. The present work takes Hegel's concept of the will as
representative of this doctrine, and uses his work to counter those who define
freedom in terms of 'freedom from'. It, therefore, pursues the definition of freedom
and subjectivity from their inceptions in order to put into perspective the purpose and
the content of today's 'apocalyptic' sentiment.
It is important to distinguish Hegel's concept of freedom of the will from
what has been established since the Renaissance. We must, however, first introduce
the three classes under which definitions of freedom are identified. First, there is the
Hobbesian interpretation which defines freedom in terms of a physical state, freedom
from as the absence of physical constraints and obstructions. A second definition of
freedom is commonly known as the 'negative conception'26 of freedom which is
defined in terms of social, economic, legal or political restraints. It includes the study
of the various restraints imposed by society and its institutions on its members, the
measure of which indicates the 'degree' of freedom that these members enjoy.
Finally, the third sense or usage of the term "freedom," implies "the quality of being
free from the control of fate or necessity; the power of self-determination, attributed
to the will."27 It is this usage or connotation that is implied in Hegel's concept of the
will (Part II, Ch. I), and what is often referred to here as the concept of 'freedom as
subjectivity', i.e. 'freedom of the will to actual self-determination', rather than what
is generally indicated in negative terms, expressed as 'freedom from restraint'.
It is important to note the debate which surrounds the understanding of the
notion of the will. This debate occurs between libertarians and determinists and/or
believers in strict theological predestination,28 or more specifically between those
who believe that the will is a mysterious 'contra-causal' force, and those who
dispense with the concept of freedom altogether, or believe that it means only the
personal and civil liberty requisite to the empowerment of choice and the consequent
realisation of one's desires. Contrary to both viewpoints, what is meant here by
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'freedom as subjectivity' does not see the will in terms of determinism, or
scientifically ascertained 'causal-efficacy', both of which treat the idea of the will in
purely physical terms. Rather, it sees that it is possible to articulate a doctrine of
conditional, finite or 'quasi-causal' freedom which is compatible with the current
understanding of causality in physics and biology, and which is sufficient to render
intelligible a notion of moral responsibility in ethics.29
'Freedom as subjectivity' is conditional as it relies on the presence of certain
elements affecting several levels of existence. On the social and political level, these
include the nature and structure of the political system, rights and liberties and their
practice. On the individual level, it includes individual consciousness and knowledge
of the social and political conditions of society, as well as a particular individual's
will to actively participate and determine his/her identity in society. 'Freedom as
subjectivity' is not a function of 'human nature' as such, but is a quality of being as
becoming, i.e. it is a state of being that implies the presence of an activity leading to a
self-posited telos, in which case it is both the present and the possibility of the future.
It is finite in so far as it depends on the activity itself (any form of physical or mental
labour), and can vanish the moment that a condition (or conditions) impeding the
active pursuit of self-determination asserts itself.30 Freedom is 'quasi-causal' insofar
as it is a perpetual dialectic between cause and effect. It is both an element capable of
determining reality, and is itself dependent on a reality which determines it. Freedom
as the will is not 'contra-causal' as it does not resist the efficient cause - God or
Nature - but submits to it, and in this submission it yields. However, its yielding is
not simply a giving-up of the self, a death, or complete self-negation, but is
synthesis, transformation and evolution. Freedom is not a wrenching away from
nature its right to the determination of reality, but is a becoming within the
possibilities of nature. This becoming depends on the actualisation of individual will.
This doctrine would establish that the freedom encountered at the level of human
moral experience is grounded on, or built up from a more generalised phenomenon
(such as environmental conditions or a given ideology) which is pervasive, and in
some sense constitutive of social, political and physical reality.
'Freedom as subjectivity' seeks to break away from the medieval Christian
definition of freedom as something distincit from subjectivity, by making it possible
for individuals to become conscious of the value of, and their responsibility for, their
actions, not only in terms benefitting atomistic, individualist existence, but, more
particularly, in terms of the social and political responsibility of each individual living
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within a free society. In breaking away from medieval Christian values, this type of
freedom puts in line contemporary Western values with the kind of freedom that is
both feasible and desirable in the present. If we are to maintain the belief that we are
living in a 'disenchanted' world, and are ruled by reason, then it becomes incumbent
upon us to recognise that we no longer need to compete with God for freedom and
mastery, and that we are the rulers of our universe, responsible for its joys and
sadness, health and illness, prosperity and poverty, honesty and corruption. The
sooner we agree to acknowledge our role in the making of our world, the faster we
can acknowledge the seriousness of our follies, and the irrationality of our choices.
'Freedom as subjectivity' is a concept which seeks to remind us that freedom is not a
by-product of human existence, but an activity which carries a heavy moral
responsibility, too great to handle as an individual atom, but perhaps far more
manageable as a collective.
This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part I, 'Genesis of Subjectivity',
consists of two chapters. Chapter I deals with freedom and subjectivity according to
the Humanist tradition. It establishes the links between Renaissance Humanists'
reading and interpretation of the Classics, and the type of freedom they sought. The
chapter demonstrates that a two-fold definition of freedom was then pursued. The
first was theo-centric which associated freedom as subjectivity with freedom from
God, the Church and the Medieval community. As we shall see, this type of freedom
accorded humanity a divine quality. The second, originally established according to
the Aristotelean scientific tradition, became effective in grounding freedom in reality.
Science was instrumental in establishing the divine and 'immortal' nature of humanity
in the Renaissance as a perceivable reality. It is the convergence of the two that gave
to the Classical Age both the inspiration and the power to develop political theories
capable of bringing about the Age of Enlightenment and the French Revolution.
Chapter II of Part I deals with the Romantic movement which developed in
the wake of the French Revolution, voicing the disillusionment of the predominantly
German and English intellectuals with its results. The levelling hand of the
ontological 'Declaration of the Rights of Man', left these intellectuals with the
impression that the quality of the human spirit was usurped by the quantitative
character of this declaration, for it seemed to have reduced that part of the soul that is
divine to a quantitatively determined entity, thereby annihilating it. As the Humanists
before them, the Romantics considered that a hierarchical order in nature did exist as
an ideal and not as the result of a real evolution, implying that individuals were not
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equal by nature, and that some may be more 'divine' than others. This was reflected
in the Romantics' drive to produce the most divine work of art, and put forward the
most spiritually inspiring scientific discoveries. This chapter presents the Romantic
movement as having used the 'theory of knowledge' which was first developed by
Baumgarten and elaborated on by Schiller in his Essays on the Aesthetic Education of
Man. Schiller's account proved useful to the Romantics - if not representative of
their age - as it developed a scientific theory of intuition bringing into harmony the
knowledge of the spiritual and the physical.
Part II, 'Modernity: Theory and Practice', is divided into two chapters.
Chapter I presents Hegel's objection to the Romantics' definition of freedom as
subjectivity. He considered the Romantic revolt as a negative definition of freedom,
which impeded the recognition of reason as the actualisation of social and political
freedom, responsible for identifying subjectivity with pure negation and distinction,
rather than with synthesis. Subjectivity for Hegel is the actualisation of freedom in
the world (freedom as an exercise of individual free-will which brings into actuality a
harmony between particular interests and the universal order). Hegel's critique of the
Romantic movement's claim to divinity demonstrates that to attempt to define the
world according to the two concepts of quality and quantity leads to an impasse. Of
the rich and diverse work of Hegel's philosophy, two elements are presented in this
chapter: first, Hegel's notion of teleology, developed in the Science ofLogic, which
establishes in clear terms how this negative dialectic may be overcome through
synthesis; second, Hegel's concept of the free will as developed in the Philosophy of
Mind. Finally, Hegel's attempt to ground his theory of freedom and synthetic
dialectics is demonstrated in the form and function of the state in the Philosophy of
Right.
The presentation of Hegel's position is paramount to this work, for he is
critical of the negative dialectic of the Romantics, and, more importantly, his work
has often been recognised (particularly by contemporary postmodernists) as a faithful
example of the working of the Enlightenment 'project'. Criticisms, as we shall see
for instance in Part III, levelled against the Enlightenment in the philosophical arena
tend to be directed against Hegel's philosophy, using it as a clear example of why the
project of freedom in modernity has failed. Chapter II of Part II seeks to establish
that this is not the case; i.e., that Hegel's social and political philosophy, in spite of
the similarities it may have had with what took place in modernity, had no
contemporary expression, either in practice or in theory. For these reasons, this
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chapter presents two sides to modernity. Max Weber's account of the workings of
modern society is here examined as an accurate appraisal of the practical aspects of
liberalism, or more specifically what truly went on. Weber's work represents a
definition of an ideology concerning the actual working of the present. It deals with
what is, rather than what ought to be. In terms of theory, Alasdair Maclntyre's
critique of emotivism and the general character of contemporary society, represents
the 'pro-Hegelian' side of thought in modernity. It exemplifies a direct critique of
liberal society as defined and analysed by Weber. Yet, neither author presents an
understanding and a critique of the present such as found in Hegel. Based on these
analyses, criticisms of Hegel presented by the postmodernists appear as lacking in
coherence and ground, and questions concerning the nature of and reasons for their
critique demand answers, which are provided in Part III.
Part III, 'Postmodernism and Subjectivity: An Unfinished Project', seeks to
identify and define the origins and elements which constitute postmodernism as an
intellectual movement. It establishes links between Jean Paul Sartre's existentialism,
his definition of human ontology and freedom, and the nature of the critique used by
French postmodernists. Chapter I of Part III presents Sartre's philosophy, both in its
earlier form in Being and Nothingness, and its later, more Marxist form in the
Critique ofDialectical Reason. It is shown that Sartre's philosophy is essentially
very critical of the type of dialectics used by Hegel and Marx; theirs is rejected on the
basis that it is this type of dialectic, essential to the grounding of freedom in the
present, that is most enslaving. For Sartre, freedom is that of thought and of the
imagination, a type of freedom that can only be ethereal. In its purity, thought's only
means to 'objectification' lies in the word, and not in any perishable form. Freedom
for Sartre appears as the freedom to exist outwith reality and the physical realm. This
is perhaps the reason Sartre established a dialectic that ends with negation rather than
synthesis, and which he attempted to ground in terms of a theory of social and
political consciousness defined along the same lines as the Marxist critique. This
presentation shows that Sartre's attempt to establish this type of dialectic in the socio¬
political realm was a failure, a fact that was pointed out very clearly in Levi-Strauss'
critique of Sartre's existentialist Marxism.
Chapter II of Part III outlines the theory of freedom as subjectivity of three
authors: Michel Foucault,31 Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Jacques Derrida. Presented
here are their theory of freedom, its relationship to authorship and language, and how
this established relationship not only harks back to Sartre's dialectic of the
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imagination, but more importantly, also reproduces the very definition of freedom
implicit in the Humanist and the Romantics' project for liberty, i.e. freedom as
subjectivity grounded in the individual's capacity to 'create', a process through which
the individual is finally able to be conceived of as 'immortal'. Put also into question
are the critiques these authors direct against Hegel and the Hegelian/Marxist
dialectics. These critiques tend to reiterate Sartre's position, condemning Hegel's
dialectic as 'idealistic', and Marx's as 'fetishistic', yet without entering into an
adequate examination of either. Although aware of the limitations imposed on the
individual in contemporary society, the postmodernists appear to continue to seek a
type of freedom that is itself an escape from reality, steadfastly refusing to take into
account a type of dialectic that seeks to ground freedom in the present. Rather, they
opt for a type of freedom that, although it can exist unfettered, remains unrealisable.
The Conclusion points out the consequences of postmodernism, and argues
that in maintaining a predominantly medieval Christian definition of freedom and
subjectivity, postmodernists thwart the real struggle for freedom, and instead of
presenting the already puzzled and bewildered contemporary individual with a viable
alternative, they produce an alternative to freedom that is essentially anti-social,
atomistic and ultimately violent. It is also pointed out that postmodernism presents a
method of analysis that can be, and indeed has been, beneficial in unveiling injustices
and inequalities plaguing contemporary society, and in virtue of being thus,
postmodernism's critical approach can be harnessed to the benefit of society.
However, as in all theories of liberation, moderation and vigilance in the application
of the method and theory are necessary in order to avoid falling into the radical
negativity found in all extremes. Furthermore, the conclusion gives as 'possible'
example of an actualised 'freedom as subjectivity', in the here-and-now, the presently
developing European Union. It briefly examines its structure, and the means by
which it may become the type of social and political matrix which promotes the
development of freedom as self-determination through its willingness and capacity to
recognise and deal with conflicts of identity and difference.
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Part I: Genesis of Modern
Subjectivity
"And when I came out of solitude and crossed over this
bridge for the first time I did not trust my eyes and looked
and looked again, and said at last, 'An ear! An ear as big as a
man!' I looked still more closely - and indeed, underneath
the ear something was moving, something pitifully small and
wretched and slender. And, no doubt of it, the tremendous
ear was attached to a small, thin stalk- but this stalk was a
human being! If one used a magnifying glass one could
even recognize a tiny envious face; also, that a bloated little
soul was dangling from the stalk. The people, however,
told me that this great ear was not only a human being, but a
great one, a genius. But I never believed the people when
they spoke of great men; and I maintained my belief that it
was an inverse cripple who had too little of everything and
too much of one thing."
When Zarathustra had spoken thus to the hunchback and to
those whose mouthpiece and advocate the hunchback was,
he turned to his disciples in profound dismay and said
"Verily, my friends, I walk among men as among the
fragments and limbs of men. This is what is terrible for my
eyes, that I find man in ruins and scattered as over a
battlefield or a butcherfield." ("On Redemption", Thus
Spake Zarathustra)
Nietzsche's reflection on the crippled state of the Western subject rings a
distinctly familiar note in the ears of contemporary socio-political critics. Twentieth
century social and political thought has come to treat the question of subjectivity in
terms of a disease which remains virtually incurable. Whether seeking to promote the
exercise of a fuller notion of subjectivity,1 or maintaining that subjectivity is an
invention that has placed society at the risk of complete dissolution,2 today's socio¬
political critics look upon the question of subjectivity with alarm and foreboding.
Conferences on the subject leave one with the impression of having taken part in a
medical consultation among experts all of whom define the disease in conflicting terms
while proposing equally conflicting solutions. Given the fact that the symptoms of
this socio-political 'disease' have been observed over a long period of time, it can
therefore be concluded that the disease itself is tenacious, a quality that can be taken to
be based on two likely causes. First, that not all the symptoms have been detected;
and second, that the patient is not receptive to the cure. In view of Nietzsche's
statement, it seems that in this particular case both causes are intertwined. In other
words, that not only is the disease itself ill-defined, but also, and more surprisingly,
the gross deformity, which constitutes the most glaring aspect of the disease, is hailed
as a sign of genius.
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Modern historical analyses regarding the rise of subjectivity take the age of
Enlightenment as the period at which the disease took its toll on Western societies. It
is in the writing of authors of this period, the historical events, and the tremendous
changes which occured in social and political thought, that they locate and identify the
symptoms bringing the whole disease into being. However, must not one remember
that the very origins of the disease do not necessarily lie in what manifests itself, but
rather in what is hidden? Must not one ask the question of why have these symptoms
been generated, as well as to the nature of the reasons underlying their growth.
Indeed one must. Otherwise, whatever cure is administered, the results run the risk of
either exacerbating the situation, or becoming completely ineffective.
Alarmed at hearing of disease and of symptoms, the questions crowd in our
minds and answers as to the nature of this nameless socio-political disease must be
given. For Horkheimer, the modern subject is suffering from a deep loss of self and
of purpose.3 For Marcuse, modern society in general and the individual in particular
is suffering from "irrationality." Foucault sees modern individuals as aphasiac,
suffering from a severe cerebral affection.4 Maclntyre's modern individual is an
emotivist5 whose ethical judgments are based upon an arbitrary subjective decision
rather than being socially founded. For Weber it is the mechanising hand of
bureaucracy which takes away the original human identity, reducing it to a mere
function, causing it to be "disenchanted." These are but a few of the names given to
this disease. However, in so defining the dilemma of the contemporary individual,
these authors appear to have based their critiques on Enlightenment rationality and its
influence on socio-political organisation. Although the neglect of other symptoms
does not, to any extent, discredit the work of the authors mentioned, it is the object of
this Part to point to the presence of symptoms which were overlooked, i.e. the
development of the essence of 'subjectivity' in Renaissance Humanism and in
nineteenth century Romanticism. The neglect of the "stalk" (Humanism and
Romanticism) to the benefit of the big "ear" (Enlightenment) occurs because the
knowledge of the former's presence is taken as a given, the study of which will add
nothing significant to the whole. In this case, the study of Renaissance Humanism
and nineteenth century Romanticism are viewed as either preliminary6 or subsequent7
to the Enlightenment.
Even as a preliminary, the Renaissance could not be stripped of its glaring
importance in the formation ofmodern subjectivity. It was indeed in the Renaissance
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that humanity first awakened and came to regard itself as the centre of the universe,
the beginning and end of all things. The Renaissance saw humanity emancipate itself
from all previous relations of bondage. It attempted this liberation with regards to
God, the community and the immediate world. To do so it escaped its reality and
looked to the heavens, turned all its previous limits, even death, into infinite space in
which its keen and curious mind could roam. The process of self-emancipation was
based upon one of self-recognition. In the writings of Humanists (Platonist and
Aristotelean) are presented the theories which gave rise to modernity's conception of
the world, and its own place within it. Therein lies expression of the "ultimate"
condition of human liberty as self-emancipation and expansion. Similarly, although
the Romantic movement acquired much of its grounding of the definition of
subjectivity in terms of 'creation' through the application of science and Enlightenment
rationality, it nevertheless maintained the Humanist belief that humanity can only be
free as long as it is capable of creation. Furthermore, to overlook the Renaissance as
simply 'preliminary' to the great event makes the understanding of the Romantic
period more problematic, for it neglects to specify the context within which
subjectivity has come to be defined as creation. It is interesting to note that socio¬
political critics' disregard for the Humanist and Romantic periods may be associated
with the fact that these movements were often considered 'literary' and 'artistic' rather
than socio-political and philosophical.
This Part of this thesis contends that a closer study of Renaissance and
Romantic definitions of subjectivity is crucial to the understanding of the signs of
'irrationality' manifested in modern society, thereby rendering them less 'irrational'.
Modern and postmodern analyses of the crisis of reason, when neglecting the study of
Renaissance and Romantic philosophy, define modern society in an arbitrary manner
thereby undermining the validity of their arguments. An example of this is present in
the work of Alasdair Maclntyre as well as many of the postmodernists. Maclntyre
contends that the crisis of modern society is to be found in the Kantian theory of
ethical self-determination, which he immediately identifies as the project of the
Enlightenment;8 the postmodernists, on the other hand, believe that Enlightenment
reason has led to the eclipse of subjectivity.9 Maclntyre believes that subjectivity is an
Enlightenment invention, the presence of which has brought on the dissolution of
socially expressible morality;10 whereas the postmodernists claim that the
Enlightenment has failed in providing the conditions necessary for the actualisation of
subjectivity and freedom.11
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This Part defines the origin and essence of liberty in the works of Renaissance
Humanists and Romantics. In Chapter I, it presents the development of this theory of
liberty in three spheres: Infinity (God/Church), Finitude, and Science, arguing that the
Humanist project of liberty was incapable of becoming an actuality without facing its
own self-annihilation. This occurred as Humanist philosophy became the
fundamental ideology lending force to the growing influence and success of science.
The latter provided a material proof of humanity's capacity to be creator, thereby
endowing it with divine status on earth. It will also be argued that the unity which
occurred between the Humanist project of liberty and scientific achievements,
provided the Classical Age with a specific understanding of freedom, basing it upon
the human capacity to actualise its superiority over all living matter through the
application of science. It is upon this definition of freedom that the Enlightenment
came to build its project of subjective self-determination.
Chapter II deals with the Romantic movement, defining it as a literary and
generally artistic movement seeking to overcome the socio-politically levelling effects
of the French Revolution through a return to Humanist ideals and Renaissance
philosophy. It contends that all theories of 'creation', whether artistic, scientific or
literary sought to re-introduce the idea that not all individuals are equal, as leaders of
the French Revolution advocated, and that this inequality is not quantitative but
qualitative; in other words, that individuals are distinguished from one another in
terms of their capacity to 'create', a capacity which would elevate them to the position
of being 'subject/creator', i.e. divine. Criticism of Romanticism will be the focus of
Chapter I of Part II, mainly found in the work of G.W.F. Hegel who pointed out the
impossibility of the achievement of such a definition of subjectivity, demonstrating
that subjectivity does not necessarily imply 'creation', but is itself an activity which
ultimately permits each individual, whether artist, scientist or other, to express a self-
identity in society.
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Chapter I: Humanism and the Definition
of Subjectivity
This chapter presents the process through which Humanism developed its
definition of the project of liberty. It seeks to establish the presence of two roads
taken toward the achievement of this freedom. The first is that of the Platonist and
neo-Platonist philosophers, the second that of the Aristoteleans. It argues that
freedom in the world made necessary the convergence of the two which resulted in a
specific fusion between spirituality and matter. To this end, the chapter is divided in
five sections. Section one establishes the break with the Church, a moment which
brought about the first signs of the dissolution of community and the establishment of
the presence of individualism. Section two describes the dilemma faced by
Renaissance individuals, once separated from Church, who were forced to shoulder,
for the first time, the responsibility for their actions in the world. Section three
provides the philosophical elements that united the search for freedom in terms of the
Humanist movement and the progress of science, a unity which found itself rooted in
the need for Humanism to 'actualise' its project for freedom in-the-world. Section
four asks questions concerning the legitimacy of science as means toward the
founding of freedom as subjectivity (i.e. actualised freedom). Section five shows
that in spite of its claim to value-neutrality, scientific progress aimed, nevertheless, to
provide humanity with a grounding of its own capacity to self-determination. In
conclusion, the question of whether contemporary philosophical claims against
scientific rationality and reason are justified is asked, i.e. whether science itself has
'dehumanised' humanity, the answer to which, it is argued, is ultimately found in the
nature of the Humanist project for freedom.
Freedom From Church
In the philosophy of Plato, Renaissance philosophers found a new way of
thinking of humanity, society and the cosmos; all came to be defined in structural
terms. Plato's metaphysics suited Christian thought insofar as it posited itself as
transcendental in nature, based on the concept of the 'two worlds', the invisible 'real'
world of perfect Forms and the imperfect, phenomenal world , a merely material and
poor copy of the original. In the Symposium and Phaedrus Plato, in the mystic
pursuit of ideal beauty, developed an ethic which equated knowledge and virtue,
"preached passive resistance to violence, selfish obedience to Reason, other-
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worldliness and the active pursuit of the Good,"12 the last two being formulated in
the Apology and Gorgias. In the Republic and Euthyph.ro, Plato opposed the
multiplicity of the Greek Gods and substituted for them the one God from the
Timaeus13 who unites the world of Forms and the inner human soul.
Plato's Timaeus celebrates the wisdom of humanity in the well proportioned
individual. The well-balanced individual is in harmony with nature, and the circular
movement of the perfectly spherical world is also present in the human mind. The
four earthly elements (earth, air, fire, and water) are reflected in humanity's
fluctuating humour. The well-proportioned individual is made of three faculties:
Reason is lodged in the head, the spirited element sits in the heart and Appetite is in
the belly.14 Balanced humanity has Reason direct its spirit, which in turn controls the
Appetite. In the Republic Plato demonstrates how these three elements are also lodged
in the state, the body of which must be ruled as one would one's own. The rulers (or
philosopher Kings), the warriors and the populace correspond and function in terms
of the same descending hierarchy Plato identifies in the human body. Thought of in a
larger context, the tripartite structure of the universe fits in easily with the Christian
understanding of the order of Being where God, humans, the animals and inanimate
world make up the descending hierarchy in terms of spiritual existence. It is in the
Republic that Plato captured the Christian imagination and gave them a doctrine of
Forms in which they found the possibility of attaining an understanding of God. For
it is in this doctrine that the philosopher King, who is head of the hierarchy, appears
capable of realising his purpose which demands the desire for knowledge of the whole
truth and of reality; this finality can only be achieved in the knowledge of the essential
Forms and not in the world of appearances.
The doctrine of Forms makes very clear the distinction between phenomena
and Idea. Both elements belong to separate worlds; only the pure Idea is capable of
sheding 'light' on the 'truth' underlying all phenomena. This distinction is seen by
Martin Heidegger to have become muddled; both worlds have become
indistinguishable due to the positing of the Idea in the Sun in Plato's Allegory of the
Cave. For Heidegger, it is with the latter that began the degeneration of Western
thought. This is due to the change that Plato effected and which appeared in the
notion of 'truth' and true knowledge. With Plato 'God' has become a non-
concealment, a truth that is palpable and hence knowable. The passage from the
darkness to the light suggests that the Idea is a form of appearing (Schein).
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"...Everything is concerned with the shining forth of that which appears and with the
rendering possible of its visibility."15 The four levels of non-concealment are
distinguished "only to explain what makes accessible as such that which appears,
visible that which manifests itself."16 As the visibleness and appearing, the Idea
becomes the coming-into-presence of beings (phenomena) as what they are. The Idea
associated with the Sun and the Light loses its non-material, non-phenomenal essence
and is reduced to the realm of whatness, the world of matter.
In Heidegger and Renaissance Humanism,11 Ernesto Grassi sheds new light
on the matter when pointing out the importance of language to the early Italian
Humanists. They are shown to have been aware of this problem of interpretation.18
Grassi argues that it was only after the incorporation of Platonism in Humanist
thought, hence after the translation of Plato into Latin by Marsilio Ficino, that the
Humanists developed a logical theory of metaphysics which brought reason to bear
upon it as its principal element. In Grassi's view "Ficino's translation of Plato at the
end of the fifteenth century and the speculative metaphysical Platonism and Neo-
Platonism which it triggered led to a break with the Humanist approach to
philosophy."19
The importance of Grassi's study lies in his presentation of the preoccupation
of the Humanists with language and more importantly poetic language. Grassi points
out that Humanism's approach to the study of humanity and the world is "not dealt
with ... by means of a logical speculative confrontation with traditional metaphysics,
but rather in terms of the analysis and interpretation of language, especially poetic
language."20 Comparing themselves with Homer whose poetry filled the function of
history and philosophy, the Humanists attached themselves to poetic activity; its
creativity provided an immediate view of situations in order to teach their meaning for
the future of the community. The Humanists saw the Poets as "creators in the highest
measure because of the directness of their language,"21 and what they were capable of
pointing out. The poetic language of the Humanists was "directed to an
'unhiddenness' in which an emperor, institutions, the future of a country and of a
community"22 appeared.
Grassi's argument points to two important issues. That the Humanists, long
before Ficino translated Plato's work, were aware of the relation in language between
"the word and object, between verba and res'," an awareness beside which "stands the
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insight that only in and through the word (Verbum) does the "thing" (res) reveal its
meaning."23 This use of language, which Grassi defines as lacking in any "logical
relationship between thing and thought or...logical truth,"24 helps establish an
understanding of how the Platonic Idea has come to be understood as a whatness, a
perceivable 'Form'. Insofar as a word "reveals" the "thing," then the Idea must reveal
a perceivable spirit; a thingness or whatness is, therefore, immediately associated with
the Idea.
The second point is based on the equation Grassi makes between the poet and
the philosopher. Grassi's association of the two is identical to the claim the Sophists
and professional reciters of the Homeric poems present in the Republic. To this claim
Plato answers that "if wisdom is to be gained only through knowledge of the real
world of Forms disclosed by Dialectic, the claim that the poet can educate mankind to
virtue must be as hollow as the pretence that the artist knows all about shoemaking
because he can paint a life-like picture of a shoemaker."25 In Homeric poetry,
knowledge cannot be gained through the study of the portraits of heroic characters
"anymore than we can leam how to drive a chariot or conduct a campaign from his
descriptions of a chariot-race..."26 Plato's attack on the artists can be traced in the
Apology where Socrates' examination of the poets shows them to work "not with
conscious intelligence, but from inspiration, like seers and oracle-mongers who do not
understand the meaning of the fine language they use."27 Here Grassi's definition of
the Humanist poet and his understanding of language fits remarkably well with Plato's
definition of an artist. This resemblance shows that the Humanist poets were, in their
thought and their understanding of humanity and the world, capable neither of proper
interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of Forms nor of making the distinction between
essence and existence. It also puts in question Heidegger's attack on Plato. One may
contend that it was not Plato's allegory of the cave which made the direct association
of the Spirit with matter, but more precisely it was the interpretation of the allegory by
the Humanists which was responsible for such an association.
The Humanists' interpretation of Plato is significant insofar as it allowed them
to escape liturgical control through the association of God with universal matter. By
doing so they were capable of reappropriating all the facets in human life abandoned
by the theologians. Both, the Renaissance thinker and the new bourgeois, were
overwhelmed by their new responsibilities, and their accomplishment meant an
affirmation of a new power. Humanity's new fortunate position demanded an
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affirmation in the heart of the theory of Creation, a positing of the self in the universe
in order to join God and attain perfect liberty. This self-positing took on, especially
with the Platonic Humanists, a Godly status.28 The Humanists' call for such a
recognition is most poignantly stated by Marsilio Ficino, a statement which illustrates
the intended 'misinterpretation' of Plato's philosophy:
Man forces himself to remain in the mouth of men for the
entire future, (...) He suffers from not having been
honoured by the whole past, by all nations, by all the
animals (...). He measures the earth and the sky, scrutinises
the depths of the Tartar, and the sky does not seem to him
too high, nor does the centre of the earth too deep (...). And
because he knew the order of the heavens and what moves
these heavens and where they go, and their dimensions and
their products, who can deny that he has almost the same
genius as the author of the heavens, and that in a certain
manner he can himself create them? Man does indeed not
want a superior or an equal; he absolutely does not tolerate
that there should be above him some empire of which he is
excluded. This condition is that of God alone. Like God he
forces himself to command everywhere. Like God he forces
himself to be always ,29
Freedom From Finitude
Regardless of the number of heavens the Humanists were capable of reaching
in poetry, their liberty from the Church was undermined by their own nature, i.e.
humanity's original sin, with which it could never return to heaven. The realisation of
this impediment made them shift their attention from the emancipation from the
Church, to their own self-emancipation. According to Agnes Heller the awakening of
humanity in the Renaissance consisted of a dynamic activity which held in its sway a
plurality of human values. This resulted from a disintegration of the unity of the 'ideal
man' into a 'concept of man' and an 'ideal of man'. The first was founded on the idea
of depravity, the second on grace. The contradictions which ensued from this
combination could not but promote a human activity which sought endlessly to acquire
grace and shun depravity. To do so, Renaissance individuals emerged as seekers of
their own private salvation; their methods of achievement were guided by a
"philosophy...[which] came to derive all morally positive action from self-love (and
altruism), from rational egoism, or from the categorical imperative."30
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This shift presented a new type of self-emancipation: the transformation of the
self. Regarding this possibility Giordiano Bruno writes:
Let us put in order the heaven that intellectually lies within us
(che intellectuallemente e detro di noi) - and then that visible
heaven that presents itself bodily to your eyes. Let us
remove from the heaven of our mind the bear of roughness,
the arrow of envy, the foal of levity, the dog of evil
calumny, the bitch of flattery; let us ban the Hercules of
violence, the lyre of conspiracy ... the Cepheus of hard
heartedness. When we have thus cleansed our house and
created our heaven anew, then, too, shall reign new
constellations, new influences and powers and new
destinies. Everything depends on this higher world, and out
of contradictory causes must necessarily flow contradictory
effects. Oh we happy ones, we truly blissful ones, if we
only rightly cultivate our minds and our thoughts. If we
want to change our condition, we change our habits; if we
want the former to become good and better, the latter should
not become worse. If we purify the drive within us, then it
will not be hard to pass from this transformation in the inner
world to the reformation of the sensible and outer world.31
There is a double side to Bruno's message. On the one hand, he is anxious to
remind humanity of its own will and its power of transformation on two levels:
spiritual and material. One can perceive a certain urgency in his message, an
impatience to make humanity realise the power of transformation within itself - that it
is not a static object, not an achieved and complete 'given', but a live, changing soul
capable of self-transformation. On the other hand, there is also a message of warning:
if this will to self-transformation is not put to use, is not recognised, is ultimately not
applied or applicable, then change may not take place. Liberty has to come from
within before any type of freedom in the world can be realised. Here, the world is
seen as the mirror of the soul, a reflection of its nature.
Bruno's understanding of liberty developed in what Isaiah Berlin calls "the
positive sense" of liberty. Berlin defines it as "the wish on the part of the individual
to be his own master." Such an individual often wishes to be "the instrument of" his
"own, not other men's, acts of will;" "to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by
reasons, by conscious purposes"32 which are his own and not by causes lying outside
him. This is a liberty guided by reason; the free exercise of reason upon the self with
the purpose of transforming it frees the individual. Freedom here consists in the
transformation of the self, mentally, and, if necessary, even physically in order for the
individual to be free, at any cost, from outside interference. Humanity overrides its
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desires, passions, etc. through the application of reason in order to control and know
its own self.
This doctrine is, of course, not Christian. In the eyes of the Church,
individuals are born depraved and all personal choices are bad and sinful. The good
choice is always what is made by God. Humanity is, in the philosophy of Saint
Augustine, a prisoner of its earthly body, it can only be set free through its union with
God which may only be achieved upon its death. The earth itself is a loathsome
prison upon which only depravity can flourish. Wherefrom has liberty as self-
transformation emerged? Although Bruno was writing after the Reformation, this
tremendous event took action against the 'glorification of man' by reducing him even
further. The answer to the question lies of course in antiquity.
The theory of liberty as self-knowledge was formulated by the early
Platonists, one of whom is quoted as saying with astonishment "men have all the
desire to lead the best life, they all know that life's sole organ is the soul...,
nevertheless, they do not cultivate it (animum suum non colunt). And although who
ever wants to have piercing eyesight must take care of his eyes whose function it is to
see; if one wants to be quick in running, one must take care of the feet whose function
it is to run ... This goes for all the bodily parts ... This all men see clearly and with no
difficulty; also I have grown tired of asking myself with legitimate astonishment why
do they not also perfect their soul with the help of reason (cur non etiam animum
suum ratione excolante)."33 For the Epicureans the principle of philosophy must be
considered as the permanent exercise of the care for the self. The same principle is
picked up by Seneca who states "just as a serene sky is not liable to a brighter clarity
for, as it is continually being swept, it is endowed with splendour that nothing can
sully; so is the man who watches over his body and soul (hominis corpus animumque
curantis), and builds in the midst of one and the other the weft of felicity, finds
himself in a perfect state and of fulfilled desires, as long as his soul remains free of
agitation and his body free of suffering."34
For Epictetus as for Aristotle before him, humanity is separated from animality
through the power of its reason, a power which ought to be used in order to control
and dispose of its other faculties. It is indeed the only power which is capable of
undertaking its own 'self as an object of study.35 The perfection of one's soul
through reason is a law which applies and is necessary to every individual. It is,
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however, not a law imposed from without, but one which is applied from within. It is
a morality which "demands again and always that the individual should subject the self
to a certain 'art de vivre' defining the aesthetic and ethical criteria of existence;" this is
no longer a social or communal law, but it is an art "which refers itself more and more
to the universal principles of nature or of reason to which all should commit in the
same manner, regardless of their status."36
The exercise of this type of liberty remained active in the Renaissance and
could be traced to Montaigne who wrote close to two and a half centuries after
Petrarca, father of Italian Humanism. Like the classical hermits who went into exile to
discover God, Montaigne went into seclusion to find himself. But Montaigne's tower
was also his library. Montaigne , as Dupront suggested, "looked for himself in the
given experience of antiquity," for he solemnly believed that man was capable of "self
making in the knowledge of the other." But further than that, what appeared in the
Humanist tradition was the idea that Humanity was self generating, that "man was
born of man, and the creation from another creation."37 It was with the appearance of
this notion that the Humanist deliberately broke ties with medieval Christian values,
replacing them with the supreme value of the 'reborn man'. The call upon the past has
here been used as an instrument to break the hold of traditions which congealed time.
The present is saved from its past captivity, it acknowledges itself as the present by
evoking the past. The consciousness of what was brings to consciousness what is; it
adds a new dimension; even more importantly, the restitution of the consciousness of
the past brings about the hope of a different future.38 Renaissance 'selfhood' has
come to see its own image reflected in the heros of the past; its own worth rose as it
sought to walk in the footsteps of the great figures in antiquity.
Actualisation of Freedom
The discovery of the philosophy of antiquity prepared, and aided to a great
extent, the development of the theoretical processes needed to emancipate the
individual from Christian medieval traditions; however, how did this appear on the
social and communal level? According to Gusdorf, "from Petrarca to Montaigne there
developed a long investigation of man on man, which was in the same time a
conquest of man by man."39 This long investigation and conquest came into being as
a result of the struggle which ensued from the dissolution of the ideal of man and its
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effects on the nature of social interactions. Humanity's perfected 'self was, of
course, not identical to every other as theory would have it; the contradiction between
the liberty of the 'one' expressed in the society of the 'many' entailed a long history of
social struggle from Renaissance Italian Republics to modern democracies.
Medieval Christianity's demand that grace be the responsibility of the
individual developed a shift from all that was communal to all that was private in the
Renaissance. The stress on the dynamism of the individual was linked to the atrophy
of social values, exaggerating the tension which existed between individuals and
society. Custom was wholly separated from ethics, so that social ties were no longer
based on a system of virtues, such as the Athenian virtues which were considered as a
social duty, but were ethical elements which demanded far reaching individual
decisions. Custom developed into a set of stereotypes which regulated conduct in all
its details, creating tremendous tension between the possibility of freedom and the
kind of freedom that really existed. Custom became a sum of social 'characters' that
had no other function but to introduce the individual to a set of rules which were no
longer defined by a traditional moral concept, but merely indicated the function of
one's given role or character. Agnes Heller argues that as a result of the growing
social and technical division of labour the stereotypes became numerous, while
involving individuals less and less, and increasingly building up the personality in a
variety of often contradictory stereotypes. To Heller, "people not only ceased to think
of the content of demands which these stereotypes made, but also about the way they
applied them. Custom because of its mechanical character always 'gives up' and
becomes helpless in the face of new phenomena."40
This shift in responsibility from community to individual brought with it
several changes in individuals' attitude toward society which took on various forms.
In the field of ethics and social norms there developed a twofold split in tradition. On
the one hand, there was an exaggerated emphasis on various ethical practices which
demanded that their development be expressed into concrete systems ofmorals, which
maintained values that were not objective, but very much partial, local and customary.
These 'values' came under the influence of the members of the social strata who
adopted those which corresponded to their various interests, exacerbating the tension
already present on the socio-political level. On the other hand, there appeared a
general human attitude bound up with certain abstract norms (fragments of abstract
traditional values), where, unlike traditional prescriptive values defined by society,
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individuals chose on the basis of certain positive ethical attitudes the right values by
which to abide in their active life. As a result, the social norm developed into a unity
of heterogeneous principles, the value content of which tended to be contradictory,
acting as hindrance rather than achievement of a unified goal. Social custom was not
considered as hindrance because "in and of itself it is bad or wrong, but because it has
become bad, become wrong, for developing reality had pulled the carpet from under
it."41
Renaissance society's traditional values crumbled in the face of the 'dynamic'
activity of individuals, and its social modes of conduct were thrown into complete
disorder. Traditional values such as 'courage' and the 'good' took on completely new
and individualistic meaning. The traditional virtue of 'courage,' defined in
Aristotelean ethics as a mode of social integration, came to be understood as "civil
courage."42 It defined the ability to hold one's own against 'social degeneration' by
respecting and acting according to one's private principles. The 'good,' defined by
Plato as the impalpable 'truth' and by Aristotle as the social 'end', became what is
merely possible. According to Geronimo Cardano, the pursuit of ethical life does not
take on a social telos, rather it finds its expression within the possibility of each
individual. For Cardano: "I determined upon a course of life for myself, and in this
my purpose was not single or constant...; I acted as seemed advantageous when each
occasion arose."43 Cardano's doctrine implies that one may know what is good, but
that one must act according to what is possible. Here the 'good' took on not only the
limits of possibility, hence diminishing the need for constant striving toward a higher
ethical achievement, but also indicated that the good is what one acknowledges as
one's own and not that of the community as a whole. The customary demands of the
community became external demands on individual 'ends', and did not necessarily
coincide with the 'good' one has chosen. The unity of the ethical within the
community dissolved into a plethora of "mutually contradictory systems of value and
into a variety of interpretations of individual virtues, again often mutually
contradictory."44
The dissolution of the communal fabric and the traditional code of ethics
occurred as a shift from the community to the universe took place. The wider context
within which the human soul came to find itself demanded in return a wider
community to contain it. The universal soul became, with the coincidental discovery
of the new world and of the route to India, the dweller of boundless and distant
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shores. The great geographical and cosmological discoveries succeeded and no doubt
followed the example of the discoveries made in the spiritual life. It was two centuries
after Petrarca's ascent to Mount Ventoux in 1336 that Mercator sketched in 1539 his
first map of the world.45 Also, in 1543 appeared with striking coincidence
Copernicus' De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium and Vesale's De Corporis Humani
Fabrica-f6 these publication signified the beginning of modern inquiry on the
universal and human bodies. However, this shift added to the tension already present
in a 'self that was in search of an identity, and whose form, although present, was
not readily nor easily actualisable. The anatomy of the body acted, for a short period,
as the provider of certainty about human nature, but left the soul to dwell in confusion
and self-negation.
Contradictions seem to abound in the Humanist project. To begin with, liberty
from God can only be achieved through an understanding of the absolute and the
transcendence of the infinity posited in it. Nicholas Cusanus' theory of the finite and
infinite places them theoretically on the same level of ontological reality, thereby
reducing heaven to matter, rendering it perceivable and knowable. This relativity is
dangerous when linked with the theory of liberty, for the finite is, here, theoretically
capable of breaking away from its subordination to the infinite. The latter, although
reduced to the former, remains to dwell in the realm of the absolute. A curious
position is generated: the infinite is reduced to knowledgable and perceivable finitude,
and the finite is elevated to the level of the absolute by its very knowledge of infinity.
Needless to say, the liberty of the finite from the infinite through the knowledge of the
latter can only be an illusion: the finite can never join the infinite, body cannot become
spirit unless its very being is altered; i.e. if the finite be no more, hence, if humanity is
essentially dehumanised.
The unification of human nature with the Christian God entails one more
element, the power of knowledge, or reason. As the infinite is reduced to the finite
universal, God is seen as the great "watchmaker" whose genius can be duplicated
through the knowledge of how the "watch" works. As soon as humanity is capable of
understanding the "mechanics" of nature, it is able to become the perfect replacement
of God on earth. Reason is seen here as the human faculty capable of grasping the
universe with all its mysteries and reducing it to knowable, controllable matter.
Through reason it outshines all other living matter, and because of it, is capable of
mounting upon the universal throne. However, this is a reason which seeks
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individual liberty, and cannot through this telos join the universal.
Liberty as self-knowledge and self-transformation encounters problems on a
different level. The emancipation from the traditionally set code of ethics and the
development of the Stoic doctrine of the culturing of the self proves to be problematic
on several counts. The purpose of the reflection of the self for the Stoics is that of self
control, self-purification and rational command over irrational forces of the passions.
Renaissance humanity adopted the method to attain a spiritual existence which
surpasses matter and joins with the universal. Its purpose is that of self-evasion, a
flight from the body to join an already reified spirit. The problem, however, becomes
exacerbated as the social unity of the community is unravelled. In this context, the
cultivation of the self serves no social purpose, no outside end but that of self-
glorification. For the Epicureans and the Stoics the cultivation of the self took on a
social, as well as a personal function. For Marcus Aurilius, the practice of peering
into his soul is made for the purpose of understanding the soul of the humblest
individual through the action of depriving himself of food and drink; such an
understanding is meant to show the ruler the road to wisdom and to justice.
Renaissance humanity's purpose of self-cultivation does not concern itself with the
affairs of the community; rather, like Montaigne in his library, the cultivated seeks
self-knowledge insofar as it permits the identification of Godly qualities within the
human soul. The affairs of the community must be resolved according to precepts of
reason which are universal, and hence, identical in every individual. In this context,
the community becomes, like the universe, the circle which revolves around the point.
This type of liberty is what we have inherited and what Isaiah Berlin considers
as impossible to achieve. For Berlin, to define liberty according to the precept of a
"subjective reason" is to run the risk of achieving the opposite: either an internal or an
external form of despotism. Internally, the subject is able to convince itself that it is
free by teaching itself not to desire what it cannot in reality achieve. Externally, states
Berlin, "if a tyrant (or hidden persuader) manages to condition his subjects (or
customers) into losing their original wishes and embrace (internalize) the form of life
he has invented for them, he will, on this definition, have succeeded in liberating
them. He will, no doubt, have made them feel free-as Epictetus feels freer than his
master (and the proverbial good man is said to feel happy on the rack)."47 But, Berlin
observes, "what he (the tyrant) has created is the very antithesis of political
freedom."48 Berlin joins Hegel in recognising that as long as the action undertaken by
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the individual does not ensue from the individual's conscious determination to act
according to an understanding of the Form in which the subjective will is the
particular, then the individual cannot be considered as expressing free agency.
Berlin is pointing out a problem which was already prominent in antiquity: the
distinction made by Plato in Gorgias between virtue and Techne. Plato's distinction
was directed against the Sophists who claimed that the individual who possessed
virtue was necessarily the one who succeeded in public life. For Protagoras, in order
to acquire virtue or success, one should learn Techne, the craft, or skill of public
oration in order to mould one's hearers successfully. Hence, for the Sophists virtue
was not the possession of wisdom, justice, courage and temperance, but the capacity,
the oral skill to effect a favourable response from the hearers. Moreover, virtue itself
is not associated with the human qualities of virtue, but merely with the degree of
success amassed in society. Similarly, the Renaissance theory of liberty aimed to
acquire for the individual the noble and magnanimous capacity of God through its
skill; its capacity to effect a favourable reaction from nature (through the knowledge
of its laws) allowed it to raise its own worth in the eyes of humanity to heavenly
heights.
The Sophists' relativism has its equivalent in the theory of perception which
guides the Renaissance understanding of reason, and hence an individual's possibility
to acquire liberty. The 'truth', the Idea, the works of God, as well as God Himself
have all become perceivable and knowable through reason. Reason is, therefore,
relativist; what is "rational" for me is what I have seen as being the works of God, and
hence it is the only truth and must therefore become universal. To convince you, the
public, of this truth, I must use all my skill to demonstrate the revelation I have
received from God and it must be perceivable. It is small wonder that magic,
astrology, and mythology were highly appreciated and believed in the Renaissance;49
science proved to be the most efficient Techne of all.
Berlin pronounces the impossibility of an achievement of a liberty based upon
a 'positive' conception because the premise upon which it bases this liberty does not
and cannot hold as "liberty in the world." Self-transformation according to the
precepts of reason can only hold when reason itself is a moral, social and political
practice, i.e. based in the world and invariable. Therefore, reason, to be the
representative of any type of liberty, must be social in character; for in its relativist
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state it will force the many to seek 'self-transformation' in order to adapt to what the
few find as "rational" and "universal." It becomes the duty of the many to repress any
signs of "irrationality" by moulding their 'self to the precepts of applied 'reason'. A
multitude of questions are bound to be raised at this point. First and foremost, in
view of the hopelessness of Humanism's actualisation of this liberty, how has the
concept of universal reason succeeded in remaining operative in the present day? In
other words, if the concept of reason is indeed "relativist" and not "universal", why
has it survived to the present day? And consequently, how can one pretend to call
Humanist project of liberty a failure? These are the questions addressed in the
following.
Freedom or Servitude? Science's Victory over Philosophy
Cries against the 'destructive ' power of science range from purely
metaphysical concerns, such as the complaints put forward by Heidegger, to socio¬
political issues such as those concerning its "dehumanising" effects.50 The major
problem for which science has been held responsible is clearly stated by Alexandre
Koyre:
Yet there is something for which Newton -or better to say
not Newton alone, but modern science in general- can still be
made responsible: it is the splitting of our world in two. I
have been saying that modern science broke down the
barriers that separated the heavens and the earth, and that it
united and unified the universe. And that is true. But, as I
have said, too, it did this by substituting for our world of
quality and sense perception, the world in which we live,
and love, and die, another world - the world of quantity, of
reified geometry, a world in which, though there is place for
everything, there is no place for man. Thus the world of
science -the real world became estranged and utterly
divorced from the world of life, which science has been
unable to explain- not even to explain away by calling it
"subjective".
True, these worlds are everyday -and even more and more-
connected by the praxis. Yet for theory they are divided by
an abyss.
Two worlds: this means two truths. Or no truth at all.
This is the tragedy of the modern mind which "solved the
riddle of the universe," but only to replace it by another
riddle: the riddle of itself.51
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Koyre's comment reveals the distinction between quality and quantity and
assigns them to two worlds, two truths. It holds science responsible for the
domination of one world over the other, and distinguishes between theory and
practice. However, it does not specify how the unity of these distinctions has come
about, i.e. how they fit together, and how they have come to alienate one from one's
self? Moreover, it does not define the nature of these two worlds, nor how they have
come to be separated? If modern science is responsible for their creation what unity
have they had? To answer these questions one must first answer the following: if
modern science is, as Arnold Brecht proposes,52 value-free then how has it succeeded
in the destruction of the harmony of Koyre's unified world by reducing it to two
opposing worlds? What is being put in question here is not simply the nature of the
effect science has had on the world, but how and why science has come to develop
such a polarised world.
Modern evaluations of the problems of dehumanisation and human alienation
from the world find in science the immediate culprit, and are happy to deploy all their
metaphysical arguments to demonstrate the pitiful state to which modern
consciousness has been reduced. These evaluations make grand statements in
discussing modern problems, but give, despite their own efforts, signs of
despondency.53 Through their analyses they often arrive at the conclusion that, given
the value-free status of science, the modern use of science as a finality in and for itself
appears irrational. This irrationality is deduced from a comparison between Greek
teleology and modern reason. Modern reason, scientific and value-free, appears as a
pure instrument for an undefined purpose. It is my intention to demonstrate that
science, contrary to the modern popular view, is indeed in possession of a value, a
finality which is none other than the Humanists' project of liberty.
This, of course, is an ambitious project. However, having already provided a
definition of the nature of the Humanists' theory of liberty, this section will point out
the inter-relatedness of the philosophical elements, both Classical and Medieval,
which permitted the fusion between the Humanist theory of liberty and Science. The
following will first outline the elements found in Classical Greek philosophy, both
Platonist and Aristotelean, which found their way into Medieval theology and its view
of the world, and second, it will illustrate how these elements became manifestly the
basis upon which Renaissance theory of liberty was established.
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The discussion of the emancipation of Renaissance consciousness from God
presented Plato's philosophy as the medium of this process, but neglected to make
explicit the relationship which existed between Greek philosophy and the concerns of
the Medieval Christians. Unlike the contention held by Grassi, Platonic and
Aristotelean philosophy entered into Christian theology much earlier than Ficino's
translation of Plato (although this marked the height in the formulation of the
Humanist project) through the commentaries of Muslim and Jewish philosophers.54
This is clear, since it is found in Petrarca's writings severe criticism of the
interpretations the Muslim philosophers made of Aristotelean philosophy.55 It is
therefore necessary that a study of how Christian theology adopted the Classics be
presented, if only schematically, in order to shed light on the elements connecting
Humanist thought (Platonist and Neo-Platonist) and scientific thought (mainly
Aristotelean, but containing traces of Platonism).
In the Timaeus Plato introduced the myth of the creation of the world. There,
he explained how the highest God after having mixed in a crater the two elements to
form the earth, the same and the other -hence the ideal unchanging and the
phenomenal transient- came to shape the soul of the world. Both elements of the
world revolved in circular and elliptical fashion, thereby defining it. All other gods,
whether celestial or earthly, were placed in a hierarchical fashion with the Ideal as
supreme, the Spirit and the Appetite followed in a descending order. The phenomenal
world of matter was separated from the Ideal world, and was also lower in status.
The Timaeus had tremendous success in the Middle Ages, inspiring a variety of
literary and scholarly works. Its attractiveness resided mainly in its idea of creation,
upon the concept of the 'two worlds', and especially upon the idea of a unique God, a
perfect God, a generous and kind God. In the Timaeus, the idea of a God-creator
acquired more strength and further conviction. The world appeared as God's own
creation for eternity.
Platonism and Neo-Platonism exercised a naturally attractive force on religious
thought. Both in the Islamic and Christian traditions, Plato's philosophy accentuated
in them the idea of a mystical soul which lay at the source of creation and which
announced a transcendental Good. The One was seen as the transcendence of Being
and of Thought of the Greek philosophers. Plotinus, who was often mistaken for
Plato, held the same beliefs as did St. Augustine. In the Confessions St. Augustine
admitted his indebtedness to Platonic thought for it was with the help of Plato that his
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confused and anguished soul found peace when he saw in the Timaeus the unity of
God; he consequently renounced his belief in the existence of a God of Good and a
God of Evil. The Good of the soul, the eternal Good were all the product of the one
God.
The 'soul' became a common denominator between Platonic thought and
religious beliefs. The medieval Platonist was overwhelmed by the actual
acknowledgement of the soul, "by the fact of being a soul."56 This acknowledgment
spurred on a will to further one's knowledge of it, of one's self; a knowledge in
which the individual found the greatest satisfaction. Just as the soul was at the heart
of the world holding its truth, humanity found the soul in its heart to contain its truth,
its essence. Also, as the soul of the world, the human soul was the most precious and
the highest in value of all other attributes. St. Augustine recommended a return to the
self in order to find God, and find eternal happiness. The 'truth' lodged in the soul
was the 'truth' of God, it was the revelation of God to us and through us. The truth
of God was God himself who lived in the soul, and who was closer to us than we
were, or ever will be, to ourselves. Deutn et animama scire cupicr, for St. Augustine,
to know God was to know one's soul, for the knowledge of the one implied the
knowledge of the other. The human soul was, therefore, the mirror upon which the
image of God was reflected.
However, as in the 'two worlds' of Plato, the soul, the world of ideas was
wholly and completely separated from the body, and could never be united with the
phenomenal real. The soul could guide the body, but was completely independent of
it. Humanity was essentially a mortal body within which a soul was imprisoned. It
was not considered as capable of thought, only the soul was. In spite of this
limitation, the Renaissance theory of liberty did not abandon its purpose, but found a
way in which the actualisation of finite humanity with the universal infinity of God
(i.e. the social expression of God through the eternal soul of the individual) became
literary, and was expressed in all creative arts: in works such as in philosophy and
poetry, and sensually in painting, music and sculpture. Through this medium God
was forever present, forever kindly and good. Humanism's failure consisted in its
incapacity to release the 'un-inspired' and 'un-artistic' humanity from the drudgery of
everyday life, one which was successfully accomplished by the institution of the
Church. On its own, it remained imprisoned in the mould of a spiritual revolt; its
capacity to reform its socio-political life-world was limited to a small sphere.
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Humanity's independence from the Church had to become an actuality, a lived
experience, an expression of its free subjective will through the 'material other'. This
form of Humanist revolt needed the accompaniment of an instrumental reason capable
of transforming the 'world', proving once and for all humanity's privileged status, its
independence and worth.
If Plato attracted to a great extent the theological spirit of the age, Aristotle did
not, until he was 'Christianised' by St. Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle could not attract
the theologians simply because his work did not seek the Ideal, but concentrated on
the real, the tangible. His was scientific knowledge based upon close study of the
physical world. The latter, for the Aristotelean of the Middle Ages, represented the
solidification, the example, the nature of the work of God. Within its folds lay hidden
the secrets of creation, through which the nature of God could be revealed. The world
was seen as a gift from God; once received, it was appropriated and was not to be
wrenched away.57 Unlike the Platonists who turned to their 'souls' to find God, the
Aristoteleans found the nature manifested in His work as the great miracle of creation,
the knowledge of which brought them closer to the 'truth' of creation. Humanity
itself could only discover the soul through contortions of reasoning. Hence, the
knowledge of the spirit was not readily perceivable, rather it could only become a non-
concealment through the employment of reason, as well as through the study of
physical nature in which the spirit might reveal itself. The preoccupation with the
material was also present in humanity's definition of its nature. For the Aristotelean,
one was not a soul imprisoned within a mortal body but, above all else, an individual
-a rational and mortal animal. Aristotle was severely critical of Plato's separation of
body and soul because this conception implied the fracturing of the unity of the
individual. For Aristotle, and those who followed him, an individual was not a
strange and superior being, but an animal, a part of nature albeit, one who possessed a
nature that was placed high in the hierarchy of the world.58
Aristoteleans believe that being-in-the-world and the unity of the individual are
primordial. Every act is an expression of this unity. Action-in-the-world is a form of
acknowledgement of the world and a step toward its understanding. Aristotle's
preoccupation with the unity of the physical world and human nature is fully
demonstrated in the ensemble of his work which covered subjects ranging from
physics and natural sciences to psychology, ethics and metaphysics. There,
knowledge and thought are the product of the unity of the soul with the material.59
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Knowledge starts necessarily from the perception the individual has of the world,
perception which can only come from what the senses reveal to us: in the first
instance, the content of our thought. Perception is the first but primary step in the
process of thinking and knowing. This is merely the first step, for it is up to
individuals to elaborate on sensation. Humanity's power of abstraction, memory and
imagination allows it to go beyond this first step, thereby obtaining scientific
knowledge. In spite of abstraction and pure thought's capacity to take it away from
matter, the relation between the latter and the soul remains primordial (Nihil est in
intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu...). For Aristotle, the Ideas, the spiritual
Forms remain alien to the direct knowledge of the human mind and can only be
conceived of through "abstract reasoning."60 This concealment applies to all spiritual
bodies including the human soul.
An important step in the understanding of the world is found in Aristotle's law
of causality. God, the human soul, and the understanding of all natural phenomena
reside in primary causes. The understanding of God is, therefore, that of the primary
cause for existence of whom all else is now independent.61 The human body, the
soul, and the physical world can be known and explained through reasoning.
Perceptions of the physical world depend on a definite primary cause, which is itself
not caused but given. Also, for every cause there is a finality, an end in and for itself.
The primary cause is the generator that puts in motion a series of effects guided
towards a given end. Each primary element contains its own end within it; just as lies
in the seed the potential to grow a flower which constitutes its end, lies within the
social individual the potential to become a virtuous political animal.
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle fractured the unity of human nature by raising the
value of thought to a higher spectrum.62 This was interpreted by St. Thomas Aquinas
as the idea that if thought came from "outside" it was given by God.63 God created in
us an intellectual agent which is superior to all animals, which constituted us as
'spiritual agents'. Hence, our self-consciousness, metaphysical knowledge and
spirituality explain the separation between body and soul.64 What Aquinas took for
granted was that there was a God of creation, whereas "the God of Aristotle (...), this
God, whose thought was only of himself, and who was unaware of a world he did
not create, was incapable of playing the role assigned to him by St. Thomas. The
Thomist solution presupposed a God creator and a created world. Because it is only
in this world, ... the spiritual individuality, that the human personality is possible.
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This was not the Aristotelean Cosmos."65 Indeed, for Aristotle, the world as physical
nature transcended and founded being, but was neither created nor did it depend on a
creator. Like Plato, the virtues of the soul were distinctly socially teleological.
However, unlike Plato, they were not bound by any Idea, the attainment of which was
not present in the world, but resided in the capacity of each individual to act according
to the best of his/her potential. In this respect, the Platonist world of Forms, of the
perfect mathematical and geometric Ideas appeared in sharp contrast to the Aristotelean
world of matter, the spirituality of which came first and foremost from the physical
world to which it necessarily belonged.
Reappropriation of Matter by Spirit
Due to the development of the Platonist and Aristotelean traditions in the
Middle Ages, the Renaissance found humanity's relationship to nature paradoxical.
On the one hand, Aristotelean philosophers/scientists, such as Paracelsus and Cardano
held that humanity was identical to nature but was reproduced on a smaller scale;
humanity was therefore incapable of learning about itself without learning and
understanding nature. On the other hand, Renaissance Humanist (Neo-Platonist)
philosophy drew a sharp distinction between subject and object, where nature was just
that object. Pico Delia Mirandola, Giordiano Bruno, Carious Bovillus and others held
that freedom and its fullest expression could only be attained when one arrived at what
Pico called "the power of Reason," that of "reflexive knowledge," knowledge of the
self. According to Pico:
it is not being that prescribes once and for all the lasting
direction which the mode of action will take; rather the
original direction of action determines and places being. The
being of man follows from his doing; and his doing is not
only limited to the energy of his will, but rather encompasses
the whole of his creative powers. For all true creativity
implies more than mere action upon the world. It
presupposes that the actor distinguishes himself from that
which is acted upon, i.e. that the subject consciously stands
opposed to the object.66
Here the Socratic virtue of "know thyself" is present, only it has a different
purpose. It is seen as the truth that allows the one who grasps it the mastery, not only
ofmaterial nature, but also, and most importantly, of one's destiny. Human liberation
can only come from the truth found within; the realisation of subjectivity is therefore
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paramount.
This paradoxical relationship gave rise to the development of a dialectical view
of human nature which in turn gave rise to the appearance of a dialectical expression
of freedom. For the Aristoteleans, it brought an identification of humanity and its
intellectual capacities with a material world that could never be reflective, but could
only inspire reflection. Paracelsus' argument claiming that one could learn nothing
from one's self, and that this knowledge emerged from one's immediate surroundings
which provide experience, could only emphasise a belief in the vacuity of the
individual 'self, and a total identification of human capacities with the material.
Kepler, also in his theory concerning the reflection of humanity in nature, claimed that
it was but a reflection of the macrocosm (nature) on the microcosm (individual).67
The Humanist tradition, while keeping in common the same elements (individual,
nature) and a similar theory (microcosm, macrocosm) with the first, perceived
humanity's relationship with nature as not of equality but of superiority. For
Bovillus, the microcosm is the reproduction in thought of the macrocosm, the
structure of the two systems is the same, but while the macrocosm is substantial, the
microcosm is the intellectual mirror of that substantiality. Bovillus states that "the
world has a maximum of substance and a minimum of knowledge. Man has the
minimum of substance, but a maximum of knowledge."68
The significance of these bipolar conceptions lies in their definition of human
nature as such. The Renaissance did not merely celebrate the 'birth' of the individual,
but helped in qualifying and defining human nature and its 'end'. The Aristoteleans
identified human nature with the material objective world; they studied it through the
eyes of scientists qualifying it as a biological entity whose spirit is identical to nature
which Kepler deemed as "mechanically structured." With nature regarded as the
"divine watchworks," its identification gave rise to the assumption that even its
rationality was also 'mechanical'. Humanity in this tradition was reduced to a mere
natural phenomenon whose being could be known through little more than
mechanically applied scientific observation. Its end was also identified with that of
nature: namely, that of continuous regeneration. Here, a teleology of being does not
lie in reason, as the original Aristotelean theory would have it. Renaissance scientists
broke away from Aristotelean social teleology specifically because the type of reason
which they used had a limited material end, and did not delve into socio-political
matters. After Christianity, which placed human teleology in the after-world and the
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day of judgement, reason can only be conceived of as instrumental. For the Christian
scientist, reason had become mechanical, incapable of finality; it could only be used
toward an 'end' which lay outside it. On its own, separated from the Humanist
project of freedom, scientific reason seemed devoid of any spiritual content; it
represented practice without theory, an instrument the practical uses of which were not
known, and was thereby deemed 'useless'.
The Humanist tradition, contrary to the Aristotelean, insisted on making the
distinction between humanity and nature. Not merely content with the distinction
made between humanity as 'subject' and the material world as 'object', it extended it
to claim that human actualisation as subjecthood through action could not materialise
before the individual was made aware of this very distinction.69 Human nature was
seen as departing from its essential being, which it shared with nature as part of its
reality, through the four steps which Bovillus called "esse, vivere, sentire,
intelligere,"10 the last being the accomplishment of 'reflexive knowledge', or self-
consciousness. In this tradition, the individual was a being filled with potentialities,
whose ultimate 'end' consisted in the realisation of self-knowledge, through which the
knowledge of the cosmos may be obtained.
"Reason" in this tradition, "is the power in man by which 'mother nature'
returns to herself;" it is hence the "passage from the' object ' to the 'subject', from
simple 'being' to 'consciousness of self'."71 'Reason' is posited as an 'end';
however, this teleology of 'reason' is no longer that of the Greek polis which is
social, rather, 'reason' is an 'end' that is 'universal'. The universe represents the
unity of nature and of humanity. Humanity no longer appears in nature as a mere part
of the universe, "but as its eye and mirror;" and, indeed, states Bovillus, "as a mirror
that does not receive the images of things from outside but that rather forms and
shapes them in itself."72 It can do so because it is the intelligent expression in nature.
Only humanity can grasp nature's totality in its 'principle' thereby rendering it the very
consciousness wherein nature finds its most eloquent intellectual articulation.
The dynamic nature of Renaissance humanity gave rise to a dynamic concept
of freedom. Although both definitions combine to call for an essential universal
equality of humanity, they define and achieve it differently. In the purely scientific
tradition equality was based on the physical criteria considered as given. Humanity
was seen to be equal in its 'natural constitution' as a living biological being. It was
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thus identified as another expression of a mechanically conceived natural
phenomenon. The Platonists saw it as a subject whose 'divine' nature surpassed
phenomenal nature in its superior intellectual potentialities. Its force resided in its
capacity for 'self-consciousness'; a consciousness of its subjectivity in nature.
Equality lay in the potential, the development of which was left up to the
consciousness of the individual of subjective possibilities; such an individual may, as
Pico so eloquently stated, "degenerate to animality or be reborn towards divinity."
Moreover, unlike the scientific definition, human teleology was not realised in mere
matter, for it was worthy of higher achievement: that of the development of the
superiority of its intellect. Matter could not have been that toward which humanity
aimed, for it lay beneath humanity in value. This was stated by Pico in his criticism of
astrology where he suggested that subjective universal freedom existed when the
determination of human will was the result of its own mind and not effected by any
cosmic influence. According to Pico, as stated by Cassirer:
To accept astrology means to invert not so much the order of
being as the order of value—it means making of 'matter' the
master of spirit.73
This view of astrology emphasises Pico's rejection of the expression of
subjectivity through the material sphere. It appears even more significant when taking
into account the popular view of astrology in Renaissance thought. Astrology
imparted a 'spiritual' character to the stars, and to the effect their movements have on
the constitution and behaviour of each individual, rendering their activity, their effect
on earth and its inhabitants, an act of God, a spiritual rather than a material effect.
Pico's purpose in his rejection of astrology was twofold. He sought to free the
concept of God from its status as the eternal dweller of the cosmos, elevating it to the
realm of impalpable spirit, thereby reducing the stars to their substantial being while
leaving humanity to shoulder the responsibility for its own development, and actions.
Pico maintained that human potentiality develops through its own will and not through
the expression of the material object upon it. Through the consciousness of its
'worth' and 'dignity', humanity should be able to impress its will upon the natural,
and contrary to the Hobbesian individual, its will is innate and superior to the power
of attraction of matter in nature.
Furthermore, in this distinction between 'matter' and 'value' there lies the
germ of the essential conflict between Quality and Quantity as the parameter
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underlying the essence of equality. Pico speaks of value, for in Oration on the Dignity
ofMan he specifically makes the distinction between three stages at which humanity
would find itself, viz. vegetative, animalistic or divine, and joins Bruno in
commenting that it is up to the individual to place the quality of the soul in one of these
stages through the will to exercise the power of reason, the perfection of which places
one with the divine. This distinction is of paramount importance since it provides the
elementary definition of three classes,viz. the common people, the commercial class,
and the intellectual class, which attempt to reflect the three types of 'soul' present in
Plato's Republic.
Both traditions, Platonist and Aristotelean, underwent tremendous changes
toward the end of the sixteenth century when a great spiritual revolution took place.
These may be summarised74 under two major movements. First, there was the
dismantling of the cosmos, i.e., that of its hierarchical and finite Form, and,
consequently, there was the disappearance of all values connected to this system from
scientific thought. Second, there appeared the "geometrisation" of space. The old
hierarchical system of values, dividing the world in two, was replaced by the
Euclidean theory of infinite space, one which was homogeneous and abstract. It
seemed as if in one sweep of the Galilean wand science and spirit came under the
same yoke, revolutionising not only scientific progress, but also, and most
importantly, affirming the realisation of humanity's liberation from matter. The
destruction of the traditional Cosmos meant the sending into infinity, into space, of all
entities, whether human souls or purely material/physical bodies. Finally, the finite
and infinite became united within this vast space; freedom from the 'baseness' of
matter, from its imprisonment, was now attainable.
The end of the sixteenth century saw Johannes Kepler, a fervent Aristotelean,
study Plato's five regular bodies from which he came to formulate a theory explaining
the creation of the world by God. He considered that the distances from the sun
should conform to the hierarchical structure of these bodies. For Kepler, the world
was harmonious, and regular. Kepler's work was a fine example of how Renaissance
scientists combined Aristotle's preoccupation with the material and Plato's God. This
fusion was facilitated by the 'Christianisation' of Aristotle. For through the Thomist
interpretation of Aristotelean thought as the intellectual gift of God, 'reason' for
Aristotle came to equal the 'reified' soul in Plato. Hence, for Kepler being both an
Aristotelean and believing in the cosmic arrangement of Plato was not contradictory,
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for he was using the Godly gift to understand his soul through the study of nature,
which was also God's creation.
Kepler's work contained traces of the union between the animistic and
mechanistic vision of the universe which became characteristic of the Classical Age.
In the Mysterium Cosmographicum , he explained how the planets were moved by the
force of the soul, and claimed that sharing the forces of the souls was also the power
of light and the power of attraction.75 The pre-established mechanism was, once put
into action, sufficient to maintain the correct evolution of the celestial bodies. Kepler
made several discoveries on the irregular rhythm of the movement of the stars and
saw this irregularity to be based upon physical causes. However, he was not capable
of reaching the discovery made by Galileo because his idea of the world was mainly
Aristotelean.76 According to Kepler, the world was finite and was created; his theory
would not admit the supposition of the break with this determined order.
Kepler's discoveries were ferociously attacked by Giordiano Bruno (mainly a
Humanist who, like Copernicus before him, took to mathematics to disprove the
'heretic' Aristoteleans)77 who meant to prove that the world was indeed infinite. He
did so through geometry based on the elaboration of Lucretius' atomic theory which
was expressed in the principle of the 'minima'.78 In spite of his weakness in
mathematics, and his complete ignorance of the Archimedean physics (that movement
was constant in an infinite space), Bruno was able to introduce a theory of the infinity
of the universe based on a geometrical theory of space. The work of Copernicus,
Kepler and Bruno among others, are examples of how neo-Platonist, Aristotelean and
Platonist geometry combined in such a manner that permitted the interpretation of the
discovery of the infinity of space according to Humanist socio-political and spiritual
needs. The fusion of the two spheres of knowledge (philosophical and scientific) into
one scientific movement further separated the individual from the Church, for it
represented the empowerment of the individual on earth thereby reducing his/her need
for clerical guidance.
In the seventeenth century Galileo's work represented the attempt of an entire
"cosmic hierarchy," Christian and Greek, to struggle against its enslaving structure,
and against those social barriers which it instituted. The struggle of which Galileo
inherited the results gave rise to a curious mixture of freedom as the overcoming of the
finite/infinite dichotomy on the one hand, and the actualisation of this freedom in the
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world of matter, on the other. To the first struggle he owed his inspiration, to the
second his method. The result was an astounding liberation from both. His
discoveries proved that the earth was inherently thrown-into infinite space where God
and humanity became intertwined, and the need for religious institutions rendered a
fallacy on both the physical and spiritual planes. There was no doubt in Galileo's
mind as to the nature of his discovery. He was essentially a Platonist who believed
fervently that only those who have studied geometry were capable of true knowledge
of the universe:
And I, I told you, that if someone does not know the truth
by himself, it is impossible for anyone to give to him such
knowledge. In fact, it is impossible to teach these things that
are neither right nor wrong; but the right ones, by which I
mean the necessary things, that is those which cannot be
otherwise, all average spirit either knows them by itself, or
can never learn them.79
Galileo was warning against the dangers that his discovery would eventually
engender. The pretension to the knowledge of truth, the ultimate and unchanging
truth, i.e. the Platonist Idea, was not to be grasped by the average individual, nor
should this pretention exist. In the Dialogue and the Discourses Galileo told of the
story of his discovery, of the kind of language one should use to discover Nature. He
also told of the method, the scientific experiments with which to prove its validity.
Galileo's science had a specific purpose, a value which cannot be denied. In its
finality, it aimed to reach the "truth" which was to liberate humanity.
Similarly, Descartes' work applied the scientific method to prove the certainty
of existence, and based this proof on a distinct relationship between thought and
being. The famous proclamation, "I think therefore I am," implied that thought cannot
be distinct from being, that my existence is certain insofar as I am conscious of my
being in the world. This also extends to the proof of God's existence, for as long as I
think that there is God, and I am conscious of God through my thought as existing,
then God must exist, for I am the mirror and 'being' of God and thought on earth. In
his philosophy, Descartes expresses quite clearly the unity between the humanist
project for liberty from clerical control, and the capacity for science, more precisely
knowledge, to ground this project in reality. For as the individual is able to ascertain
the presence of God through thought, there is no reason for the Church to act as
mediator between individuals and God. Furthermore, the Church can no longer set
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claim to the knowledge of what God wills, for in being the mirror of nature and of
God's creative will, the individual is finally able to interpret God's command and
execute it independently from any religious order.
* * *
In conclusion, a fundamental question is bound to be posed: have the
contradictions pointed out earlier been resolved, and has humanity attained its aspired
liberty? The answer is an ambivalent yes and no.
'Yes' insofar as it freed itself from the Medieval theological view and socio¬
political relations which depended on the Church for the continued existence of a
given type of community, one which seemed to have congealed time and stopped all
types of necessary developments. 'Yes' also insofar as it managed to overcome
material scarcity and through scientific innovations, raise the level of subsistance by
tapping the secrets of nature. 'Yes' insofar as it came to recognise its relationship to
the objective order as existing independently of Church hierarchy and class structure;
also it came to believe in a certain degree of self-worth, and an affirmation of its
originality and creative capacities.
The negation of this self-emancipation lies in the effects of the methods used to
achieve it. Humanity in order to overcome its enslavement came to see itself as the
possessor of a divine, unalterable quality, a 'given' soul which would guide it to the
ends of the earth and beyond, for the divine 'Good' became also its possession. All
the mathematical theories taught in modern schools, of inertia, of infinity, of the laws
of motion, etc... proved this 'given' divinity to all the generations since Galileo and
Newton and continue to do so to the present day. They proved the supremacy of the
human mind, proving existence solely on the power of thought. However, is mere
certainty of existence sufficient to define us in terms of 'magnanimity of soul'? Have
we acquired the Stoic peace of mind by reflecting upon the quality of this inner
'being'; have we become conscious of our true worth through 'reflexive knowledge'?
We did not have to. To reach infinity was our greatest dream, and once
grasped we needed no longer to test this 'divine' soul, for unlike the Stoics' it needed
no cultivation as it held God within, making its actions equal to those of the 'divine'.
In its quest for the ultimate truth, humanity distinguished between those chosen by
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God, those endowed with the 'divine intellect', and those who were condemned to
remain in darkness. Of course, all expression of truth gained plausibility when
manifested in the phenomenal world; for what proof had we of our divinity but the
demonstration of our capacity for creation? Thus perceived, humanity is not
irrational, for it has a reason to which science is catering with great indulgence. It is
rather unconscious, intoxicated by the very brew it has taken as medicine. It is only
now coming to terms with the havoc it wrought on the environment and on society.
The destruction of its own universe lies before it, and it is incapable of reacting, it
looks on with bewilderment and disbelief: How can the 'Good' yield such disastrous
results, it asks itself.
Another question needs to be answered at this point. If in the seventeenth
century the Renaissance theory of liberty has come to affirm its goals in the world,
why has it remained to push for further liberty, why does the modern Western World
seek liberty; have we not succeeded three centuries ago? What else does one need?
An answer to this is present in Isaiah Berlin's analysis of positive liberty.
Renaissance liberty could only be complete through the realisation of self-
consciousness, and the liberation of the soul. True liberty was to be achieved through
the subject and its personal development. As Berlin showed in clear terms, such an
actualisation of freedom succeeded primarily when the subject was completely isolated
from the world. In the world, this freedom was impossible. Here, the contradiction
of the spirit and the material was bound to appear. Subjectivity, as affirmation of
individual will, could not be actualised in-the-world. It became the object of the
household; it defined itself in the individual's freedom to choose personal ethical
principles.80 On the social level, the individual was subjected to the universal laws
pronounced by the laws of reason which were, and remain to be, considered as value
free, incapable of formulating an ought from an is. The struggle for "subjective"
freedom continued. In accepting the Galilean affirmation of its liberty, humanity was
enslaved by the very material it adopted. For in reducing God to the finite, it also
reduced its own humanity to matter. As the laws of science tell us, matter is inanimate
and can contain no subjectivity.
Since the Renaissance, the philosophical tradition inherited the contradiction
between the subject and the world, the finite and infinite, the particular and the
universal. This contradiction presenting itself as theory (freedom as unity with the
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universal), is here frustrated, because it is only actualisable through a particular type
of practice (the affirmation of liberty in-the-world through an objective other). In this
context, Koyre's charge against modern science as the cause for the separation of
Praxis and Theory gains further clarity. However, contrary to Koyre's assumption, it
is not Newton, nor modem science in particular which are responsible for this split,
but it is the very nature of the Renaissance idea of liberty which must carry the blame.
Science is merely the instrument through which this liberty has come to project itself.
Science and rationality are not ends in themselves, but cater to a human telos, to the
'Good1, which has come to be defined as the ultimate liberty for the individual to be:
"the greatest of all miracles in nature ... the centre of nature, the middle term of all
things, the series of the world, the face of all, the bond and juncture of the
universe."81
In this chapter, I sought to point out the essential historical and theoretical
components which define the various elements constituting modern subjectivity. I
have sketched the origins, and in the following chapter I shall illustrate how the
Romantics continue to maintain, albeit through different means, the Humanist project
of liberty. It will argue that the struggle for freedom came to be expressed in the
necessity to unite the finite and infinite in the 'image' of the artist, and through the
distinction between quality and quantity, equality and mere commonality.
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Chapter II. Subjectivity as Creation
in the Romantic Age
The Romantic movement in Germany lasted a short period, from 1797 to the
end of the 1830s (although the early texts appeared in 1760, and the last of the
adherents to the movement died in 1860), during which three phases may be
distinguished. Early Romanticism was initiated by Wackenroder and Tieck who
posthumously published works on the theory of art in the Outpourings from the Heart
ofan Art-Loving Monk (1797), and the magazine Athenaum (1798-1800). Mme. de
Stael's book De LAllemagne (1810) on the Romantic movement included also
Goethe and Schiller as among its earlier Sturm undDrang leaders. Later or Middle
Romantic phase lasted until 1815 mainly in Heidelberg (although Berlin and Munich
were also centers for this phase) counted among its members von Arnim, Brentano,
Eichendorff, Fouque, Hoffmann, Chamisso, the Schlegel brothers, and Zacharias
Werner. Finally, the Late Romantic phase which lasted until the late 1830s included
works dealing with scientific and medical research alongside those on literature and
art, religion and philosophy.1
The Romantic revolt in its various expressions (scientific, philosophical and
artistic) did not aim to destroy a specific element in the new order of things, but
sought to re-introduce a theory based on nature in order to differentiate between
individuals within society. The Romantics, as did the Humanists, considered that a
hierarchical order in nature existed as an ideal and not as the result of a real evolution.
What mattered was the quality of the "metaphysical context and not the external,
historical connections between phenomena;"2 however, the difference between real
and ideal connections was not always consistently observed. They sought to ground
this type of differentiation both in metaphysics (i.e. pure knowledge) and natural
science, for they did not perceive scientific discoveries to be independent or separate
from the social world. Rather, they saw science as practical application involving
projects concerned with the improvement of external living standards, the social order
or people's intellectual education. However, in all branches of science, concrete and
technical applications received theoretical justification, but were consistently
considered as subordinate to pure knowledge.3 This meant the subordination of
reason to divinity, and practice to theory. For this reason, the Romantic scientist
sought to limit the extent to which reason was the only source of human
understanding and to consider faith, feelings and dreams as elements capable of
helping one comprehend nature. On this subject von Engelhardt in his article
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Romanticism in Germany 4 states that according to the Romantic scientists "the
Absolute foundation of both nature and the mind can be grasped neither by
'intellectual appraisal' nor by 'belief in reason'," for "every word in favour of the
Absolute was merely a 'sign of it'."5 Nature in this context would not simply imply
physical nature, but anthropomorphised and biological nature, in which humanity
may still find the definition of its ontology.
The object of this Chapter is twofold. First, it aims to establish parallels
between the Humanist project for liberty elucidated in Chapter I and the Romantic
movement in the nineteenth century. The disillusionment, extreme optimism and
pessimism and the confusion resulting from them will be shown to have a twofold
source. On the one hand, optimism is -purely in the ideal form- the result of the
capacity in the arts and sciences to overcome the dichotomy of human existence as
finitude, which is separate from the Infinite absolute. On the other hand, pessimism
is the attitude taken by the artists and scientists when facing the result of the French
Revolution, (here the French Revolution is taken as the symbol of the actualisation of
freedom wrested from the old order in socio-political and economic terms), as
representing not the elevation of the finite to the infinite, but the reification of God
and the elements which constitute the divinity of human nature. Madness and irony
return to haunt nineteenth century intellectuals as they did during the Classical Age
two centuries earlier, only now they no longer represent simply 'death', but most
terrifying of all, they represent eternal damnation, for God was there no more. With
God's disappearance came not merely the absolute negation of the divine character of
Renaissance 'Man' as individual maker of the universe, but, also, and more
importantly, of the artist/scientist's claim to be the creator of the new world and its
absolute link with Infinity.
Secondly, this Chapter establishes further similarities between the Humanists
and the Romantics in terms of the struggle for the recognition of subjectivity as a
differentiated 'individuality' within society, one which is based on the individual's
capacity to use reason and imagination toward the achievement of personal freedom
from finitude. To do so, the Romantics based human merit on a 'theory of
knowledge' and a 'theory of genetics' which, when combined, provided the bases for
social stratification. Baumgarten's 'Science of Intuition', Schiller's 'Aesthetics', and
Herder's 'genetics' combined to provide a mixture of reason and imagination upon
which the Romantics based their distinction between 'quality' and 'quantity' which
establishes the measure of human worth. The failure of this distinction to bring forth
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a socially recognised and accepted measure of 'quality' brought an intellectual assault
on the merits of technology (responsible for the quantification of value) which
characterised the attitude of the intellectuals during the nineteenth and twentieth
century.
Infinity and Finitude: Unresolved Tension
The Romantic Age suffered a sense of loss of self and of identity which
followed the devastation of the Napoleonic invasions, leaving the old German Empire
fragmented and desolate. Holderlin expressed the spirit of the age most poignantly:
But we are destined to find no resting place, and suffering
mortals dwindle and fall blindly from one hour to the next,
hurled like water from ledge to ledge, downwards for years
to the great abyss.(Hyperion Schicksallied)
Holderlin's disspiritedness was shared by many noted German Romantics who saw
the expression of bright optimism resulting from the French Revolution turn to bitter
irony. According to Ernest Behler:
this melancholic note of irony devolves from the
contradictory experience of infinite longing in the face of the
finitude of life. Immeasurable sadness permeates every form
of life, since the absolute can only appear in limited, finite,
and transitory form. Pain is the basic timber of nature,
transitoriness the mark of art, and the death-wish the desire
of him who encounters such experiences. At best, we can
only mask and in irony disguise this "Weltschmerz" through
feigned laughter and gaiety. Marx and Engels explained this
attitude simply as a reflection of what they called the
predominant "German misery."6
Literature's shift from gaiety and laughter to tragedy is seen by Behler to stem
from the "na'ive expectations turned disillusionment" which took place after the
eighteenth century. Frederich Schlegel in his last lectures of 1829 stated that
genuine irony is the irony of love. It arises from the feeling
of finiteness and of one's own limitations and the apparent
contradiction of these feelings with the concept of infinity
inherent in all genuine love.7
It is often in love, both earthly and sublime, that the whole being is moved to great
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feats and sacrifice, that optimism and pessimism combine to satisfy the lover's
hunger for extremes. It is there also that individuals find disillusionment and deep
loss. In the above passage, Schlegel expressed the wish of the Romantic artist for
whom art should elevate the artist and humanity to the level of the sublime absolute.
However, disillusionment sets in when the artist recognises the limits of human
powers, and their failure to elevate the soul to a higher level of spiritual vision. This
bitter realisation was followed by the identification of several different types of irony:
"God's irony" (Gottes Ironie), "World Historical Irony" (Welthistorische Ironie), and
"general irony of the world," (allgemeine Ironie derWelt).8 These formulations came
as a sense of emptiness permeated the spirit of the age. Benjamin Constant's
speculation about "La mort de Dieu?," and Heinrich Heine's questioning of "reason
and discernable plan in the course and eventual fate of our world,"9 both pronounced
the spiritual impoverishment deeply felt and suffered by these intellectuals. How did
this spirit come about, and develop?
In Chapter I, it became clear that freedom from clerical and, consequently,
feudal bondage appeared, in the first instance, as the overthrow of institutional ties
maintained by Church and clergy took place. The Humanist project which meant to
introduce a theology based on the simple assertion of the existence of the individual
'soul', whose development was to be the responsibility of the individual and in which
the individual's salvation or damnation resided, had as a result the glorification of
individuality on the basis of its capacity to know God through nature. In this context,
irony, expressed as God's irony, may be defined here as "an ill-timed or perverse
arrival of an event or circumstance that is in itself desirable."10 The actualisation of
freedom from clerical control, in itself desirable, came in the form of the French
Revolution, while initially exalting the intellectual elites around Europe, this first
moment of fervor was followed by disillusionment. Disillusionment was the result of
the reign of terror and mob rule which led to the blind execution of eminent
intellectuals. This left the Romantics with the image of a loss rather than a gain in
actual liberty. Moreover, far from expressing a highly 'evolved' soul, the French
mob demonstrated basic human instincts whose soul did not seem to be elevated by
the great achievements assigned to it by the Humanists. A counter-revolutionary
attitude appeared in the neighbouring countries of Germany and England where the
intellectual elite fell into a spiritual doubt, later expressed as 'emptiness' of both the
human soul and the universe.
This perhaps would explain how the intellectuals of the nineteenth century
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came to maintain a distinctively dichotomous attitude toward freedom and society.
On the one hand, they pursued the Renaissance will to maintain religion in the realm
of nature as the property of the individual, and sought with abandonment the
communion with the absolute universal. On the other hand, they continued to use the
power of science and instrumental reason, developed in the Enlightenment, in order
to further prove the absolute power of knowledge and that of humanity on earth. The
Renaissance project was therefore not altered, only deeper disillusionment was
expressed as the reality of materialist science and reified spirituality gained further
ground in the social, political and economic changes which accompanied the
aftermath of the French Revolution. The Romantics, unlike the Humanists, dealt
more clearly with two extremes which Hegel denounced as "infinitely absolute
negativity" whose unrelenting opposition often led them from "joyous freedom to
sadness, melancholy and despair."11
In Germany, an especially high, if not the highest, place was reserved in
Romanticism for the artist and art in all its diversity. Romanticism as a movement
was, more often than not, associated with art and literature. Art represented the
culmination and reflection of the whole of reality. It was in art that the artist, poet,
intellectual..., was able to combine the dichotomous tendencies with which the artist
as creator contended. Artists suffered from a split personality: "Doppelgdnger, the
contrast between everyday realities and dreams, consciousness and
subconsciousness, sensuality and reason, bourgeois and artist, society and the
individual, crime and virtue, nature and culture, and day and night" pervade all
Romantic literature whose essence is fixed in the Romantic conviction "of the ideal-
real unity of the world."12 Artists believed in their capacity to join God and the
infinite through their work. Friedrich Schlegel even suggested a mathematical
formula for Romantic poetry wherein the Poetic Ideal is the very expression of God,
and this through the use of the variables such as the fantastic, the sentimental and
mimicry. Similarly, according to Novalis' slogan 'magical idealism,' nature and
history are meant to find true freedom in artistic creations, and subject and object
manifest themselves as metaphysically identical. Hence God, the subject of creation,
becomes identical to the object of creation, be it Humanity, Nature, or History. Life
in its totality is, for the Romantics, a longing for the fluid intertwining of the finite
with the infinite, which can be experienced in friendship and love. However, marked
by a dichotomy between bourgeois reality and artistic productivity, coupled with the
foundering of personal relationships, reality appeared to the artist in the form of
irony. As such, the relationship between the artist and the infinite came to be
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described as "floating intelligence" thereby representing the tension between the ideal
and real not in terms of subjective arbitrariness, but in absolute quality.
In Britain, as in Germany, individuality took on a specific value, a religious
and somewhat messianic character, especially in the writings of poets and intellectuals
who saw their work as divine creation. When translating Spinoza's tract On
Prophecy, Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote that "with the exception of Christ, none ever
apprehended the revelations of God without the assistance of imagination, that is of
words or forms imaged forth in the mind, and ... therefore ... the qualification to
prophecy is rather a more vivid imagination than a profounder understanding than
other men."13 Shelley's use of the word imagination is not meant to be deprecatory
for he writes elsewhere that the "great instrument of moral good is the
imagination,"14 and that the "office and character of a poet participates in the divine
nature as regards providence, no less than as regards creation."15 Shelley, Blake,
and other poets of the period, took their work far beyond artistic expression, and like
Renaissance Humanist poets who saw Homer as their guide, used their 'gift' of
imagination to encompass ethical and ontological reality. Blake's entire poetic canon
was devised to embody and engender a philosophical vision: imagination was
considered as the principle which bound his art in union with other forms of thought
and perception. Similarly, Coleridge developed a theory of imagination which
accounts equally for the production of art and also "all human perception."16 In
Religious Musings the poet, portrayed by Coleridge, was summoned by a Cherub's
trump and lifted to the height of vision.
The language and vocabulary used by these poets was adapted to express
secular purposes. Henry More, Berkeley and Swedenborg agreed in defining the
'spiritual' as 'mental'. Blake's doctrine that "Mental Things are alone Real" had its
precedent in Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophy where the conversion of the
phenomena to intelligible thought, and the reference of knowledge to mental activity
both made of the imagination a literary and epistemological principle. According to
M.H. Abrams, Christianity has the tendency, (one which he also associated with the
Romantic Period), "to internalize apocalypse by transferring the theatre of events
from the outer earth and heaven to the spirit of the single believer;"17 in these terms
he summarised the "high Romantic argument":
Faith in an apocalypse by revelation had been replaced by
faith in an apocalypse by revolution, and this now gave
away to faith in an apocalypse by imagination or cognition.
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In the ruling two-term frame of Romantic thought, the mind
of man confronts the old heaven and earth and possesses
within itself the power ... to transform them into a new
heaven and new earth, by means of a total revolution of
consciousness.18
Abrams' analysis is enlightening as it establishes the thread which links the
Humanist resolve to go against the Church in the Renaissance in order for humanity
to appropriate its salvation, to the French Revolution, the adherents of which
perceived equality as the actualisation offreedom from birth right, the guild and the
Church, as lived experience in-the-world. The third stage, represented by the
Romantics, sought the reappropriation of the inner 'man,' i.e. human consciousness
of freedom. Just as in a Hegelian dialectic the third stage involves the synthesis of
the oppositions of earlier periods, so should the Romantic project for freedom as
consciousness and self-consciousness be the synthesis of reappropriated salvation
and reason. However, bitter irony expressed by the Romantics tells a different story.
The Romantics expressed violent disillusionment, and in some, such as with Fichte,
one may find an expression of absolute subjectivism which renders reconciliation
between individual and society inconceivable. This irony, loss of self and of identity,
point to the failure of progress toward freedom due to the nature of the components
which the Romantics, like their Renaissance ancestors, sought: the overcoming of
dichotomy between infinity and finitude in the realm of the imagination, rather than,
as Hegel would suggest, in the realm of the actual. The Humanists and the
Romantics sought to appropriate the spirit in terms of mere consciousness, for they
conceived of it as an other-worldly entity. Hegel, on the other hand, would argue, as
we will see in Chapter I of Part II, that God/spirit must be a determinate entity
because it is perceivable by determinate beings (i.e. humans).
Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophies are shown here to have survived
in a form which combined the aspirations of both ages: the will to reach the infinite
through the finite of the Renaissance, and the use of scientific reason to achieve
freedom in the world. Here, both enterprises are frustrated. The Romantics seemed
to be suffering from a twofold disillusionment, for the reaching of infinity through
finitude remained an illusion with or without the power of materialist reason. Infinity
is achievable solely through the power of the imagination. However, because of its
material-bound nature and purpose, reason does not allow the actualisation of this
divine gift. This occurred because of the alternative dimension, viz. technology, to
which reason catered with great indulgence, thereby usurping the project of freedom
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as spiritual privilege, and allying itself with the development of freedom from material
want. The Industrial Revolution and its diverse restructuring effects on the social and
economic spheres undermined the project of the Romantics, stifling, yet again, the
spiritual dimension of Renaissance Humanism. Infinity and finitude remained to
dwell in the hearts and minds of those who felt abandoned by the industrial age and
cheated by 'corrupt' reason.
Quality vs. Quantity: the Romantic Theory of Knowledge
According to Irving Babbitt "a thing is romantic when, ..., it violates the
normal sequence of cause and effect in favor of adventure. ... A thing is romantic
when it is strange, unexpected, intense, superlative, extreme, unique, etc."19
Romanticism, as a literary genre, denotes a predominance of the element of fiction
over reality in literature. Babbitt observes that this type of romanticism refers to
literature found as the "spontaneous product of the popular imagination of the Middle
Ages."20 Furthermore, Babbitt makes a general statement wherein he claims "that the
uncultivated human imagination in all times and places is romantic in the same way.
It hungers for the thrilling and the marvelous and is, in short, incurably
melodramatic."21
This definition does not come with much surprise to modern readers, but
Romanticism as a social and literary movement goes further in its implications.
Beyond literature, Romanticism defines the intellectual movement of the nineteenth
century, whose contributions helped shape the socio-political theories of the nation-
state. Romanticism was concerned with the redefinition of the world not merely as a
political organisation, but more importantly, in religious, ethical, and social terms.
The Romantics were faced with what they saw as their task to define the content of
the demands voiced in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen" of 1789 and
give them an objective and actual existence. This meant the redefinition of the
structure of society, which they saw better established according to the precepts of
reason and science, wherein each individual will be rated on the social echelon
according to his/her achievement as a rational individual. To this end the Romantics
elaborated a 'theory of knowledge', which they used as a measuring-stick, according
to which humanity and its socio-political relations may be arranged.
One of the first theories of knowledge to try and break with earlier ones is
associated with A.G. Baumgarten's "Science of Intuition" or Aesthetica (1750) the
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object of which was to investigate a "mode of knowledge."22 Baumgarten started
with the distinctions made by earlier philosophers, Leibniz and Wolff, which pointed
out two types of knowledge: what gives us 'clear ideas' of things, sufficiently clear
for practical purposes, and enables us to distinguish one object from another; and
what gives us "distinct ideas," distinct insofar as the knowledge of the components of
these objects allows us the understanding of the why and wherefore, a knowledge
which promotes the recognition offormal (essence) truth rather than mere phenomenal
(appearance) truth. Baumgarten's theory of knowledge mediates between the two:
one which is neither purely that of the phenomenal whole, nor the product of
scientific and philosophical analysis. This is known as Confusa, i.e. a "confluence"
or "fusing together" of elements.23 This type of knowledge attempts to investigate a
form neither empirical nor purely intuitive, but which combines both to represent in
clearer form the human process of learning and knowing. His use of 'intuition'
should not be confused with the Romantic movement precisely because he does not
undertake to understand intuition through intuition, but leaves to the power of reason
the processes involved in their prompt apprehension as wholes. As such, methods of
rational analysis act as a form of knowledge which in itself is not analytical nor easily
accessible to rational inspection.
Baumgarten's theory of knowledge contributed in a threefold manner to the
development of Romanticism: first, it reacted strongly against the Enlightenment's
empiricism and challenged it by transcending its enquiry into the knowledge of the
human psyche to involve spheres of human knowledge which, until then, were
thought beneath rational concerns. Second, Baumgarten remained, in spite of this
achievement, a product of the Enlightenment as he continued to profess that reason
was the ultimate "queen of the faculties."24 Finally, his study helped establish a firm
distinction, in rational terms, between a higher and an inferior form of intelligence, a
distinction which imparted by itself a "qualitative" value to the exercise of human
faculties. Moreover, Baumgarten's naming of this theory of knowledge Aesthetics,
and later on Schiller's own letters On the Aesthetic Education of Man, may have
contributed to the association of Aesthetics with art, and the Science of Intuition with
what Babbitt termed "romantic."
Aside from Goethe, Schiller may be considered as one of Germany's most
gifted poet/philosopher whose work, although seemingly dichotomous,25 represents
the genius of the age in its capacity to seek practical solutions to practical problems
while using sublime poetic language and prose. For Schiller, aesthetics did not mean
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simply art as beauty, but art as the actualisation in-the-world of objective truth. This
is apparent in his reflections on Kant's Critique ofJudgement. Upon studying Kant's
theory which sought to free aesthetics from all subjective considerations thereby
allowing them to join the universal, Schiller could not help but ask whether Kant did
not reduce the word 'beauty' to an empty concept.
Schiller objected to Kant's reduction of the 'emotional', such as grace and
love, to mere empty concepts the existence of which appeared merely formal, not
practical. In Letter XXV, Schiller asked what then becomes of grace and
graciousness, of those moral deeds in which the joy in the doing makes "the whole
man move together." This was echoed by Coleridge who similarly, while working
through the Metaphysics ofMorals, asked "What then becomes of love -love, not as
the mere beneficence to which Kant seems to reduce it, but love as spontaneously
outflowing sympathy?"26 In his rejection of Kant's extreme subjectivism, Schiller
joined Hegel in his interest in the practical and the possible, rather than in the merely
ideal. Education for Schiller implied not the abandonment of theoretical and abstract
ideals, but a necessary orientation of those ideals, leading toward the practical and the
possible. Through education Schiller sought to transform the more primitive and
self-involved motives in the cause of interests transcending the merely personal.
Kant appeared to Schiller as preoccupying himself too much with 'man' and not
dealing with the objective 'other' in and through which 'man's' actualisation of 'real'
freedom was to occur. Schiller's understanding of aesthetics as a relation was
reflected in Hegel's synthesis in which subjective self-actualisation was maintained
through an inter-subjective interaction in society.
Schiller's interest in education stemmed from his earlier studies on the nature
of human knowledge, and freedom of the individual will. In his work Philosophic
der Physiologie he attempted to answer the question posed by Christian Grave,
translator of Ferguson's Moral Philosophy: "How without assuming a dual source of
knowledge in man, the one natural, the other supernatural, are we to explain his
power to determine his own thinking? How without recourse to innate ideas, ensure
his freedom to think and act as he chooses?"27 Calling upon Baumgarten's theory of
knowledge, Schiller studied the interaction between body and mind which meant to
prove the assumption that the will is free and not entirely supplanted by the effects
and desires of the physical. His first distinction was of Aufmerksamkeit or the
capacity of the psyche to recognise "certain links in the chain of involuntary
associations rather than to others."28 This was later enhanced in Letter XIX with the
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recognition of Selbstbewusstsein, or self-awareness which he saw as an essential,
although inexplicable, attribute of human selfhood, an element which imparts a
necessary wholeness to the psycho-physical organism. For Schiller, the psychic
power related to Selbstbewusstsein is erdichten, a word which does not imply poetry
making but is cognate with it (the simplex dichten may also mean to feign, invent,
fabricate...). This connection points to "that impulse to seek and find in the freedom
of aesthetic creativity the source of man's power to make himself what he will."29
In Letter XXIII Schiller introduced the notion of the 'leap' where he
repudiated the rationalist assumption that the abstractions of reason were formulated
by one who yesterday was little more than an animal. Here Schiller refuted the
generalisations brought forward by philosophers of the Enlightenment who studied
the mind from its 'state of nature'.30 For Schiller there must be a 'discontinuity'
between the two stages of consciousness (since a human being can live in one
without ever developing into the other). He envisaged the arrival of the 'leap' at an
early stage in human development with the first glimpse of self-consciousness (what
Hegel defined as self-recognition in the Master-Slave dialectic). The 'leap' is a
'given' whose origins, he stated in letter XIX, are shrouded in mist unfathomable by
either Metaphysics or Physics. The appearance of self-awareness is not connected to
merit, nor its absence a fault. However, once recognised it is our responsibility to
develop it. In it lie the seeds of freedom. It is in this sense that Schiller can say that
the aesthetic is the condition of the will, and as such the will is never wholly free
from chance and caprice of nature; the will remains free insofar as it has already been
determined by an outside factor.31
In Schiller's theory of freedom, there are two basic elements. First, a natural
'given' which was closely associated with Herder's theory on 'genetics', and second
his notion of the 'leap'. Schiller's view of human nature, adopted by the Romantics,
took as a given that individuals were born with a predetermined set of hereditary
attributes directing their possibilities of self-actualisation as 'free will' in society.
Schiller called this 'genetic' connection the 'gift of nature' which was in some
measure dependent on the 'favour of fortune.'32 In the nature of genetic inquiry, the
law of causality was pushed to its limits in order to explain the diversity present in the
different levels of human achievement. Schiller believed that a child's exploration of
his/her environment shaped to a large degree the gifts of intellectual, aesthetic, or
moral life that he/she will lead in adult life. Also, he thought it idle to pin the primary
cause in faulty education since what we were faced with was a cycle: from generation
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to generation
the trouble starts early, often enough in our mother's womb.
As we are, so are our children. No one can give to posterity
anything better than himself.33
Here, both Herder and Schiller fell short of early Humanist thought which extolled
the infinite possibilities of all individuals to attain freedom, on the condition that they
obtain the knowledge of how to use the superior quality of reason. Humanism did
not care to, nor was capable of, presenting a genetic theory because it was still
operating under a Christian belief that all individuals were equal before God on the
one hand, and under the rigid hierarchical system of Church and feudal order on the
other. Only the development of the 'soul,' given to everyone in common, was the
responsibility of the individual. In essence, Schiller elaborated, and, to a certain
extent modified, the Renaissance idea of freedom as the simple distinction between
subject and object. In his theory he made further distinctions between the subject
who could make the distinction, and humanity, (although indirectly a subject of action
in the world), who was incapable of making such a distinction. Freedom then came
to be associated with providence and with a specific reference to class in society. The
Renaissance's Christian idea of equality of all individuals before God was thereby
surpassed, and more practical, earthly, and hierarchical considerations combined to
establish freedom, by nature, as the property of a given individual in a given social
strata.
Schiller's work reflects a pragmatic rather than an ideological approach to
problem resolution. His work faithfully reflects, rather than deals with and resolves,
the problems of the reality of his age which are products of the structure of his
society. This is clearly demonstrated in his conclusion to the Letters where he
questions the validity of his argument in stating:
But does such a State of Aesthetic Semblance really exist?
And if so, where is it to be found? As a need, it exists in
every finely attuned soul; as a realized fact, we are likely to
find it, like the pure Church and the pure Republic, only in
some few chosen circles...34
I would agree with Georg Lukacs who commented that Schiller's writings
gave expression to many "illusions" of the possibility of returning to "small
communities" in which "the exemplary social function...[was] a general feature of the
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age," and "where a community of intellectually and morally outstanding individuals
not only labour[ed] to educate each other, to develop each other's various faculties in
a general humanist sense, but also [sought] to further various social goals, in
particular, the voluntary harmonious phasing-out of the vestiges of feudalism and the
transition from outmoded methods in agriculture to modern capitalist ones."35
Although Lukacs distinguished Goethe and Schiller from the Romantics and insisted
that the former belonged to the German classics, I should like to maintain that the
Romantics, as the Humanists did before them, used the classics as a base allowing
them to develop a theory upon which they were able to establish ground for a
definition of 'particularity' as 'quality', and as such distinguish it from the
'quantitatively' defined 'individuality' of the French Revolution. They used the
discoveries in biology, and the greater 'faith' in science to establish theories, whose
content allowed the drawing of class distinctions within a society, the establishment
of which had suddenly made earlier forms obsolete.
The second element in Schiller's theory of freedom consists in the notion of
the 'leap' which allows the passage from mere recognition to self-recognition, a first
step, the successful accomplishment of which depends on education and the
undertaking of the responsibility to develop the elements conducive to freedom's
actualisation in the world. In this theory, Schiller may be seen as undertaking the
establishment (or discovery) of a solution to the Humanist project of freedom, the
failure of which was based primarily on its incapacity to become an actuality in the
world without having recourse to scientific reason. However, Schiller's theory
seems to commit a similar error and bases itself on a 'genetic' theory, the essential
legitimacy of which relies to a great extent upon science. It can then be said that
Schiller's achievement lies in his capacity to mark the shift in the struggle against the
Church in the Renaissance to a struggle embedded in the form of class redefinition
and materialism in the Classical Age. The science used by Schiller is also class-
conscious, for the 'gift of nature' combined with the 'genetic' theory restrict the
possibility of successful aesthetic education to a very small class of intellectuals who
are also noblemen and aristocrats. As such, the middle and lower classes are a priori
deprived of the possibility of reaching an aesthetic understanding of themselves and
the world. The nature of the 'leap', unlike Hegel's self-awareness, is rather Kantian
insofar as it occurs within individual consciousness, and as such it is extremely
arbitrary and subjective. It does not allow for the full operation of the 'interactive'
nature of aesthetic knowledge to emerge. Self-awareness becomes the product of a
'given' cultural and moral milieu, also restricted to the 'given' class of intellectuals
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and artists.
The Kantian roots of Schiller's theory of freedom can best be seen in
Schiller's definition of 'beauty as freedom' developed in answer to Kant's theory of
Aesthetics. For Schiller, 'beauty' is not as Kant conceived it, that is, as the point of
view of its effect on man as purely subjective and one-dimensional perception,36 but
as an attribute of the 'object' regarded as appearance. In Kallias Schiller states that
"beauty is nothing but freedom in appearance."37 In the first instance, beauty is
"freedom in appearance" insofar as it is the impression that one is left with when
faced with a beautiful object, i.e. the "miraculous air of independence and casual
indifference towards its surrounding circumstances and conditions under which it
came into being;"38 hence its capacity to surpass its own limitations and render
obsolete the very notion of finitude. Beauty resides in the very nature of the soul it
inhabits, it exists through a rule which it has given to itself.39 As such
"purposefulness, order, proportion, perfection -qualities which have so long been
identified with beauty- have absolutely nothing to do with it; except where these
qualities belong to the nature of the object."40 The beauty of the aesthetic object
resides in its capacity to master its own technical attributes and use its technical form
as a "kind of foil" to its own freedom, "so that its beauty, which consists in freedom,
appears as a tour de force achieved in spite of its technical form."41 Beauty is
freedom insofar as it is the overcoming of its negation: "The negative concept of
freedom is conceivable only through the positive concept of its opposite, and just as
the idea of natural causality is necessary in order to introduce us to the idea of free
will, so the idea of technical form is necessary in order to introduce us to freedom in
the kingdom of appearances."42 Freedom, as beauty or the overcoming of
limitations, is therefore the positive recognition of non-freedom as limitation and
encapsulment in finitude. It demands a yielding to limitation, a recognition whose
ultimate negation is the expression of the free will, where the latter's actualisation can
only then be called freedom.
In moral terms, beauty is 'Truth', or more specifically, sense-perception to
Virtue; it encapsulates moral feelings and dispositions which are the foundations of
reasoned and reasonable actions.43 "A moral action becomes a beautiful action only
when it resembles a spontaneous effect of nature. In a word: a free action is a
beautiful action, when autonomy of mind and autonomy in appearance coincide."
According to Schiller, "moral beauty," (moralische schonheit), "appears only when
duty has become second nature."44 lust as the internalisation of the technique for the
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aesthetic object becomes the very essence of its freedom, so the assimilation of duty
as second nature constitutes the expression of moral freedom. The analogy between
beauty as "freedom in appearance," and freedom in the social world ends in morality.
Freedom is no longer the freedom of the absolute, but is concrete freedom the
actualisation of which coincides with the will and inner nature of the individual. For
Schiller, it is in human nature to "object to seeing compulsion anywhere, even when
it is exercised by reason itself; we desire also that the freedom of nature shall be
respected, because in aesthetic judgment we regard each being as an end in itself..."45
In moral freedom Schiller comes very close to Hegel's theory on synthesis
between two opposing elements, the particular and the universal. Freedom as the
overcoming of opposition begins first with recognition of the negation, not in terms
of elimination, but as a positive actuality the negation of which constitutes the
identification of the form which freedom may take in order to actualise itself in the
world. Hegel would object to this, because for Schiller freedom remains subjective,
a mere dialogue within the self. In order for this freedom to become actual, Hegel
demands that it becomes inter-subjective, and hence social. There has to be therefore
a moment when freedom is able to recognise and admit to the freedom of another
subject in the universal or objective order. However, Hegel would concede that
Schiller has already in 'negation' recognised the first step towards freedom's
actualisation. Schiller's theory would remain purely in the negative because no social
'other' has been identified. Aesthetics, as the theory of knowledge, does not provide
a nucleus in which freedom of the will may find true expression; in it freedom finds
its essence as the negation of non-freedom, reconciliation and actualisation thereby
remain in suspension. In fact, Schiller provides a clear depiction of the moment in
consciousness when freedom and servitude are facing each other as polar opposites in
a state ofAufmerksamkeit, mutual recognition. A bi-polarity which is recognised by
Hegel as the opposition of 'individuality' to 'particularity', and of 'quantity' to
'quality' undertaken by the Romantics, but which does not lead to reconciliation.
This is also the opposition which Hegel recognised as the reason responsible for the
"madness" of his age. Hegel recognised this view of freedom from finitude as the
contemplation of the aesthetic, the very element underlying the deep pessimism and
irony of the Romantic age.
As Goethe foretold, the Romantics 'plundered' Schiller's theory on Aesthetic
Education a year after its appearance in 'Die Horen' in 1795.46 Following its
publication, there was set up a "System-programm des deutschen Idealismus" which
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elaborated and defined the Romantic understanding of Art, Science, Philosophy and
proclaimed the aesthetic 'act' as the "highest act of reason;"47 beauty as that of form
was the Platonic Idea embracing all ideas. Poetry also claimed its position.
Following from the Humanists' appreciation of the poetic language of Homer, poetry
was considered as "what it was in the beginning -the teacher of mankind... which
will supersede and outlive all the other arts and sciences."48 This movement although
basing its premises on Schiller's Letters altered his whole emphasis and intent. The
Intuitive and Imaginative became enmeshed with the rational; the distinctions which
were so carefully set-out by Schiller were 'confused' and to some extent completely
discarded.49 Aesthetic education came to mean an "innate," "given" quality of nature
to which only the few could ascribe. It became the only distinguishing factor
between those who could rule and those who should be guided by this type of new
divinity. The notion of equality, also the basis for a quantitative measure of freedom,
had to face this new affirmation of quality, considered "inexplicable and
inalienable."50 The Romantics held within their grasp a 'quality' that was to elevate
them to the position of not merely moral and educational guides, Platonic Philosopher
Kings, but also Christian Messiahs. They coveted the positions sought after by their
Humanist ancestors, to be gods on earth and the light and hope for humanity.
In their struggle against the levelling power of 'equality', the Romantics
fought against the rise of materialism and its generator, industrialisation. This
struggle took on after 1848 the garb of what Marx and Engels defined as class
struggle, but which was not as evident fifty years earlier. According to Georg
Simmel, freedom as equality following the French Revolution came to be opposed by
the Romantics who introduced inequality as a definition of emerging freedom.51 On
this Simmel commented that "as the ego had become sufficiently strengthened by the
feeling of equality and generality, it fell back into the search for inequality."52 The
difference between the inequality of the new order compared with the old was that the
former was self-imposed. Individualism, after liberating its identity from the rusty
chains of guild, birth right, and Church, sought to establish a content of its own
which was specific, irreplaceable and given.
Compared to Humanism, Romanticism's definition of the 'self,' the given
quality of the soul, appeared to have finally established a content uniquely its own.
Both intuition and clear reason combined in order to present the individual with
elements, the juxtaposition of which allowed him/her to fulfill a double need: that of
"enigmatic unfathomableness" and "unquestionable clarity," the divergence of which
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was seen by Simmel to satisfy "one homogeneous need, in the idea of the ego and in
the feeling of personality."53 The ego's progress toward self-identification took the
shape of one of two given states of socio-political existence. Either, the ego should
in its journey towards selfhood discover that it is like the others and that in
community it has its place there, or it should discover that "it may be strong enough
to bear the loneliness of its own quality, and may hold that the only reason for a
multitude of individuals to exist at all is the possibility of each component individual
to measure his own incomparability and the individuality of his own world by those
of the others."54 This twofold recognition was experienced by most Romantics and
harks back to Rousseau's enigmatic position in which the philosopher expressed an
emphatic need at once to be at one with, and entirely isolated from, society.
Simmel defined the spirit which prevaded Romanticism as 'qualitative
individualism' in contrast with 'quantitative equality' of the eighteenth century. He
also labeled it 'uniqueness' [Einzigkeit] rather than 'singleness' [Einzelheit].55 In its
one spirit of empirical reason and intuition, Romanticism reflected the "inner rhythm
of the incomparability, of specific claim, of the sharp qualitative differentiation of the
single element, which the new individualism also sees in the social element, among
the components of society."56 Simmel acknowledges Romanticism as a child of its
time, as the intellectual voice given to the constant flux caused by the redefinition of
class barriers and the outcome of inner class struggle.
Lukacs, who defined Romanticism as irrationalism, was equally aware of its
nature as "reactionary answers to problems to do with class struggle."57 This
combination of reason and intuition wherein only confusion may reign lead Lukacs to
add that real freedom under irrationalism can only be a sham, for "in the eyes of
reactionary bourgeoisie, one of irrationalism's most important tasks is to provide men
with a philosophical 'comfort', the semblance of total freedom, the illusion of
personal autonomy, moral and intellectual superiority - while maintaining an attitude
that continually links them with the reactionary bourgeoisie in their real dealings and
renders them absolutely subservient to it."58 Romanticism appears so because of the
very nature of its aspired freedom. The Romantics seem to have been struggling to
maintain an illusion of infinity and divine quality during the age's success in
effectively suppressing all bases for the maintenance of such divine hierarchy.
Furthermore, the harder the Romantics struggled to achieve their Aesthetic freedom,
the less free they seemed. The restrictive area according to which an individual may
find ground to define his/her own uniqueness becomes so restricted that its very
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definition appears as absence of freedom because it has taken the shape of flights of
fancy and imagination. It is for this reason that "this individualism, which restricts
freedom to a purely inward sense of the term, easily acquires an anti-liberal tendency.
It thus is the complete antithesis of eighteenth century individualism, which, in full
consistency with its notion of atomized and basically undifferentiated individuals,
could not even conceive the idea of a collective as an organism that unifies
heterogeneous elements."59
The Romantics' definition of freedom betrays the intellectuals' struggle
against the socio-political order established at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The Romantics view their struggle as necessary, not merely to their own class -
intellectual and artistic - but also to the rest of humanity. They combined in their
work the divine aspirations of the Humanists, and the empirical, probing of scientific
rationality. The lines between divinity and science are blurred here, and the result is
an uneasy co-existence with the type of liberty that emerged in-the-world since the
French Revolution. This Part sought to distinguish the various elements, threads that
history, since the end of the Middle Ages, has woven into intricate tapestry relating
the story of the struggle for freedom and individualism. It has meant to establish the
argument stating that our definition of freedom today cannot be disassociated from its
past forms, and that perhaps in the very expressions we use to define our will to
freedom, there lay the historical elements which established its nature and content.
If this Part dealt with the elements defining the projects of freedom of
centuries past, Part II deals with modernity in terms of the present. First, in chapter
I, it outlines Hegel's critique of Romanticism, and his elaboration of a theory of
freedom the practice of which is illustrated in the Philosophy ofRight. Second, in
chapter n, it outlines the kind of freedom that leading intellectuals perceived as having
come into being. For this purpose, two twentieth century authors have been chosen,
Max Weber and Alasdair Maclntyre. The work of the first defines -in sociological
terms- the type of freedom that became possible in early twentieth century capitalist
society. The second, is a critique of the first. Together they combine to present
effectively the dilemma of the modern age, depicted as humanity's failure to achieve
freedom and subjectivity in modern society. The similarities and differences noted in
the discussion of Weber's and Maclntyre's work with that of Hegel seek primarily to
point out that Hegelian theory of liberty was not put in practice, and that, contrary to
the claims made by postmodern authors (Part III), the modern age cannot be
considered as 'Hegelian', nor would a critique of Hegel be considered as a viable
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critique of modernity. This point is further discussed in Part III. Presently, it
suffices to point out to the reader the particular differences which separate Hegelian
theory from modern practice. To a study of Hegel and modernity we now turn.
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Chapter I. Hegel's Enlightenment
If Renaissance philosophy sought to break down static Medieval social and
political structures, nineteenth century philosophy, following the path paved by the
Enlightenment tradition, sought to replace the old regime with a state structure which
would attempt to ground the inherited conception of liberty in a constitution. Hegel's
entire work, culminating in the Philosophy ofRight, is intended to represent the age's
attempt to render liberty an actuality. Hegel's theory of the state, presenting a system
in which the acceptance of tradition and custom was to restore freedom to humanity,
appeared at a time when the overthrow of the state as the symbol of oppression was
all encompassing. Faced with the extreme stance of the Romantic movement of his
time, one may see Hegel's work as an urgent message seeking to instill reason in a
world bent on destruction and irrationalism. However, Hegel's philosophy,
advocating the 'here and now' as a rational actuality, failed to capture the imagination
in spite of its adherence to a radical concept of freedom. Freedom, as actualisation in
the objective sphere (social and political realm), could not fmd any reconciliation with
a humanity whose disillusionment with the objective world defined its freedom as the
latter's absolute negation. Hegel was aware of this. In the Preface to the Philosophy
ofRight, for instance, he complained bitterly against empiricists, reactionaries and
philosophers belonging to the Romantic movement whose attacks were levelled at the
state in the name of freedom and Reason. Hegel's objection was based upon his
belief that this negative definition of freedom,1 expressed in philosophical language
and context, impeded the recognition of Reason as the actualisation of social and
political freedom. For Hegel, freedom could only be an inter-subjective life-world
experience and not merely, as some empiricists would argue, a solitary enjoyment of
the senses.
It is the purpose of this chapter to point out two fundamental points regarding
Hegel's philosophy. First, it will be argued against current interpretations,2 that
Hegel's concept of freedom does not attempt to justify the philosophical movement of
the time, i.e. the rationalisation of liberty in terms of the Enlightenment tradition, but
to respond to the ideological contradictions expressed in Romanticism. Second,
Hegel's philosophy and his concept of freedom are not Romantic. Rather, they
express acute awareness of this movement's problematic nature and influence, and
provide a definition of freedom that would do away with the 'negative' character of
the Romantic movement. Hegel's 'Concept of Freedom' presents a response, indeed
an alternative to Romanticism's 'unactualisable' project. To this end this chapter is
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divided in three sections. Section 1 identifies the nature of Hegel's critique of
Romanticism. It presents this critique on three levels, viz. interpretation of the
classics, understanding of the role of religion and definition of Reason. The
exposition of this critique permits the articulation of certain elements of Hegel's
theory that are necessary for this work. These include Hegel's definition of actuality,
Reason, Becoming as mediation, and self-consciousness. Section 2 discusses
Hegel's concept of the Notion and Teleology as presented in the Science of Logic.
Finally, section 3 outlines Hegel's definition of the 'concept of freedom' as the will
and its 'practical' application in the Philosophy ofRight.
Hegel's Critique of Romanticism
In his letter to Schelling of 2 November 1800, Hegel described his own
intellectual activities of years past:
In my scientific development, which started from [the] more
subordinate needs of man, I was inevitably driven towards
science, and the ideal of [my] youth had to take the form of
reflection and thus at once a system. I now ask myself,
while I am still occupied with it, what return to intervention
in the life ofmen can be found..."3
Hegel's preoccupation with the "subordinate needs of man" included topics on
politics, aesthetics and religion which concerned his private writings, first published
in this century by Hermann Nohl under the title Early Theological Writings. There
his "ideal of youth" was projected in his study of pagan, essentially Roman and
Hellenistic, way of life whose religion united in harmony the 'subjective' and the
'public'. Indeed, like the Romantics of his time, Hegel was equally interested in
pagan philosophy, viewing it as an early moment of 'wholeness', where individuals
were indistinguishable from the whole. However, unlike the Romantics, Hegel did
not believe that we can regain this 'wholeness' by 'taking flight' from the present.
Rather, Hegel advocated a 'wholeness' that the Greeks were unable to conceive of,
that is the product of a free, rational and conscious decision to be one with the
objective order.
Far from opposing the masses bent on the destruction of the archaic objective
order expressed in religion, Hegel's Early Theological Writings conclude that the loss
of self suffered as a result of social dissolution is both embodied in, and perpetuated
78
by, prevailing religious ideas and conduct. Hegel makes distinctions between
objective and subjective religion, as well as between postive and natural religion. In
the Tubingen Essay of 1793 Hegel is critical of the form that the religion of his time
has taken, defining it as 'objective religion' which has separated itself from the very
function it meant to perform, i.e. bringing in harmony the particular and the
universal.4 According to Hegel, 'objective religion' is a doctrine which belongs to
the life-world in which it is preserved in outward experience, social norms and
historical discourse, but not one with which individuality is able to identify itself.
'Objective religion' poses itself as a transcendent beyond. It identifies the 'self in
terms which do not constitute individual experience in the world. It maintains its hold
on its subjects through social norms and custom long after belief in the doctrine has
passed. This contradiction between subjective belief and objective order comes to
naught when social and political disintegration is imminent. Under such
circumstances objective religious norms would subsist only through the use of
coercive force or a specific form of 'superstition', a spiritlessness which Hegel terms
'fetishism'.5
Hegel distinguished further between subjective and objective religion within
the context of Volksreligion, folk religion, which he deemed as the true objectified
spirit of inward subjective morality, which he recognised as belonging to the earlier
form of 'unconscious' or 'natural' wholeness. He recognised folk religion as the
"embodiment of the shared life animating people who participate in a common history
and enjoy ethical and cultural consensus."6 In folk religion, subjective religion "is
alive, is effective in the inwardness of our being, and is active in our outward
behavior. Subjective religion is fully individuated," whereas "objective religion is
abstraction,"7 i.e. formal. Volksreligion is Hegel's idealised image of the life
enjoyed by the Greeks, when the individual and the objective order blended in a
unified whole. It is what "generates and nourishes noble dispositions," and "goes
hand in hand with freedom," whereas the prevailing religion of his own day:
aims to educate men to be citizens of heaven whose gaze is
ever directed thither so that human feelings become alien to
them. At our greatest public festival, one draws near to
enjoy the heavenly gifts, in a garb of mourning and with
lowered gaze-at the festival, which ought to be the feast of
universal brotherhood, many a man is afraid he will catch
from the common cup the venereal infection of the one who
drank before him, so that his mind is not attentive, not
occupied with holy feelings, and during the function itself he
must reach into his pocket and lay his offering on the plate.8
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Hegel's critique of the religious spirit of late-eighteenth-century Germany is
present in the discussion on 'positive religion'. In the Positivity of Christian
Religion, Hegel contrasts 'positive religion' to 'natural religion', and states that
"positive religion is a contranatural or a supernatural one, containing concepts and
information transcending understanding and reason and requiring feelings and actions
which would not come naturally to men: the feelings are forcibly and mechanically
stimulated, the actions are done to order or from obedience without any spontaneous
interest."9 Hegel's view on positive religion highlights its capacity to separate, rather
than reconcile, the subject from the objective order. It also promotes and maintains
the alienation of subject from self in its very capacity to impose rather than stimulate
subjective compliance. 'Natural religion', on the other hand, is seen by Hegel to
contain the elements of synthesis between the subjective and objective orders.
However, it is incapable of revealing the spirit of the Supreme Being, because the
synthesis here is arbitrary, a given in which distinctions between the subjective realm
and the objective order have not yet come into being. In other words, individual
consciousness as such is not present in natural religion, and this is because
individuality is itself distinct from particularity. For Hegel, the individual is already a
product of synthesis between the particular and the universal.10 It is only in revealed
religion that this distinction is possible. It is possible because the moment of
negation, or individuality, provides the elements for consciousness to become aware
of itself and the world. For Hegel then, only revealed religion is capable of unveiling
the full truth. This is because Hegel saw revealed religion as the historical product of
natural religion, objectified in life-world structures, doctrines and scriptures. The
coming into being of revealed religion's positivity appears "when another mood
awakens," and once human nature at any given time in history "begins to have a
sense of itself and thereby to demand freedom in and for itself instead of placing it in
its supreme Being, then and only then can its former religion begin to appear a
positive one."11
The consciousness resulting from this recognition of positivity is one which
permits the actualisation of a higher level of freedom. It is a level of consciousness
that is superior to consciousness present in both 'natural' and 'positive' religion.
This is because the awareness of the subject of its subjectivity and position within the
objective order occurs, for Hegel, through a higher level of reflective consciousness
of the self by itself in and through the 'other', i.e. objective world. In this moment,
consciousness transcends both purely subjective and purely objective spheres, which
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is equally an overcoming of opposition and synthesis. This makes clear that for
Hegel, true freedom could not have been present in the Greek world, and is equally
lacking in positive religion. Hegel viewed the Romantic revolt against the positivity
of the religion of the day as the affirmation of the beginning of self-consciousness
expressing individuals' need to be one with their belief, i.e. to acquire a sense of
'wholeness'. This 'wholeness' is nevertheless different from that of natural religion
in so far as it is made by choice and not arbitrary, and that its presence in the objective
order is actual12 rather than abstracted, i.e. that 'wholeness' exists in the objective
world as a rational, and hence actualisable state.
Hegel illustrates how religion succeeds in helping individuals gain
consciousness of themselves, as individuals and not as particulars, in his account of
Abraham's experience of God. In the Spirit of Christianity and its Fate, Hegel
illustrates the negative moment of alienation by analysing how Abraham's goal of
human striving toward reconciliation with reality, which he took to be the
transcendent Lord, separated him from nature. In following the precepts of his Lord,
Abraham was forced to separate himself from his social, natural world, and
eventually from his own sense of self. Consequently, "mastery" became "the only
possible relationship in which Abraham could stand to the infinite world opposed to
him," but being "unable himself to make this mastery actual, it therefore remained
ceded to his Ideal."13 As Abraham "himself also stood under his Ideal's domination,
...he served the Idea, and so he enjoyed his Ideal's favor; and since its divinity was
rooted in his contempt for the whole world, he remained its only favorite."14 Thus,
Abraham became alien to his own nature, opposing everything which connected him
with his reality - a faithful nomad, who "was a stranger on earth, a stranger to the soil
and to men alike. Among men he always was a foreigner."15 In this discussion,
Hegel demonstrated that, although the first moment in revealed religion was the
separation of the self from its own essence, it was so only for the purpose of entering
into the moment of the 'self', becoming conscious of its 'self as consciousness.
This moment of consciousness of the selfs subjectivity and its essence present in the
objective order was none other than that: a moment in history, a moment in the
evolution toward the unity of particulars and their reconciliation with the whole.
Hegel believed that Abraham's faith accentuated the opposition between
humanity and nature, individual and society, alienating him further from his true
sense of self. In its extreme form, positive Christian religion operated very much in
the same way, i.e. as it posited the impossibility of the individual's reconciliation
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with the objective order as part of human existence, it promoted a definite clash
between Reality and Ideality thereby negating the very essence of Volksreligion.
According to Jean Hyppolite, for Hegel, Judaism
poses essence beyond existence and God outside of man.
By recognizing the duality of the extremes, I stand with the
nonessential. I am merely nothingness; my essence is
transcendent. But that my essence is not in me but posed
outside of me necessarily entails an effort on my part to
rejoin myself so as to free myself from nonessence. Human
life, thus, is an unceasing effort to attain itself. But this
effort is futile, because immutable consciousness is posed as
transcendent a principio.16
In his analysis of the Abrahamic faith and the positive spirit of Christianity, Hegel
was acutely aware of the nature of disillusionment of the Romantics of his age. They
expressed the failure of the self to attain its essence due to the eclipse of God as its
transcendent Other. After the French Revolution, a distinct separation between
Church and civil society became evident, leaving the individual to shoulder the
responsibility of defining human nature in the void left by the negation of the divine.
The Romantics protested against the void left by the Church, and sought to replace
the Christian God with a Nature that was viewed as Absolute. Nietzsche's cry "God
is dead" should not be considered simply as a heretical revolt, but also, and more
importandy, as a lamentation. According to Camus, Nietzsche was able to sieze upon
the nature of the disillusionment of the age, defining its nihilistic spirit in terms of an
'apocalypse to come'.17 Nietzsche expressed the Romantic revolt as "the inability to
believe and the disappearance of the primitive foundation of all faith-namely the belief
in life."18 For Camus, Nietzsche posed a question to which Hegel had already
sought to provide the answer, namely, "can one live believing in nothing?"19 To this
Nietzsche answered in the affirmative on the condition that one should create a system
out of the absence of faith, and accept the final consequences of nihilism, i.e. when
emerging into the empty desert of the objective order, one should feel and suffer
one's freedom with the same intensity as one does both pain and joy.20 Similarly,
Hegel's philosophy, contrary to Romanticism, sought a solution in which a
consciousness of self and of the objective universal (other) was no longer alienating
but uniting. It sought to find this solution in a state of social and political harmony,
where social and personal fragmentation could be avoided. This would occur
through the replacement of the objective order with a political association in which
individuals could live as social and rational beings whose subjective identity (essence)
was not opposed to their social and political existence. However, unlike Nietzsche,
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Hegel believed that Reason is capable of providing humanity with such a solution, for
he did not equate Reason with empirical science.
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel questions the logic used by Romantic
philosophers who criticise the state in their understanding of the nature of reason,
reason in nature, as well as the manner in which these two notions are conceived. He
does this with a view to alter the order of things on the social and political levels, and
shift all that is public to the private sphere in the name of the "idea that freedom of
thought, and of mind generally, evinces itself only in divergence from, indeed in
hostility to, what is publicly recognized."21 In the Science of Logic, Hegel
demonstrates that reason is freedom, and that this freedom is the affirmation of the
individual will in society through the medium of an objective 'other' which resides in
the ethical world, or more commonly, the constitution of the state. In other words,
reason symbolises the unity between the particular (citizen) and the universal (State),
or 'individual', in the social and political matrix. Reason in nature, as the Romantics
claim, is present at its most rudimentary stage. For Hegel, reason in nature is a
potentiality that has not been expressed through individual will and is not yet
conscious of itself nor the 'other' which resides outside it. For Hegel, the Romantics
"grant that it is nature as it is which philosophy has to bring within its ken, that the
philosopher's stone lies concealed somewhere within nature itself, that nature is
inherently rational, and that what knowledge has to investigate and grasp in concepts
is this actual reason present in it; not the formations and accidents evident to the
superficial observer, but nature's eternal harmony, its harmony, however, in the
sense of the law and essence imminent within it."22 Hegel contends that in this
definition, reason is not uniting but separating, not communal but private, not
evolved and self-conscious, but limited and material bound. The concept of reason in
nature ignores the evolution in social and political history, and leads its proponents to
believe that "a special and original" theory of the state ought to be discovered and
promulgated, suggesting that "no state or constitution had ever existed in the world at
all or was even in being at the present time."23 Hegel objects to this understanding of
reason which denies that the objective social order (ethical sphere) has "achieved
power and mastery" through reason, and that it is by reason that it "maintains itself
and has its home there."24
Reason as inherent in nature presents further problems. For Hegel, as
illustrated in the Theological Writings, reason is the overcoming of oppositions
through the lengthy process (in history) of the coming-into-being of consciousness of
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the individual of the elements (subjective and objective) which make up the social
world. By contast, Romantic reason, or reason as the "law and essence" of the
"harmony" in nature suggests that knowledge, and hence certainty regarding human
existence and relationships, appears only through the subjective understanding of
each individual. Knowledge and reason thereby become a given (since everyone is
essentially part of nature and partakes of the reason inherent within it) and do not
depend on a process of becoming, or coming-into-being. Consequently, the
knowledge of 'objective' truth appears difficult because as the "universe of mind"
(i.e. reason as it actualises itself in the element of self-consciousness) is left "to the
mercy of chance and caprice," the ethical world is emptied of its 'objective' content,
and becomes "Godless."25 Truth as 'objective' certainty would lie outside it because
it has become subjective truth and nothing else.26 Truth becomes 'my' truth, and not
a set of laws according to which all citizens within a state should abide. Thus
conceived, truth makes difficult the actualisation of the individual will in the objective
sphere, for in so far as it may vary from one individual to the next, truth itself, as
impassive and immutable, would not exist.
The Romantics understand truth in terms of what is, whereas Hegel
conceives truth as Notion, or conception of truth. Similarly, the Romantics conceive
of truth as what is 'real', whereas Hegel prefers to call it 'actual'. The Romantics
speak of 'perception' of the truth, and Hegel defines it as 'unfolding'. Hegel argues
that the Romantics commit the error of discounting the importance of 'unfolding'
because they concentrate on what is. In the Preface to the Phenomenology ofSpirit:,
Hegel refers to the Romantics' method of ascertaining Truth as:
[t]he more conventional opinion [which] gets fixated on the
antithesis of truth and falsity ... It does not comprehend the
diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive
unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements.
The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and
one might say that the former is refuted by the latter;
similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up
in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit
now emerges as the truth of it instead.27
This is what is loosely called 'empirical', or 'scientific' truth. Hegel condemns this
form of knowledge because in its 'anti-thetical' approach it fails to contain, or
acknowledge, mediation. Hegel defines mediation as "nothing beyond self-moving
selfsameness, or is reflection into self."28 Hegel would say that Abraham's first
moment of alienation consists in his knowledge of himself as separate from both
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nature and other individuals. Abraham's consciousness of his alien nature is a
'reflection' of God, or God's qualities. Mediation is, therefore, for Hegel the "T, or
becoming in general," or "is just immediacy in the process of becoming, and is the
immediate itself."29 According to Hegel, reflection is a necessary part of the dialectic
of truth since it consists of a "positive moment of the Absolute."30 It is in his
moment of reflection, i.e. alienation, that Abraham identifies himself as subject,
hence as a "moment of the Absolute."31
Hegel states that it "is reflection that makes the True a result, but it is equally
reflection that overcomes the antithesis between the process of its becoming and the
result, for this becoming is also simple, and therefore not different from the form of
the True which shows itself as simple in its result; the process of becoming is just this
return into simplicity."32 Here, Hegel is describing what in fact occurs behind the
'appearance' of 'simplicity'. That is, he claims that for Reason to be properly
'understood', it must be considered in its dialectical form, i.e. capable of perceiving
the movement underlying 'simple appearances'. Reason cannot be based, as the
Romantics perceive it, on "intuition" or on "immediate knowledge of the Absolute,
religion or being."33 Therefore, to the Romantics Hegel answers in the affirmative
that the "True is the whole," but argues that the whole "is nothing other than the
essence consummating itself through its development."34 However, this cannot
occur without the "purposive activity" implied in the Notion of "development,"35 or
becoming.
Hegel's critique of Romanticism stems from his use of the dialectical method
which deals with the development of "isness" into "nothingness"36 and vice versa.
This movement permits the identification of a third category, becoming. It identifies
the passage of nothing into being (origination) and the passage of being into nothing
(decease).37 Hegel's critique of the Romantics is based on their reluctance to
perceive an identity between the 'isness' and 'nothingness', the finite and infinite.
Because the Romantics perceive a separation between finitude and infinity, they
attempt to overcome the first by 'being' or positing themselves in terms of the
second. As they perceive the 'infinite' in terms of 'God', hence in terms of other¬
worldly experience, they seek to establish this divine quality through imagination and
dreams. However, this attainment of 'infinity' is not a moment that is grounded in
'consciousness' as an 'isness', but "is related to a twofold antithetic essence; it is in
its own self a contradiction, and is distraught in its inmost being."38 This occurs
because in order for the 'living' authors of the Romantic movement to be 'infinite',
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they must negate the very essence of their existence. The dialectic they would use
must contain not one, but two antithetical moments. The first moment is that of self-
negation (against finitude), and the second is a negation of the world (against being in
general). This occurs because imagination and other forms of other-worldly
experience, as Sartre would later illustrate,39 makes necessary a break with both the
self and the world. Indeed, for Hegel, the Romantics' use of antithetical categories
forces them to view themselves as either finite, or infinite, but never both. Hegel
states that this moment of twofold antithesis "reveals itself to be this inner perversion
of itself, to be a deranged consciousness which finds that its essential being is
immediately non-essential, its reality immediately an unreality."40 Reflecting on the
state of mental agitation afflicting the Romantics of his age, Hegel concludes, that
their need to be both 'infinite' while consistently rejecting their 'finiteness' may
eventually drive them to "madness."41
In the following, I shall point out the adverse consequences that Hegel
acknowledges to be the result of the Romantics understanding of Reason as empirical
knowledge. First, for Hegel, the Romantics use 'intuition' to perceive God, but use
Reason - empirical and scientific - to ground this knowledge into reality, i.e. to act
according to God's will on earth. Consequently, God is posited in an equivocal
fashion. On the one hand, God is posited as the Absolute Subject, other-worldly,
remote and inaccessible, but on the other, God is also knowable. Hegel argues that
such positing is "meaningless," because "what is posited is not a being [i.e.
something that merely is], or essence, or a universal in general, but rather something
that is reflected into itself, a Subject."42 Hegel adds that this positing of Absolute
Subject is faulty as the very action of 'positing' makes of the Notion of Absolute
Subject an impossible 'actuality', "for the anticipation posits the subject as an inert
point, whereas actuality is self-movement."43 By this Hegel means to point out that
to perceive God through intuition cannot be compatible with knowing God through
purely empirical Reason (i.e. a reason based on antithesis). Both means express the
Romantics' distinction between the finite and infinite, and their inability to perceive
any form of mediation. In employing these methods they merely posit God as a
fixed and non-developing notion, which is essentially contradictory to the idea that
God is Absolute will. Hegel would argue that because the Romantics are incapable of
conceiving of their reality in terms of 'actuality', i.e. in terms of 'becoming', they are
blind to the fact that they are both finite and infinite. For Hegel, all rational beings
partake of this dialectic. He maintains that infinity is not the privilege of the 'divine'
soul, as the Romantics would have it, but the state of all those capable of reflecting on
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the nature of the categories. Hegel defines the Romantics' wish to constitute the
expression of the "heart-throb for the welfare of humanity," as "passing into the
ravings of an insane self-conceit, into the fury of consciousness to preserve itself
from destruction; and it does this by expelling from itself the perversion which it is
itself, and by striving to look on it and express it as something else."44
Second, Hegel is critical of the Romantics' conception of self-consciousness.
The Romantics' understanding of Reason as empirical knowledge, or knowledge as
sense-certainty, represents for Hegel "the most abstract and poorest truth," for "all
that it says about what it knows is just that it is; and its truth contains nothing but the
sheer being of the thing [Sache]."45 Hegel states that what is lacking in sense-
certainty is the acknowledgement of immediacy and mediation,46 Hegel contends that
sense-certainty is based on the distinction which occurs immediately between the
perceiver, the 'I', and the perceived, the 'object'. Sense-certainty is aware of the
object in terms of a 'This' that is 'not-I'. However, this knowledge is never
immediate, but is mediated through something else, the other. This type of
knowledge is equally true of consciousness, for consciousness is aware of the truth
through the recognition and overcoming of the untruth.41 Consciousness is both
reflection and distinction,48 and is also the moment of the coming-into-being of self-
consciousness. Deprived of mediation, the Romantics' approach to self-
consciousness from consciousness is thereby limited. For Hegel, the first moment of
self-consciousness is consciousness, "and the whole expanse of the sensuous world
is preserved for it, but at the same time only as connected with the second moment,
the unity of self-consciousness with itself ..., i.e. it is Desire in general."49 Self-
consciousness is desire which satisfies its certainty for itself in the destruction of the
"independent object."50 As perpetual desire, self-consciousness is none other than a
first moment of negation (i.e. consciousness as not-I), and can achieve its
"satisfaction only in another self-consciousness,"51
Hegel states that self-consciousness "exists in and for itself when, and by the
fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged,"52 or
recognised. This moment of recognition is essential because "first, it has lost itself,
for it finds itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other,
for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its own self."53
This process of recognition is of vital importance, for Hegel maintains that the
process of self-knowledge through the other must be reciprocal, i.e. that the other
must also be experiencing this process of self-consciousness through recognition.
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On this Hegel states that self-consciousness "is aware that it at once is, and is not,
another consciousness, and equally that this other is for itself only when it supersedes
itself as being for itself, and is for itself only in the being-for-self of the other."54 In
this situation, "each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates
itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an
immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this
mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another."55
However, recognition is only the first moment of self-consciousness, for
there remains the need to ground this consciousness of the self in reality, i.e. as
determinate being. Self-consciousness continues to be pure, or abstract
consciousness until it enters into "a life-and-death struggle,"56 for until then it is
indeterminate consciousness, a self-reflected consciousness into itself. Hegel argues
that the two self-conscious individuals confronting each other "must engage in this
struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in
the case of the other and in their own case."57 Only when both lives are preserved in
an act of "negation coming from consciousness,"58 does self-consciousness learn that
"life is essential to it as pure self-consciousness."59 However, the result of the
struggle is not an identical form of self-consciousness, but one that is "pure self-
consciousness," i.e. Lord, and a consciousness that is for another, "i.e. is a merely
immediate consciousness, or consciousness in the form of thinghood,"60 i.e.
bondsman. Hegel argues that both moments are essential, "since to begin with they
are unequal and opposed, and their reflection into a unity has not yet been achieved,
they exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent
consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is the dependent
consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another."61 Hegel
states that both self-conscious individuals acted freely. The lord chose not to take
away the bondsman's life, and the bondsman chose bondage to death. The
bondsman appears to have simply delayed the affirmation of his for-self, and chose to
become for-another as means to self-preservation. Hegel shows him capable of
eventually turning the situation around, and becoming lord himself, in and through
his ability to be first for-another, for in being so he is also being-for-self. This is
possible, because in becoming the middle term necessary for the maintenance of the
lord's being-for-self, the bondsman develops his self-consciousness through this
mediation, for in it he constitutes all three moments. He is object for the lord, but is
also 62for-another to the lord, and a being-for-self vis a vis the 'object', however,
only as a for-self that is mediated through a moment of being-for-another. The
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bondsman cannot express pure desire vis a vis the object, i.e. annihilate it, but "only
works on it."63 Hegel recognises that it is only in fear that the bondsman is able to
experience his own negativity, for fear drives him to exert himself in a formative
activity, which becomes the medium of the actualisation of his being-for-self, the
grounding of it in the objective order.64
For Hegel, the Romantics, like the Stoics, define freedom in terms of self-
consciousness. This is possible insofar as consciousness "as the infinitude of
consciousness or as its own pure movement, is aware of itself as essential being, a
being which thinks or is a free self-consciousness."65 Hegel adds that thought itself
is not abstract, but is a Notion that is both a "picture-thought" and "something that
immediately is."66 In this sense, the Notion is itself distinct from simple thought
insofar as it is "immediate and distinct unity"67 of thought and being. Therefore, for
the Romantics and Stoics, "in thinking, I am free, because I am not in an other, but
remain simply and solely in communion with myself, and the object, which is for me
the essential being, is in undivided unity my being-for-myself; and my activity in
conceptual thinking is a movement within myself."68 However, for Hegel, this type
of freedom remains unactualised because it is "indifferent to natural existence and has
therefore let this equally go free."69 As "freedom in thought has only pure thought as
its truth, a truth lacking in the fullness of life [, so] ... [f]reedom in thought, too, is
only the Notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself."70 In maintaining
this form, Hegel argues, self-consciousness as freedom is reduced to "contentless
thought," whose Notion "as an abstraction cuts itself off from the multiplicity of
things, and thus has no content in its own self but one that is given to it."71
Unlike the Stoics, however, the Romantics were able to ground this freedom
in reality, (i.e. in art, science, etc.), but instead of making of freedom a determinate
reality, they posited its actualisation in the infinite, thereby making use of a second
negation.72 By using the dialectic as "a negative movement,"73 the Romantics caused
to "vanish" both "objective reality," and their "relationship to it."74 This form of
consciousness is that of the "unconscious, thoughtless rambling which passes back
and forth from the one extreme of self-identical self-consciousness to the other
extreme of the contingent consciousness that is both bewildered and bewildering."75
In itself, this Romantic self-consciousness is aware of this duality, but does not seek
for it any synthesis. At one moment "it recognizes that its freedom lies in rising
above all the confusion and contingency of existence, and at another time equally
admits to a relapse into occupying itself with what is unessential. It pronounces an
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absolute vanishing, but the pronouncement is, and this consciousness is the
vanishing that is pronounced."76 Hegel calls this the Unhappy Consciousness. It is
"unhappy, inwardly disrupted consciousness, since its essentially contradictory
nature is for it a single consciousness, must for ever have present in the one
consciousness the other also; and thus it is driven out of each in turn in the very
moment when it imagines it has successfully attained to a peaceful unity with the
other."77 The Romantics' unhappy consciousness, argues Hegel, is "the gazing of
one self-consciousness into another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is also its
essential nature," however, it is not as yet "explicitly aware that this is its essential
nature, or that it is the unity of both."78 The Romantics' unawareness of human
nature as both "Changeable" and "Unchangeable," causes them to remain bound to
this inner contradiction that is "merely the contradictory movement in which one
opposite does not come to rest in its opposite, but in it only produces itself afresh as
an opposite."79
According to Hegel, the Romantics, like the Humanists before them,
employed Reason to instrumental and immediate ends. In separating Reason from the
end, or telos, the Romantics were unable to overcome the duality of the
consciousness of their existence in and through Reason, because they were unable to
perceive of Reason as mediation in Nature, but only as subordinate and opposed to it.
Freedom, for Hegel, must start in thought, and thought must be teleological.
Therefore, before developing Hegel's 'Concept of Freedom' in section 3, it is
imperative to define, briefly, what Hegel means by teleological reason, the end, and
its actualisation. To this we now turn.
Teleology in Hegel's Logic
In the Science ofLogic, Hegel makes the distinction between 'Teleology' and
'Mechanism', and bases this distinction on the identification of the opposition
between causae efficientes and causae finales -between efficient and final causes.
Here, Hegel identifies a controversial view of the "absolute essence of the World,"
which is based upon either a "blind natural Mechanism," or an understanding which
determines itself by its ends. Hegel links this antinomy to that of "fatalism or
determinism and freedom."80 Schiller's, and, later on, Romanticism's, Mechanism
is fatalist in the sense that it does not manifest self-determination through the use of
"efficient causes", i.e. it contains no expression of a free will.81 It does so because it
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posits its determinateness in the 'object' which lies outside it. In a direct sense, its
product is not a finality in and for itself, rather it appears as the means to another end
which is in itself finite. Teleology, on the other hand, is, in its own content, primary.
It supposes a Notion which is determinate in and for itself, and "therefore, self-
determining." Teleology makes a definite distinction between form and content,
where the latter determines its unity. The teleological content cannot be finite, nor
trivial. In its very nature teleological content is a totality which aims towards
infinity.82 The true essence of teleology may have been, and indeed for Hegel, was,
trivialised by the Romantics through the positing of finite objectives (the pure 'I') as
its end, thereby rendering it insignificant and even contemptible.83 Due to the
absolutist character of teleology, the positing of finite objects as an end will
necessarily drive "a more universal thought ...[to] feel infinitely cramped or even
nauseated"84. For Hegel, the very essence of freedom lies in the true infinite, rather
than the immediate finite.85
Hegel develops the process of the synthesis between the Finite and Infinite in
the third book of the Science ofLogic in the chapter on Teleology. Hegel's structure
of teleology resembles Kant's method in the third Critique, wherein the latter
introduces a distinction between relative and external adequacy to an end.,86
According to Hegel, Kant's achievement lies in his introduction of the teleological
theory of a reflecting faculty of judgement, thereby, making a connection between the
universality of reason and subjective intuition. He also succeeds in distinguishing
between the reflective universal faculty of reason and the determining faculty which
allows him to consider the latter to merely subsume "the particular under the
universal."87 The subsuming nature of the universal is "an abstract which becomes
concrete only in an other, the particular."88 The end is therefore the "concrete
universal which contains in itself the moment of particularity and externality, and
consequently is active and is the impulse to repel itself from itself."89 Kant
succeeded in presenting the notion of 'life' or the Idea as the outcome of a syllogistic
argument, wherein there exists a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion.
This is how Hegel defines the process of end-realisation which appears in terms of
three stages of the end: Subjective end, the Means to the end, and end-actualisation.
In this process the end is actualised through the other, through the means, hence, in
externality; what allows this other to be subsumed in the universal is the reflective
teleology of the subjective end, which is expressed through intentionality of the Idea
of the end. This externality does not effect the nature of the telos, rather the relation
between the telos, the subject, and the other constitute the "truth which is in and for
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itself, which judges objectively and absolutely determines external objectivity."90
The nature of the relation between the three factors is syllogistic, the outcome of
which is necessarily internal, expressing an internal truth. For Hegel, "The End" is
"the complementary third term ofMechanism and Chemism; it is their truth."91
The syllogistic argument of teleology is constructed in such a manner as to
extend from the particular to the universal through the 'other'. In the centrality of the
objective sphere, the concept of the subject discovers and posits the "negative point of
unity."92 Through the positing of objective realm as the "notion-determination,"
subjectivity has now posited its determinateness in externality, rendering its very
unity as "self-repelling," while admitting a process of "self-preserving" unity.93 This
expresses the unity of opposites, or the unity of freedom and necessity. The end is
here expressed as subjectivity's impulse towards external self-positing, which
channels force and cause from accidental and opposing effects into the content which
must be "reasonable" in its existence.94 Its "reasonableness" is due to its capacity to
express "the concrete notion which preserves the objective distinction in its absolute
unity."95 This unity of opposites by virtue of its own self-relation combines both
"intro-reflection of form" and "individuality."96 The nature of this reflection is "(1)
Inner universality of the subject, and (2) Reflection outwards."97 It is in this manner
that the end remains subjective while its activity "is directed against external
objectivity."98 As the telos of the subject, the end is now "this total intro-Reflection
of Objectivity, and is so immediately."99 As objectivity, it is first posited as self-
determination or particularity, distinct from the concrete form. It is also finite
although it is posited as infinite subjectivity.100 This is so due to the form it takes
wherein the determinateness is expressed through objective indifference thereby
acquiring the form of a "presupposition."101 Its finite character is mainly associated
with its need to express its objectivity in reality. The subject's need to express its
objectivity renders its self-determining activity, or identity "immediately external to
itself, and as much as it is intro-Reflection it is Reflection outwards."102
This subjective positing of the end contains an absolute negative unity, the
overcoming of which presupposes the necessity to transcend the "positing of the
negative as against the subject."103 This positing, being the first step in the negation
of the objective world, does not realise the end, but signifies the mean, the first step
to the end. For its very realisation, the end requires a medium, "that is, a Mean,
which at the same time has the shape of an external Determinate Being, indifferent to
the End itself and to its realisation."104 The mean represents the "formal middle of a
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formal syllogism; it is external as against the extreme of the Subjective End, and
consequently also against the extreme of the Objective End."105 In its particularity,
the nature of the mean is indifferent to the purpose it serves, its place can be taken by
any other.106 The mean is also a particularity only because "it is determinateness in
relation to one extreme and universal in relation to the other,"107 thereby rendering its
very nature relative, i.e. expressed through others. The relationship between the
means to the end is purely external, its only immediate relation is present in intro-
Reflection found in the realm of the subject. Hence, the end remains at first as merely
"external determinateness" in the means, and so it is realised outside it as a "negative
unity."108 The means itself is a "mechanical object" which is shaped by the end as a
mere "determinateness and not as simple concretion of the totality."109 The end, as
an 'activity', and not a mere impulse or 'tendency', remains in need of an objective
return to itself in order for it to acquire its totality.
Due to the external relationship of the means to the end, the process of
realisation of the determinateness of the means will always be external to the end. It
can only reach the objectivity of the end by transcending this externality through
intro-Reflection. Hegel argues that the very nature of the means, as an activity which
carries within it the Notion of the end, remains subjective unless this Notion reaches
beyond subjectivity to include the universality and infinitude of the objective. The
consistent presence of the Objective Notion in the two previous stages, (i.e., through
the Subjective End expressed in intro-Reflection and the means posited by this End),
ensures the realisation of the End through its Other, to which it is identical, and
whose very embodiment is subsumed in the Notion. The product of the means, as
external object, becomes the Objective Other, the identity of which is subsumed and
transcended by the Objective Notion. For Hegel, the full realisation of the End
through its identical Other cannot be the product of a finite Notion of Subjectivity.
Rather, it is the product of a subjective activity within which the Objective, of
Universal Notion, is necessarily present, and which in turn directs and shapes its
action, hence its means. In this respect Hegel explains:
the subjectivity of the finite Notion contemptuously casts
aside the Means - and, reaching its goal, has reached nothing
better than this. But the reflection that the End is reached in
the Means and that in the fulfilled End the Means and
mediation are preserved, is the last result of the external End-
relation, - a result which, after transcending itself, this
relation has exhibited as its truth.110
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This process of end-realisation represents the passage of "Subjectivity or
Being-for-self of the Notion ... over into its Being-in-self or Objectivity."111 In this
process the Notion or the Idea determines itself in such a manner that its concreteness
or particularity is external Objectivity, and its concrete unity is self-realisation.
Within its very process of realisation lies the unity of opposites, where the identity of
Objectivity is the simple Notion, hence immediate Objectivity. However, it is at the
same time a process of mediation, and "is that simple immediacy only through the
latter as self-transcending mediation."112
Hegel's theory of teleology develops the process of the overcoming of the
dichotomy of the Romantic age in 'ideal' terms, and lays the ground to a different
way of conceiving of Infinity and Finitude. Hegel had to go further in his philosophy
and complete it by introducing a practical manual in which this process of synthesis
may be made applicable. Unlike the Romantics, whose vision of their own 'quality'
is that of possessors of the divine potentiality, i.e. Creativity, Hegel goes so far as to
allow the different forces in society to gain a definite grasp of their reality and
translate it into self-actualisation and lived freedom. This form of self-actualisation as
freedom in the world is illustrated in the Philosophy ofRight.
Hegel's 'Concept of Freedom' and the Philosophy of Right
In the Introduction to the Philosophy ofRight, Hegel states that "the subject-
matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right, i.e. the concept of
right together with the actualization of that concept."113 More specifically, "the basis
of right, is, in general, mind"114 For Hegel, mind "has or rather makes
consciousness its object: i.e. whereas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the
ego with its other, the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it
only knows."115 The mind is able to do so because it is governed by the principle
explained above with relation to end-realisation, i.e. the principle of "all reason that
the contents are at once potentially existent, and are the mind's own, in freedom."116
Similarly, as with the idea of the Notion, the mind consists of a twofold aspect "-as
being and as its own: by the one, the mind finds in itself something which is, by the
other it affirms it to be only its own."111 As form and consciousness, the mind is
therefore both theoretical and practical. The mind is theoretical, insofar as it "has to
do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has
to free knowledge from its pre-supposedness and therefore from its abstractness and
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make the affection subjective."118 The mind is practical as will, insofar as "its
content is at first only its own, and is immediately willed."119 Both aspects of the
mind "reciprocally integrate themselves precisely because they are distinguished ...
for both ... what is produced - though in different ways - is that which constitutes
Reason, a unity of subjectivity and objectivity."120 Therefore, to return to Hegel's
definition of the concept of Right as 'generally mind', this would indicate that in the
first instance, Hegel perceives the abstract notion of right as an interrelated activity of
theoretical and practical mind, i.e. the moment when mind "confronts itself as free
mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-sidedness,"121 hence, when mind
appears as free will.
Indeed, for Hegel, the mind's "precise place and point of origin is the will.
The will is free, so that freedom is both the substance of right and its goal, while the
system of right is the realm of freedom made actual, the world of mind brought forth
out of itself like a second nature."122 The will is the unity of two sides, an abstract,
indeterminate side which "involves the dissipation of every restriction and every
content either immediately presented by nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, or
given and determined by any means whatever," which manifests "the unrestricted
infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thought of oneself,"123 and
the determined side which commits "the transition from undifferentiated
indeterminacy to the differentiation, determination and positing of a determinacy as a
content and object."124 Therefore the will is "particularity reflected into itself and so
brought back to universality, i.e. it is individuality."125 It is "the ^//-determination
of the ego,"126 and as such is free.
The first aspect of the will is considered by Hegel to be responsible for the
Romantics' understanding of freedom as essentially negative. For they "regard
thinking as one special faculty, distinct from the will..., and ... contend that thinking
is prejudicial to the will, especially the good will."127 By restricting their will to the
moment of negation, the Romantics seemed to lack the force of actualisation, or
determination of the will. For Hegel, the moment of actualisation of the will requires
"an object of the will that is at the same time also the dissipation of the restriction of
the will."128 This object is ultimately found in thought. For Hegel, "it becomes clear
that it is only as thinking intelligence that the will is genuinely a will and free."129
Or, "true liberty ... consists in the will finding its purpose in a universal content, not
in subjective or selfish interest. But such content is only possible in thought and
through thought."130
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For Hegel, the proper object of the will is contained in the absolute universal
or rational.131 In its practical extent, the will must find its object in terms of the
"principle of right, morality and all ethical life,"132 which constitute the state.
Indeed, for Hegel, "the absolute goal, or, the absolute impulse, of free mind is to
make its freedom its object, i.e. to make freedom objective as much in the sense that
freedom shall be the rational system of mind, as in the sense that freedom shall be the
world of its immediate actuality. In making freedom its object, mind's purpose is to
be explicitly, as Idea, what the will is implicitly. The definition of the concept of the
will in abstraction from the Idea of the will is 'the free will which wills the free
will'."133 In the principle of right, morality and all ethical life, Hegel finds the
embodiments of what would constitute for us, as citizens of the state, the objective
order in which stands objectified, as it were, the object of the will as freedom. This
is clear in Hegel's definition of the constitution of the state. As constitution, the
dialectic of right, viz. the principle of right, moral and ethical worlds, appears as the
actualisation of the science of right insofar as it defines and brings-into-being the
elements necessary for the actions of the free will. To illustrate this, it is necessary to
outline of the workings of the Hegelian state.
In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel defines the object of his
work: "This book, then, containing as it does the science of the state, is to be nothing
other than the endeavor to apprehend and portray the state as something inherently
rational. As a work of philosophy, it must be poles apart from an attempt to construct
a state as it ought to be. The instruction which it may contain cannot consist in
teaching the state what it ought to be; it can only show how the state, the ethical
universe, is to be understood."134 For Hegel, "the basis of the state is the power of
reason actualizing itself as will."135 The state is distinguished from civil society
insofar as it is grounded in Reason, and as such is a power which craves the
universal whether in the realm of thought or in the realm of ethics. By contrast, civil
society, is a social and political arrangement wherein "each member is his own end,
everything else is nothing to him. But except in contact with others he cannot attain
the whole compass of his ends, and therefore these others are means to the end of the
particular member."136 Although ruled by a public authority, civil society has not yet
attained the universality of a state in whose legal constitution is the actualisation of the
Idea within which is to be found subsumed the elements of the moral and ethical
precepts.
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In §259 Hegel writes that "the Idea of the state has immediate actuality and is
the individual state as a self - dependent organism - the constitution or constitutional
law." Hegel's constitution determines the organisation of the state, and this includes
the specification of the rights, duties, and activities of the citizens. The state, is
organised in three basic powers: the determining power of the universal - the
Legislature, the overcoming of particularities by the universal - the Executive, and the
ultimate subjective power of the will - the Crown.137 Although distinct in their
function, all three powers are interrelated and interdependent; only their coming-into-
being together can maintain the rational status of the state's sovereignty: "Sovereignty
depends on the fact that the particular functions and powers of the state are not self-
subsistent or firmly grounded either on their own account or in the particular will of
the individual functionaries, but have their roots ultimately in the unity of the state as
their single self."138 It is important to note the recurring dialectic of freedom, i.e. the
universal sphere (Legislature), the particular sphere (Executive), the expression of
free subjective will (Crown). For Hegel, freedom as actualised subjective will is a
product of a necessary synthesis between particular and universal. As such, it is
neither a flight from what is, nor an arbitrary expression of impulses. Moreover,
freedom as universal subjective will is neither completely subjective nor completely
objective, but a blending of both spheres in and through thought.
Hegel introduces safe-guards for freedom both in the essence of the state as a
rational entity, and, in practice, in the distribution of power in the constitution. In the
beginning of the discussion on the concept of the state Hegel writes: "Rationality,
taken generally and in the abstract, consists in the thorough-going unity of the
universal and the single. Rationality, concrete in the state, consists (a) so far as its
content is concerned, in the unity of objective freedom (i.e. freedom of the universal
or substantial will) and subjective freedom (i.e. freedom of everyone in his knowing
and in his volition of particular ends); and consequently, (b) so far as its form is
concerned, and self-determining action on laws and principles which are thoughts and
so universal."139 Here, the constitution as the reality and rationality of the state
represents, and indeed promotes, the realisation of subjective freedom as personal
expression, and objective freedom as the rational expression of the community of
individuals who constitute the state. This is realised in the form which Hegel
attributes to the constitution and the role of each of its three levels of power.
The individual as subjective free will participates in the political process
(which also represents objective freedom) indirectly by the medium of the legislature,
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which is composed ofmembers elected by the people. The Legislature "is concerned
(a) with the laws as such in so far as they require fresh and extended determination;
and (b) with the content of home affairs affecting the entire state."140 The Legislature
not only determines the rights and duties of individuals and groups, but also acts as
the universal in terms of positing itself as the uniting factor, or the bridge141
mediating the powers of the state. Also, as is suggested by M. Mitias,142 the
Legislature, in its capacity to alter the laws according to the actual desires and wishes
of the people, reflects the stage at which a given community is to be considered a state
in the rational sense. Although the Executive is entrusted with the determination of
the law this is not absolute: "the Estates are a guarantee of the general welfare and
public freedom. A little reflection will show that this guarantee does not lie in their
particular power of insight, because the highest civil servants necessarily have a
deeper and more comprehensive insight into the nature of the state's organization and
requirements."143 Thus, the Executive cannot act to alter the law without the
agreement of the Legislature and the acquiescence of the Crown. Hegel proposes that
the Estates "possess a political and administrative sense and temper, no less than a
sense for the interests of individuals and particular groups," for "the significance of
their position is that, in common with the organized executive, they are a middle term,
preventing both the extreme isolation of the power of the crown, which otherwise
might seem a mere arbitrary tyranny, and also the isolation of the particular interests
of the persons, societies, and Corporations."144
A remark should be added here concerning the process of self-actualisation of
the individual in the Hegelian Philosophy of Right. It is clear that Hegel's system
maintains a class system which has earned the reputation of being reactionary and
against the process of democratisation, the elements of which have been developing
since the French Revolution. It is also clear that Hegel maintains that, within a proper
state, to every age there is a constitution which reflects the moment of its development
and progress. His own age, imbibed with Romantic spirit and suffering from deep
fragmentation of the inner individual, on the one hand, and that of the guild and civil
society on the other, can only allow the resolution of the primary problems at hand
through the system he proposes in the Philosophy of Right; that is, to replace the
guild, Hegel suggested that the individuals in the commercial class should organise
themselves under the auspices of Corporations (through which the particularity of
each individual can be expressed and reflected on the social level) the purpose of
which is to be the representative, and the mean toward the synthesis between the
individual/particular with the Universal. The interrelatedness of each class to the
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others through the established rules of the constitution seeks to maintain the process
of synthesis between individual and particular at each social level in the state. Given
the historical and socio-political elements with which Hegel contended, it is therefore
possible to argue against the claims branding his position as outrightly reactionary.
Hegel's answer to the problem posed by the Romantics shows his deep
understanding not merely of the intellectual spirit of his age, but also of the socio¬
political and economic developments which were taking place. However, like
Schiller, his work suffered many distortions in the hands of his disciples, and later
came to be associated, by modern writers as well, such as J. Plamenatz, J. Maritain
among others, as "against democracy," "illiberal" or even downright "totalitarian."145
This chapter aimed to make a clear distinction between the Romantics and Hegel,
which is particularly necessary since Hegel's critique of Romanticism proves to be
equally applicable to the philosophies of both modernists and postmodernists. It is
perhaps significant that as we approach the end of the twentieth century, we also
stand at the threshold of not only a new century, but also, and more importantly, at
the moment of a great deal of geo-political restructuring and ideological questioning
regarding the meaning of the state as a viable social and political entity, of the
economic need to forego self-identity and blend into the universal, and the fearful
demise of our small planet by either atomic bombs or by ecological disaster. Parallels
between the Romantic era and ours abound both in the nature of the political spirit,
and in the intellectual revolt against a given ideology, that is exemplified in
postmodernism; however, we need not follow their example, but heed, to a certain
extent, the analytical gift that Hegel has left us as a social and political legacy.
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Chapter II: Disenchantment or Emotivism?
Weber and Maclntyre on Freedom in Modernity
Far from exemplifying the coming-into-being of Hegel's theory of freedom,
the present chapter seeks to tell the story of the difference between what the modern
state established in terms of freedom and the kind of freedom that Hegel believed was
in our grasp. Max Weber and Alasdair Maclntyre tell of the fall of the age into
separation and distinction, rather than harmony and synthesis. This chapter has a
twofold objective. First, it seeks to distinguish between theory and practice by
establishing that the type of modernity that is conceived of having taken place (in the
writing ofWeber for instance) is distinct from the theory expounded by Hegel. This
distinction is necessary, for, as we shall see in Part III on postmodernism, critiques
ofmodernity often take the shape of critiques of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. The
second objective is concerned with establishing the nature of the debates that so-called
'modernists' engaged in. Although Weber and Maclntyre approach the study of
freedom and modernity from two opposed sides, they nevertheless portray it as
caught in a game of separation of fact from value. Weber commends and Maclntyre
condemns, yet both tended to perceive freedom in terms of this basic separation.
Unlike Hegel, the theoretical alternatives they sought maintained this separation,
viewing it either directly (Weber) as a necessity, or indirectly (Maclntyre) as
essentially natural. Furthermore, they did not apply dialectics as a tool for the
development of a socio-political theory. They are therefore childern of Schiller's
second phase, suggesting that the third phase -the synthesis of opposites - is yet to be
achieved.
(a) Weber: Reason and the Disenchanted
What is often repeated by critics of the Enlightenment tradition regarding the
work ofMax Weber concerns primarily Weber's definition of the state of the world in
the term "disenchanted". The word itself is equivocal; it contains both a positive and
a negative connotation. Positively, disenchantment signifies 'freedom from
enchantment'; negatively it is expressed as 'disillusionment'. It is curious that the
phrase Weber used is often understood in its negative connotation by those whom
Gellner calls Hegelians. In this Chapter analyses will aim to define what Weber
understood by modernity's Enlightenment. Weber's understanding of reason as
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liberation is equivocal and appears to be both in agreement and at odds with the
Enlightenment tradition. On the one hand, reason is freedom, not a Hegelian
actualisation of the self-determined individual will, but the smooth operation of a
capitalist market and all the material satisfaction which this implies; reason is therefore
instrumental. Briefly, freedom is material plenitude actualised as freedom of choice
in the market (this regardless of the nature of the good). On the other hand, the
Hegelian freedom of individuals actualised in social roles is rejected by Weber who
views any type of individualistic freedom as irrational. Weber would agree with
Hegel in that individuals should join society in terms of social roles, such as their
necessary participation in bureaucracy, but he would not see this as freedom, since
any socially imposed role is itself an imposition and cannot maintain individual
freedom. Weber's position regarding the safeguarding of the sanctity of the
individual's liberty within society leads him into problems whose ramifications will
be brought forward through a consistent contrast of his position with Hegel's.
Similarities and differences in the whole project of both authors will be discussed in
light of what both recognised as what is 'possible' for their own socio-political
reality. Questions of what is 'desirable' are posed with respect to the nature of the
social telos which is common to both thinkers, viz. realisation of freedom for the
modern individual as the expression of a freely developed subjectivity in a society
which promotes this very concept of freedom. This Chapter begins with Weber's
definition of the nature and function of scientific rationality as it is applied to social
organisation. Second, there will be an exposition of his understanding of what
defines 'individual freedom' and how it may be recognised as the ultimate social
telos. Finally, the practical side to Weber's social edifice is presented in his view of
the process of differentiation as applied to society.
Freedom as Disenchantment
Following in the Enlightenment tradition, Max Weber, in "Science as a
Vocation,"1 defined the advantages of modernity's adoption of scientific rationality in
the educational system of universities. When comparing the 'meaning' which science
held for a Bacon and a Galileo with the scientists of the Enlightenment, Weber
denounced the 'intellectualism' which permeated the interpretation of science in the
Classical Age, and commended modern youth who recognise modernity's purpose as
the "redemption from the intellectualism of science in order to return to one's own
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nature and therewith to nature in general," adding in a lighter tone: "Science as a way
to art? Here no criticism is even needed."2 Similarly, Weber condemned academics
who remain attached to the Humanist idea of science, that is, as a means to the
knowledge of God. On this he commented:
...during the period of the rise of the exact sciences ... the
scientific worker ... conceived to be his task: to show the
path to God. ... Who -aside from certain big children who
are indeed found in the natural sciences- still believes that the
findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could
teach us anything about the meaning of the world? ... If
these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are
apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as the
'meaning' of the universe die out at its very roots.3
The "big children," to whom Weber referred here, are later more specifically
recognised as those found occupying "university chairs or editorial offices."4 He
clearly identified their attachment to the Humanist definition of liberty as a negative
influence on modernity's youth, for he saw it as leading them into craving religious
experiences in the practice of reason of everyday activity. For Weber, this attitude
signifies the very fall into the 'irrational', a state whose advent is necessary insofar as
it prompts the raising to consciousness and analysis of the elements which feed it.
Irrationalism is for Weber, as Romanticism was for Hegel, the necessary moment of
negation, a moment in whose wake an eventual "emancipation" of science "from
intellectualism" may occur. Science, defined as "the technique of mastering life
which rests upon science,"5 is here conceived of as the form, i.e. as reason, rather
than the substantive content of the life-world.
Weber defined what he called "intellectualization" in terms of a distinction
which he made between the idea of "progress" and the increase in knowledge about
the life-world of every Western individual. In this distinction Weber argued that the
increasing complexity of the modern world, far from allowing individuals a better
knowledge of its mechanism and function, acts as an alienating factor thereby leaving
individuals 'disenchanted'. Weber rejected the idea that Western progress necessarily
leads individuals to gain a greater mastery over their world for, compared to a savage,
modern individuals seem to know far less about the institutions which organise and
rule their lives. It is worth noting that this is the conception which may have been
responsible for the misunderstanding of Weber's attitude toward the process of
disenchantment. Weber seems to lead his readers to believe that disenchantment in
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the world is negative, signifying a feeling of alienation and of disillusionment;
however, his own definition belies this interpretation. For Weber, the very process of
'disenchantment' occurs when
... principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that
come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master
all things by calculation. ... One need no longer have
recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the
spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysterious powers
existed. Technical means and calculations perform the
service. This above all is what intellectualization means.6
It is therefore a loss of a certain degree of ignorance and uncertainty that
disenchantment is responsible for. Modern individuals, and this will be made clearer
in the section on bureaucracy, may rest in certainty that their affairs will be dealt with
not according to godly caprice, but to rational organisation.
However, disenchantment as disillusionment is equally present in Weber's
work, specifically when discussing the link between 'science' as infinite progress and
its effect on the substantive significance of an individual's life. Weber associated this
with the Romantics' bewilderment regarding the failure of the power of Science to
bring to infinity the life of modern individuals, and saw its clear expression in the
"broodings" of Leo Tolstoi. The question which concerned Tolstoi "revolved around
the problem of whether or not death is a meaningful phenomenon,"7 to which he
answered that for modern individuals death has no meaning. This is so due to the
idea of 'progress' which is virtually infinite, and no one who experiences death at any
given moment in this road towards infinity may give a significance to their death, or
that of others.
In light of his reflections on Tolstoi's work, Weber gives a fresh look on the
'disenchantment' of the Romantics. Romanticism is then seen not merely as a revolt,
a class struggle, or a pure and utter disillusionment with the results of the Industrial
Revolution, but also as a quest for a 'meaning' for life and death. For Weber, the
modern individual "placed in the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture by
ideas, knowledge, and problems, may become 'tired of life' but not 'satiated with
life'," for
he catches only the most minute part of what the life of the
spirit brings forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always
something provisional and not definitive, and therefore death
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for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is
meaningless, civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very
'progressiveness' it gives death the imprint of
meaninglessness.8
In recognising that rationality is "meaningless because it gives no answer to
our question, the only question important to us; "What shall we do and how shall we
live?","9 Weber not only limits scientific reason's applicability to quantitative areas of
knowledge, but suggests that rationality,10 both formal and substantive, has no place
in the shaping of individual freedom because it is mainly concerned with the material.
Although 'substantive' rationality deals with values, it measures its degree of
'success' in terms of 'formal', empirical, rationality. According to Weber,
substantive rationality "is the degree in which a given group of persons ... is or could
be, adequately provided with goods by means of an economically oriented course of
social action. This course of action will be interpreted in terms of a given set of
ultimate values no matter what they may be."11 However, given the numerous points
of view, themselves relying on "absolute values,"12 constituting substantive
rationality, Weber claims that they are "significant only as bases from which to judge
the outcome of economic action,"13 making it possible "to criticize the attitude toward
the economic activity itself or toward the means used, from ethical, ascetic or
aesthetic points of view."14 In other words, ethical values do not enter into the
qualification of the success of a specific economic enterprise. For Weber, in the field
of social and economic action "there is no question ... of attempting value judgments
..., but only of determining and delimiting what is to be called 'formal'."15 Once
again Weber administers the separation ofmeans from ends, of value judgement from
social organisation, thereby acknowledging rationality as a mere instrument, for it
allows the individual to acquire a specific type of'self-knowledge', one which is
conscious and deliberate, but cannot be used to define the content and teleology of
this 'self, since it is estranged from the realm of value. In the context of social and
economic organisation, substantive rationality "is itself in a certain sense "formal";
that is, it is an abstract, generic concept."16 Socially applied reason is therefore
mechanical, and its only telos lies in its capacity to help society overcome material
scarcity. Social teleology is thereby left undealt with, and the very question of social
finality becomes blurred. Weber follows a liberal understanding of social bonds
wherein no social telos exists, but only competing individualist ends.
Moreover, in his definition of social organisation, Weber sought to maintain
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an element of mysticism, of mysterious powers - in a word, an irrational element
which he called 'charisma', and with which he identified 'freedom'. Weber describes
charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set
apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or
at least specifically exceptional qualities."17 Charismatic individuals must be socially
recognised for "this recognition is a matter of complete personal devotion arising out
of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope."18 In this context, Weber is suggesting that a
large part of social and political systems operates upon charismatic legitimation. The
choice of leaders (whether political or moral) arises from irrational motives such as
extreme emotions. For Weber, Charisma commands loyalty and obligation in a
manner that a rationally conceived constitution does not, and suggests that whether
the charismatic leader is an individual or a social group, charisma's presence and
power may go unchecked in the absence of a rational body which may be the only
means to oversee their actions; hence the need for the rational bureaucratic machine.
Weber's definition of 'freedom' recognises a substantial part of freedom as residing
in the social expression of 'emotions', what Hegelian theory does not allow. It also
suggests that true freedom is an expression of personal caprice, or heart-felt mystical
emotion, rather than rationality in its instrumental form.19 This explains even further
the equivocal meaning that Weber imparts to disenchantment. From this it follows
that if freedom is of an 'irrational' nature, then the very development of socio-political
structuring is a prison, a necessary evil, constructed to keep humanity from the self-
destructive effects of its own irrationality. As such, modernity's development
towards rationality/un-freedom seems perverse and un-enlightened if in its quest to
control its own 'irrationality' it throws itself into a more efficient hell of its own, one
that Weber termed "the iron cage of modernity."
Furthermore, when seen in the context of Hegel's Logic, Weber's proposal to
maintain individual freedom as irrationality, through the creation of a 'rational,
neutral, and value-free' social matrix, one which embodies the norm of
'normlessness', appears Kantian insofar as it creates a separation between the
individual telos as freedom, and the social telos as reason. In Weber's society,
individuals would appear forever alienated from the objective world, incapable of
seizing the thing-in-itself. Hegel would argue that Weber's project would fail,
precisely because individuals growing up in such a society will find it very difficult to
maintain a social identity on the one hand, and continue to develop a healthy personal
view of their freedom and its extent, on the other. For Hegel, socialisation is a
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necessary condition for the realisation and actualisation of any type of individual
freedom. The subject needs a social role through which an expression of this freedom
in the public sphere can take place. However, in spite of the bi-polar view that both
thinkers held with regards to the nature of human freedom, it is curious to see that
both ultimately proposed two very similar social organisation -bureaucracy- for the
safe-guarding and promotion of two distinct types of freedom. The difference seems
to lie in what each believed constitutes the nature of individual telos, and of social
teleology. Weber's view reflects scepticism and pessimism as to the fulfilment of
individual freedom in society, whereas Hegel's remains hopeful. Differences
between both thinkers seem to stem from their view of how individuals relate to their
own selves and to society. That Weber based his vision of society on the fast
developing capitalist enterprise becomes more visible in a closer study of the value-
free nature of its bureaucracy. To this we now turn.
Weber's Value-free Society
Unlike Hegel, Weber does not believe that a personal goal may be achieved in
and through a public office. Individuals do not, nor indeed are able to, fulfil their
telos in the vocation which they adopt in the life-world. While defining the 'essence'
of the vocation of teaching, Weber makes a very strict distinction between the duty
that individual teachers have toward the fulfilment of their vocation, and their own
duty toward the fulfilment of their personal aspirations -whether political, social,
religious or ideological. In the social realm, the individual may not, and this out of
duty rather than personal conviction, impress any subjective views onto the hearers;
the responsibility of finding one's path rests with the individual, and a teacher's duty
is to open the young mind to the possibilities which are available, hence to the tools
of thinking, which aid in the making and execution of personal decisions.20 No
ethical and moral content should, as they do in the Hegelian state, be able to define
the social telos or mold the decisions of the nascent personality of modern
individuals. Weber would show extreme intolerance to the Hegelian concept of
society specifically because it seeks to guide, for any guidance is seen as capable of
being corrupt and made to promote the enslavement of individuals. In the objective
realm, or that of the life-world, the individual is guided by the precepts of rationality,
both formal and substantive, a mere method according to which the Humanist idea of
freedom of the will is fully expressed.
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Weber's discussion of the nature and scope of science in socio-political life,
and the emancipation of the subjective will, shows him to be keenly aware of the
Humanist project of liberty as individual self-determination and its earlier 'fusion'
with 'Science'. Unlike the philosophers of the Classical Age and Enlightenment, he
did not see Science as the means toward the actualisation of personal freedom in
society, but, on the contrary, he saw to be means to overcome economic scarcity
through perfected techniques, whose purpose is to manipulate and subjugate nature to
the profit of humanity. Natural law, what modern debate terms as instrumental
reason, cannot, and indeed needs not, pretend to answer ethical and moral concerns,
but should provide knowledge to a humanity whose achievement lies in its liberation
from religious mysticism and asceticism. For Weber, the true sense of personal
freedom lies in the capacity of individuals to choose.21 The responsibility of this
choice lies upon the individual's shoulders, and no one or anything may intervene on
one's behalf to save one from eternal damnation, or guide one to paradise. The
community is no longer responsible for the 'souls' of its members such as was the
case in medieval society. Society's function, and therewith its telos, becomes limited
to the making and maintaining of a system which safeguards the availability to the
individual of possibilities, freedom of choice and of will.22 Science, and its method
of rationalisation, operate as guides toward the achievement of such a neutrality in
socio-political organisation.
Hegel would seriously object to Weber's radical wish to maintain a society in
which freedom of choice is posed as the only form of 'self-determined actualisation
of the will'. In the Logic, Hegel states that although freedom of choice is
"undoubtedly a vital element in the will (which in its very notion is free)," it "is only
in the first instance a freedom in form," for the "matter of choice is given, and
known" and as such it is antithetical to the notion of freedom.23 Weber's vision of
society cannot admit to Hegel's conception of individuality because in the capitalist
market subjectivity remains, in the first instance, in the process of constantly
redefining itself through negation. This process is recognised as a first moment that
is precarious. Its stability is further endangered by the capacity of the capitalist
system, in its very aim to tap consumer needs, to manipulate and mould
consumers'(subjects') understanding of their own needs, the primary source of their
self-identity in the world, and this because capitalism is itself geared towards the
acquisition ofprofit24 through exchange. It thrives on creating a need for its products
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by appealing to consumers' desires, the side that Weber identifies with the irrational,
i.e. freedom. Capitalism leads towards the recognition of material acquisition as a
specific form of freedom and of choice, but leaves moral and ethical content
undefined. For Weber, next to the freedom to choose material possessions there lies
a society whose organisation maintains social institutions in which moral and ethical
issues are dealt with, and act as moral guidance to those who seek them.25 This
society would be led by a specific body of government - bureaucracy.
The Bureaucratic Machine
In his lectures on the nature of "Bureaucracy,"26 Weber demonstrates the
benefits of the application of the process of rationalisation on the modern socio¬
political system. Modern 'instrumental' reason would indeed make necessary the
development of a process of 'differentiation' of value spheres, such as law, morality
and culture. This process is necessary in so far as it allows the separation of spheres
of fact from value. Scientific rationality asserts that a connection between fact and
value is neither possible nor desirable. Moreover, this rationalisation does not
operate merely in the public sphere, but extends to the private sphere, for it maintains
their formal separation in the very distinction it makes between objective and
subjective law. While the former permits the organisation of society in a rational,
value-free manner, the latter is in its own being indeterminate because it follows the
level of self-consciousness of each individual. The opposition between Hegel and
Weber appears sharply in this context. For Hegel, self-consciousness may only be
realised through an objective other, namely a form of social activity with which
individuals are able to identify their position in society. Weber, while maintaining the
idea of the realisation of self-consciousness through an objective other, chooses to
empty this other of its objective content (as religious or moral values) and replaces
this content with a distinct notion of public duty, which demands that individuals
occupying public posts be conscientious in executing their tasks without the
expression of any subjective preference, or personal value judgement. This demand
is equivocal, for it makes of the annihilation of value judgments in society a moral
virtue. Hence, individuals working in public life have the moral obligation not to
articulate what makes them moral and holders of values in society, a condition which
separates the subjective from the objective, causing individuals to feel alienated from
their activities, and their society.
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Synthesis, as the moment wherein the individual subject is reconciled with the
objective order, remains constant in both cases. However, for Weber, the
differentiation of spheres of value limit the individual from achieving access to a
sense of selfhood through a given understanding of history. The individual uses
factual data, such as science as means to avoid past mistakes, but not as basis for the
grounding of a self-identity. History is useful as it serves to provide illustrated
examples of socio-political organisation and means of production, and as such it is
evolutionary. The manner in which Weber differs from Hegel lies in his belief that
self-consciousness is not a historical product, but is what Foucault later called the
"making of the self." Hegel did not separate this process of self-consciousness from
history, whereas Weber, followed by the phenomenologists and existentialists, did.
He did so because the maintenance of history as the basis for individual identity will
only serve to leave modern individuals at the mercy of historical interpretation, i.e.
the subjective understanding of history by those whose own understanding is often
coloured by their ideology, self-interest or class interest (as was the case with the
Romantic movement). Weber seems to advocate the view that modern individuals
represent the only truly free men and women in history, specifically due to their
capacity to choose the content of their 'self' according to what inspires them. The
process of differentiation means to permit the availability of 'value spheres', but does
not allow their content to spill into society. Social organisation's telos would be the
pure maintenance of their availability as 'possible' means toward the discovery of the
individual 'self. Here, individuals have to constantly redefine their sense of self as
they advance through life, according to the access they have to such spheres.
In "Politics as a Vocation," Weber grounded his concept of freedom in the
process of differentiation. He defined the modern state as "a compulsory association
which organizes domination," and "is successful in seeking to monopolize the
legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory."27 It
bases its legitimation of domination on the belief in the validity of legal statute and
functional 'competence' which is based upon rationally created rules. This type of
domination is "exercised by the modern 'servant of the state' and by all those bearers
of power who in this respect resemble him."28 Political domination is maintained
through an administrative apparatus which "requires that human conduct be
conditioned to obedience" to the bearers of legitimate power. This apparatus requires
a specific type of administrative 'division of labour' which maintains the "'separation'
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of the administrative staff, the administrative officials, and of the workers from the
material means of administrative organization."29 The administrative staff are also
bound by obedience to the power of the holder for several reasons. On the personal
level, the material reward, and social honour which is based upon respective wages
act as an appeal to entice the joining of the bureaucracy. However, on a more
functional level, the 'division of labour' within the system engulfs individual civil
servants on both the professional and personal level; they are pegs within a
bureaucratic machine without which they cannot have a meaning or use for their
existence.30
Weber conceived of social roles as a medium in which no value judgement,
other than duty may be imposed on the individual, whose only purpose is the
maintenance of an atmosphere in which individual subjective self-knowledge and
consciousness, sought outside of these social roles, is not merely a by-product, but a
goal. The economic development of the capitalist system is thereby understood in a
Marxist context, for its accelerated development only hastens the production of
material elements necessary for the actualisation of individual freedom from want.
However, unlike Marx, for Weber the freedom achieved in the post-capitalist age will
not be communal, but absolutely individualistic. Weber did not envision the
appearance of a 'communal' spirit from the ashes of capitalism, because he
specifically believed that freedom is only possible in and through a society organised
according to his system of 'differentiation'. Like Hegel, Marx, in Weber's view,
imparted an ethical value to the social organisation with which Weber would remain
uncomfortable, for it would seek to mold, and thereby, restrict the process of self-
knowledge of the individual.
The separation of value and fact is illustrated in the important distinction
Weber makes between political control and economic control. In his discussion
regarding the revolution which occurred in Germany in 1918,31 he acknowledged the
success of the revolutionaries in gaining control over the political apparatus through
public elections, but expressed doubt (even hostility) towards their success in
"carrying through the expropriation within the capitalist enterprises," specifically
because political control is understood by Weber to be almost entirely separated from
the working body of civil society, which is, in turn, dependent to a large extent upon
the economic system. This apparent distrust of the power of the political body
(which he associates with its charismatic leaders) is indicative of Weber's recognition
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of the vast influence of the capitalist system on the organisation and application of
political power -one which Hegel was not in a position to take into account. It
therefore follows that the holders of legitimate political power within the capitalist
system remain impotent when it comes to the making of the decisions in social policy.
Weber explicitly allied himself with the capitalist class, and maintained that the major
contradiction found within the capitalist-democratic states occurs when capitalism
pushes for bureaucracy and lack of ethos, and democracy demands ethical
considerations. Weber was in favour of bureaucracy because it would maintain an
autonomous machine whose efficiency is likely to override the 'ethical', and for
Weber 'irrational', decisions of the charismatic leader or group chosen by the public
in the democratic state.32
With respect to the political organisation of society, Hegel's view of an ideal
political state whose ruling body finds equilibrium in the creation of a bureaucratic
body composed of two types of divergent classes (propertied and entrepreneurial), is
seen by Weber as at best questionable. To illustrate this, he distinguishes between
two ways of making politics one's vocation: as a specific expression of one's own
essence, or as a means to an end. On this he stated:
Either one lives 'for' politics or one lives 'off politics. By
no means is this contrast an exclusive one. The rule is,
rather, that man does both, at least in thought, and certainly
he also does both in practice. He who lives 'for' politics
makes politics his life, in an internal sense. Either he enjoys
the naked possession of the power he exerts, or he nourishes
his inner balance and self-feeling by the consciousness that
his life has meaning in the service of a 'cause'. In this
internal sense, every sincere man who lives for a cause also
lives off this cause. The distinction hence refers to a much
more substantial aspect of the matter, namely, to the
economic. He who strives to make politics a permanent
source of income lives 'off politics as a vocation, whereas
he who does not do this lives 'for' politics.33
Hence, although Weber allows the Hegelian solution -that a politician may
live, as members of the Executive class (propertied) do, simply 'for' the purpose of a
'cause' or social telos- to remain a possibility, he adds many conditions which render
such a possibility if not rare, generally tentative with regards to the social good. For
to be economically 'uninterested' the politician in question would have to be wealthy,
and, therefore, will not be endowed with the awareness of the economic problems
plaguing lower classes. Weber analyses the position of modern professions (workers
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and entrepreneurs) and finds them incapable of being what he calls "economically
dispensable," that is, one whose "income must not depend upon the fact that he
constantly and personally places his ability and thinking entirely, or at least by far
predominantly, in the service of economic acquisition."34 Befitting such a definition
are the rentiers found only in Antiquity and the Middle Ages, whose existence cannot
be taken as a given, at least not as Hegel would have us believe.
Hegel would deem Weber's attempt to advocate the idea of promoting a value-
free social matrix through the imposition of a specific moral value, i.e. duty, a self-
defeating process. Duty has both a social and moral dimension. To impose as duty
society's need to be morally and ethically neutral is indeed self-contradictory and
limiting. Furthermore, as definitively separated from the life-world, freedom in the
world, the product of the very process of synthesis between the individual and the
universal, cannot take place, thereby leaving the individual with a sense of freedom
that is at best illusory, since the social expression is absent. Finally, if the very
process of participation in society is to be kept separate from value, what would
justify or legitimise the content of any ethical decision? Weber seems to suggest that
such a society is necessary for the individual to develop a personal sense of identity
which forms itself as a result of its interaction with the life-world, but not as a
product of this world. Hegel's argument would add that substantive rationality, i.e.
what deals with values and ends, does necessarily belong to, and effects the product
of 'formal' rationality, for it poses itself as the objective content according to which
individuals arrive at decisions the purpose of which is moral. Rather, a complete
separation between formal and substantive reason in social behaviour impoverishes
the very content of individual knowledge of one's selfhood and identity, for,
according to Hegel, one may only be regarded as subject insofar as one's actions in
the world are recognised by the social order and evaluated in terms of the social-
good.
Weber's preoccupation with the separation of fact from value, the public
sphere from the private sphere, and morality from politics and socio-economic
organisation seems to stem from his wish to keep the moral sphere separate from, and
thereby immune to, the abusive hand of the capitalist enterprise. In The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism, Weber recognised capitalism's capacity to exploit
the very substance of morality, which he associated with religion, reducing all moral
values to mere objects of persuasion, used by capitalist enterprises to further their
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efficiency. For Weber, under capitalism "material goods have gained an increasing
and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in
history."35 Weber shows awareness of the mechanism and need for expansion by
modern capitalism, the power of which, he sees, must be checked by a value-free
administration, and separated entirely from subjective morality.
However, this does not in any meaningful sense answer the question as to the
moral content of the ideology of such a Weberian state. If democracy as a system
which is based on freedom to vote is unviable because of the political influence of
charismatic leaders, then Weber seems to reject all ideology, since for him, individual
preferences are formed by the market. For Weber, ideology appears as a value-full
phenomenon to be savoured by individuals, and may, as a choice, fulfil the definition
of one's own selfhood, but cannot be the ruling hand in society. Weber's system
leaves certain questions unresolved. In the first instance, how is one to define the
nature, content and orientation of the socially differentiated value-spheres? More
specifically, who, in a society composed of neutral, value-less individual bureaucrats,
would be the decision maker, and in what context can this driver of the bureaucratic
body lead the bureaucratic machine and define the content of this function? Also, if
value-free activity is a duty, how are bureaucrats to learn such a quality which is itself
a value-full concept, and by whom? It is my opinion that Weber's work does not
seek to answer questions of an ideological nature, but adheres vehemently to what is
here-and-now without looking further into the future. In effect, Weber seems to
scoff at the ideological aspirations of humanity, and ends up seeing all ideological
efforts which impart ethical values to society as shamanistic and un-enlightened.
Little did he realise that the very telos of his own study of society was itself the
product of an ideology, and that his very drive to separate fact from value maintains,
to an extreme extent, the conditions needed to make a Humanist dream come true.
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(b) Maclntyre's Emotivist Society
If Weber's hopeful position suggesting that instrumental reason yields
positive results in the socio-political and economic life of individuals was severely
criticised by Marcuse and members of the Frankfurt School, this same position is
viewed by Maclntyre as responsible for the 'socio-ethical crisis' of modern society.
Permeating Maclntyre's thought is a drive to identify and define the elements
pertaining to the crisis of modern values. Maclntyre believes that social cohesion,
originally the very basis for individual socialisation and identificadon ofmoral values,
dissolved because modernity heeded the Enlightenment's recommendation to render
individuals autonomous, thereby separating public utility from moral decisions,
public economy from the private household, and public morality from private values.
The following consists of a brief study of Maclntyre's definition of the crisis
of modernity which he defines in After Virtue (1981), and is divided in three
sections. Section one deals with Maclntyre's definition of Emotivism. Section two
develops Maclntyre's critique of the Enlightenment project and contrasts it to Hegel's
critique of Kant. Section three develops Maclntyre's 'alternative' to modernity's
socio-political 'practices' and provides a discussion of the nature of Maclntyre's
philosophy.
Emotivism: Modernity's Plight?
Maclntyre's concern over the crisis of modernity is manifested in his study of
the effect of scientific rationality's relativism on the coherence of moral judgements
and expressions in modern society. For Maclntyre, modern society is suffering from
a state of moral disorder due to the effect of the separation of fact from value in the
socio-political sphere. Emotivism appears as modernity's "empirical thesis ... about
those who continue to use moral and other evaluative expressions, as if they were
governed by objective and impersonal criteria, when all grasp of any such criterion
has been lost."36 Here Emotivism can be defined as the very expression of Scientific
Method where 'Is' and 'Ought' are completely separated. Values are separated from
facts in the sense that only facts can be discussed in terms of scientific 'reason',
whereas values, deemed subjective in character, are neither true nor false, and
"agreement in moral judgement is not to be secured by any rational method, for there
119
are none."37
The Emotivist doctrine concerns itself with the theory that the meaning of
uttered sentences is a direct expression of moral judgement. In uttering the sentence
"this is good," C.L. Stevenson, founder of Emotivist theory, claims that its meaning
suggests "I approve of this; do so as well."38 Here the moral judgement of the
speaker is expressed and aims at one and the same time to alter through its expression
the moral decision of the hearer. In spite of its success in characterising the dilemma
of modern society's incapacity to bridge the fact-value gulf, Maclntyre claims that
Emotivism, as a theory of the meaning of a certain type of sentence, fails for two
reasons. First, emotivism's claim to be able to identify the types of feelings of
approval or disapproval that are the expression of the utterer's moral attitude is
deemed unfounded. In the first instance, its explanation of such expressions occurs
in a circular fashion where expressions are explained in terms of moral concepts and
vice versa. Maclntyre claims that Emotivism attempts to explain the content and
working of a faculty (morality) of which it is itself ignorant, and argues that this type
of attitudinal explanation, as expressed by a specifically moral judgement, has
"become vacuously circular."39
The second reason for its failure lies in emotivism's concentration on the
meaning of sentences as the utterances of moral judgements rather than the use the
speaker makes of these sentences. A sentence uttered in a menacing tone does not
necessarily express in its meaning a sign of disapproval, but it might very well do so
in the tone and facial expression of the speaker, which in itself makes up the effect on
the hearer. Maclntyre gives the example of the angry school-master who may vent
his feelings of frustration and disapproval at the student who has just made an
arithmetical mistake: 'seven times seven is forty-nine!'40 In this situation the tone
and the facial expressions serve to indicate the schoolmaster's feelings and not the
technical meaning of the sentence uttered. Herein the Emotivist theory may be
rejected for placing its emphasis on the meaning of the utterance rather than on its
use.
Maclntyre defines the social content of Emotivism as suggesting "the
obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative
social relations."41 This entails the obliteration of the Kantian moral distinction
between a moral and an immoral conception of subjectivity, for it does not make the
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distinction between the treatment of others as means or as ends. In the Emotivist
tradition "others are always means, never ends."42 For Maclntyre, Emotivism is a
direct indication of the disintegration of the Kantian position, and the decline of
morality which took place during the Enlightenment. Questions of ends are seen in
the Emotivist tradition as questions of value upon which empirical instrumental
reason has to remain silent. The conflict arising between rival values cannot be
rationally settled. As a result, individuals in society are forced to choose arbitrarily,
according to their needs between political parties, classes, notions, moral causes and
ideals.43
According to Maclntyre, Emotivism is a theory which seeks to define the
state of affairs in modern society. In the modern social context, it attempts to
overcome the impossible justification of subjective moral decision -posited in the
Kantian moral imperative- by relying upon expressions whose content is itself based
upon social roles. For this it calls upon roles carried out in society according to
scientifically determined criteria whose content is devoid of moral expressions.
Characterising the modern moral attitude are two prominent professions: the manager
and the therapist. Both demonstrate the Emotivist (Enlightenment's) tradition's
separation of fact from value, of professional life from private life.
The manager, whether engaged in the bureaucratic or the private sector, has a
profession which demands the knowledge of available techniques allowing the
maximisation of profit. This profession posits a predetermined end: the maximisation
of profit within a given period of time. The methods used are purely rational and the
results are calculable. The therapist, on the other hand, is trained to deal with human
conflicts. The function consists in resolving neurotic problems and redirecting
confused human capacities into channeled productive energy. This profession
demands, just as the manager's, certain specialised scientific knowledge and poses at
the same time a predefined end: efficiency . However, unlike the manager who
works primarily with calculable matter, the therapist deals with individuals to whom
he/she may only relate on rational and scientific level; questions relating to value
judgements cannot be answered if they presuppose the giving of 'personal advice'.
The therapist, like the manager, is not able to "engage in moral debate." The social
function of both professions is expressed in terms of Scientific Method's separation
between fact and value. Both characters are concerned with facts; the first with
material availability, the second with the observable symptoms of a mental
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disturbance; neither may allow an expression of values which belong to the subjective
realm. Maclntyre defines Emotivism as a symptom ofmoral non-uniformity and the
identification of a lack of a commonly accepted code of ethics wherein a lack of a
common social 'end' is also indicated. However, unlike Weber, he does not view
this as a common ground for subjective freedom, but a sign of deep disturbance and
social disintegration.
The crisis ofmodern society is seen to lie in the reification of the social telos.
The Emotivist tradition's characters are not defined through a fusion between social
and personal attitudes and moral content; on the contrary they are defined primarily
through a bifurcation of modern social existence between 'bureaucratic' organisation
within which ends are imposed, not considered as subject to rational justifications,
and a personal realm wherein judgement on values need not and cannot be subjected
to rational inquiry. Here, judgements are not able to have an objective and
impersonal socio-political expression. This crisis is not merely felt on the social level
through the absence of a common telos, but is also present in the crisis of the
individual who is seen to acquire a sovereignty which "in its own realm lost its
traditional boundaries provided by a social identity and a view of human life as
ordered to a given end."44 For Maclntyre, the establishment of subjective morality
signifies the deprivation of the self of its own communal qualities. Through the
development of a value-free society, the self is seen to have become "criterionless,
because the kind of telos in terms of which it once judged and acted is no longer
thought to be credible."45 This is the plight of the modern age which continues to
function according to the type of rationality Maclntyre identified as "The
Enlightenment Project."
The Enlightenment Project
In After Virtue, as well as in other earlier articles46 Maclntyre contends that
the project of the philosophers of the Enlightenment to render morality rational has
given rise to two specific -although interrelated- problems. On the one hand, the
rationalisation of morality emphasised the already present process of social
breakdown. On the other hand, it helped mask bureaucratic domination by giving the
individual a false sense of liberty. For Maclntyre "individualist moral philosophers
share in both the liberating and the constricting characteristics of bourgeois society.
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They represent both the genuine advance in human liberation which it represents and
its specific form of human alienation."47 Individualist philosophy promotes the latter
condition as it is incapable of developing a teleological theory of society. Its theory
does not allow the bridging of the gap between the universal and the particular, nor
can it consolidate the individual and the community. This is seen by Maclntyre to
constitute the alienation of individuals from forms of social life by falsely objectifying
their actions while endowing them with independent existence; they are equally
convinced of being "free agents in areas of their life where the economic and social
forms are in fact dictating the roles they live out;" both illusions, liberty and
independence, contribute to "man's loss of the grasp of his own nature."48
The Enlightenment does not merely signify the rise in the value and status of
science, but also represents the appearance of social class dissensions, and the
intellectual and scientific pursuit of the understanding through reason, rather than
through religious advocacy. Although this Age affected most of Europe, Maclntyre
associates it with northern Europe where the secularisation of Protestantism
representing the change in belief, hence the stage at which a new set of definitions of
moral expressions was put in order. This is also accompanied by a shift in the status
of the Latin language -which is very close in its interpretation ofmoral expressions to
the Greek language- from being first to becoming second. Maclntyre's theory
suggests that a breakdown in the coherence and unity of a set of moral expressions
occurred with the development of the Protestant Reformation.49 It is for this reason
that he chooses Kant as representative of this Age and prominent developer of the
project.
According to Maclntyre, Kant's theory of the categorical imperative acts at
least in two ways as representative of the emerging individualist capitalist society. In
the first instance, it renders individuals morally sovereign, enabling them to reject any
outside moral authority, leaving them with a set ofmoral precepts that are laws which
act in a negative rather than a positive manner. Kant's laws indicate what individuals
should not do, rather than what they should. The adoption of a moral law is taken by
the subjects to stop them from falling prey to their immoral inclinations, but not to
give them a specific 'end', a purpose for which they must act in a moral way.
The second point stated by Maclntyre concerns the test of consistency. In
Kant's doctrine of the categorical imperative no indication is made as to when and
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why one must formulate a maxim and subject it to the test. In fact, Kant's theory
appears to be dependent on an already existing morality from which subjects are to
choose the maxims that appeal to them through the test of consistency. Maclntyre
contends that this test cannot be considered reliable because one may invent through a
play on words a maxim that will appear as universal while preventing through the
citation of specific, unique situations its being applicable to others. The formulation
of such a maxim would proceed as follows: "I may break my promises only when ...
"5° Maclntyre's formulation would not have been considered by Kant as a valid
one, for the clause "only when" is conditional, and as such is not a valid categorical
imperative. Also, it is the expression of an inclination rather than a deterrent from an
inclination. Although theoretically Maclntyre's illustration of the unreliability of
Kant's test is not convincing, one may agree, nevertheless, with the claim it attempts
to raise concerning the unguaranteed consistency in the application of a subjectively
determined morality within a social setting.
Maclntyre considers that the Enlightenment project was bound to fail due to
its very structure and purpose. To illustrate this, he compares the Kantian morality to
traditional Aristotelean ethics. Traditional morality distinguishes three stages of moral
development: The original human nature in its crude un-informed state, the process
of transformation, or the coming into being which consists mainly of the application
of a set of moral rules for each social role, and finally, the realisation and perfection
of this end. In comparison, the Kantian project fails as it places emphases on the first
two stages, and completely disregards the third. For, as the ethical evaluation is
necessarily based on a morality which is derived from the original crude nature of
individuals, the realisation of human nature if it reached its telos cannot exist; in its
very nature, the Kantian theory cannot indicate a moral telos, for the process begins
and ends in the subject. The subject is already moral, but has no moral end outside of
personally developed sphere of reflection and moral development. The Kantian
theory being a mix of "novelty and tradition" expresses the necessity of a moral
imperative, but distorts it by separating it from the social context. In its distorted
form, traditional moral precepts become a series of arbitrary and subjective
expressions which are devoid of any socially applicable dimension.
Maclntyre's critique of the subjectivity of the Kantian philosophy and its
underlying presentation of a socially fragmented modern society resembles to a great
extent Hegel's critique of the "reflective philosophy of subjectivity."51 In a forward
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to a book by Hinrich, Hegel describes the "evil of the present time" as "the
fortuitousness and caprice of subjective feeling and its opinions associated with the
culture of reflective thought which has proved to its own satisfaction that spirit is
incapable of knowing the truth."52 In a close study of the work of Kant, Fichte and
Jacobi, Hegel set out to demonstrate that eighteenth and nineteenth century theories
on "reflective subjectivity" are the intellectual expression of the social, political and
religious breakdown of modern life.
In Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, Hegel defined the term reflection
as "the action that establishes oppositions and goes from one to the other, but without
effecting their combination and realizing their thorough going unity."53 Reflection is
understanding; it is primarily an analytical activity which allows the making of
distinctions and the establishment of antitheses. It is also "thought" which "sticks to
fixed determinations and the distinction of one thing from another: every such limited
abstraction it treats as having a subsistence of its own."54 The nature of the
philosophy of "reflective subjectivity" cannot combine but separates (entzweit). It
can divide (trennt) but cannot unite, it alienates but cannot reconcile.55
Hegel believed that the most pronounced statement of "reflective subjectivity"
resides in Kant's critical philosophy. It is evident for Hegel that this "reflective"
characteristic can be perceived in Kant's theory of knowledge presented in Critique of
Pure Reason. Kant's distinction between concept and possible experience effected a
clear distinction between subject and object which brought his theory of knowledge to
a halt, for this very separation indicates the impossibility of knowledge. Kant's
distinction between the concepts or categories of understanding and of experiences
forced him to distinguish between the things as we conceive them, and the things in
themselves. These are posed as an absolute limit to the reflective activity of the
knowing subject. This absolute opposition of subject and object renders the
knowledge of the object by the subject impossible. Hegel viewed the Kantian critical
theory of epistemology as a failure for it leads to an extreme type of subjectivism due
to which the individual becomes incapable of knowing or acknowledging an objective
end. According to Hegel, Kantian "objectivity" is "to a certain extent subjective.
Thoughts, ... although universal and necessary categories, are only our thoughts -
separated by an impassable gulf from the thing, as it exists apart from our
knowledge. But the true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from
being merely ours, must at the same time be the real essence of the things, of
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whatever is an object to us."56 The antithetical relation of subject and object pertains
to a development of a subjectivity that is forever alienated from the objective
knowable world. With regards to morality Hegel's assessment of Kant's second
Critique states that:
As theoretical reason is opposed to objective sensuousness,
so practical reason is opposed to practical sensuousness, to
impulses and inclinations. Perfected morality must remain a
beyond [ein jenseits]; for morality presupposes the
difference of the particular and universal will. It is a
struggle, the determination of the sensuous by the universal;
the struggle can only take place when the sensuous will is
not yet in conformity with the universal. The result is,
therefore, that the aim of the moral will is to be attained only
in infinite progress.57
For Hegel, the dichotomy of Kantian philosophy is expressed in both
theoretical and practical reason. As theoretical reason seeks to bridge the gap between
a-priori categories and a-posteriori sense-data, practical reason tries to bridge the gap
between moral ideality and empirical reality. The opposition which separates the
knowing subject from the empirical object is internalised in practical reason as the
conflict between universal, objective categories and subjective desires of the
individual.58 The internalisation of the conflict gives rise to a shift from alienation in
the world to self-alienation. It is both Maclntyre's and Hegel's view that the
implementation of practical reason develops a fundamental contradiction where the
realisation ofmorality is at one and the same time its negation. The separation of 'Is'
from 'Ought' must occur if any moral action is to take place. The moral duty as a
result becomes an unrealisable must (Sollen) or an unreachable beyondness
(Jenseits). Life becomes an unbearable burden within which the individual aims to
reach an end which is in principle unrealisable.
In spite of the similarities between Hegel's analysis of the philosophy of
'reflective subjectivity' and Maclntyre's analysis of the failure of the Enlightenment
project, Maclntyre does not take a Hegelian stance. Much of their differences lie in
their vision of the theory of the historical evolution of the individual in society.
Hegel's view of history as progress towards the rational consciousness of subjective
freedom allows him to regard philosophical "reflective subjectivity" not simply "as a
false direction in philosophy, but as a trend which is necessary and whose errors also
bear the "stamp of necessity."59 Historically, Hegel attempted to show that
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"reflective subjectivity" is the product of the contradictions of the present and that this
constituted its historical justification and its historical achievement. However, as a
provider of a solution to the contradiction it exposed, "reflective subjectivity" is a
failure. This is clearly stated in Hegel's study of the second and third Critiques of
Kant's philosophy. The assessment Hegel makes of the latter demonstrates its
incapacity to reconcile the very contradition it exposed.
Maclntyre on the other hand, sees historical evolution - especially in terms of
the evolution of the social formations and its accompanying fracturing of moral
language - as a decline, a distortion of human consciousness expressed in the
distortions found in moral discourse. Reason and its essential role as the telos of
social existence and interaction, is distorted, its significance and its clearness of
purpose within the social context is obscured as individuals become aware of their
own being as subjects and are alienated from society. The rise of subjective
consciousness, as the Hegelian concept of historical progress, appears for Maclntyre
to have taken the place of the collective will exemplified in its socially conceived
notion as virtue. Maclntyre conceives of subjective consciousness as what is
responsible for the rise of relativism and perspectivism,60 for in its liberal context,
subjectivity comes to embody the individualisation of claims to truth. For Hegel, the
process of subjective consciousness commenced with the appearance of religion
when the individual while avowing devotion to God became separated from the
community. Maclntyre sees religion as much of a unifier as the Polis was in the
Greek city-state, and considers the actual division to have set in with the arrival of the
Protestant Reformation61 which provided individuals with completely altered views
of human nature and its telos. Therefore, what Hegel qualified as a distinct
realisation of subjective consciousness developing against the community's, and later
the Church's, abuse of its powers, Maclntyre sees as a disintegration in the unity of
social practice of the virtues.
Moreover, Maclntyre plainly objects to the fact that there is, or has been, a
notion of an 'individual', for he sees the "project of Enlightenment" as the "inventor"
of the "individual." Second, Maclntyre also objects to the notion of rights which he
defines as those "which are alleged to belong to human beings as such and which are
cited as a reason for holding that people ought not to be interfered with in their pursuit
of life, liberty and happiness." He also finds it odd that there should be "human
rights." He adds that rights attached "to human beings simply qua human beings" is
127
a concept that did not arise before the close of the middle ages, a fact which suggests
that "there are not such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in
unicorns."62 It is clear from Maclntyre's argument that there is no concept of an
individual that can exist outwith a distinct society, and the rights for such a fictious
entity are equally illusory, just as the notion of a subjective morality is an outrageous
lie. Hence, Maclntyre cannot follow Hegel into a post-Kantian theory of 'Sittlichkeit'
because for him individuals are incapable of self-determination, of freedom of
thought, or action. The Enlightenment project does not indicate a step towards higher
subjective consciousness, rather it signifies the absolute break with tradition, a break
which he sees as almost irredeemable for it suggests in its very being the first stage in
the process of social, and hence moral disintegration, and of an overall dissolution of
the value or quality of human life. Unlike Hegel, Maclntyre cannot view this
development in a positive light, for it is not the evolution of a tradition, but it signifies
the rise of a rationality which seeks to destroy the very fibre of what constitutes a
tradition;63 therefore, unlike Hegel, the rise of subjectivity does not imply the
coming-into-being of unity, but signifies the beginning of the end. However, it has
to be conceded that Hegel's 'universal' is equivalent to Maclntyre's 'tradition', and
hence, it may be said that Hegel also refuses to acknowledge the possibility of
freedom and self-determination outwith the society one inhabits. The distinctness of
Maclntyre's position from Hegel's lies precisely in his refusal to acknowledge the
'necessity' of subjectivity. Hegel would contend that Maclntyre's position betrays
the horror and frustration with which Maclntyre regards the state of affairs that so-
called 'individualism' has wrought upon society.
Like Hegel, Maclntyre's theory of the individual and society is Aristotelean in
character. Individuals within society are not creators of their 'self, for the self is
defined according to the social position it occupies in society, the practice of which
determines its success or failure as this or that social role. Their morality is not
purely their own, it is not an expression of their being as human beings, but depends
on the degree to which they are able to execute their social role, itself a means toward
the internalisation of what constitutes a virtue. Self expression acquires a distinct
value when it is actualised in the world, i.e. in terms of socio-political and economic
participation. Hence, for individuals to attempt to stage their own life as their 'end',
rather than having this 'end' be set in the community, is the primary factor in the
breakdown of the unity of the social formation. However, unlike Hegel, Maclntyre
expresses a Christian understanding of the will, which prompts to him to declare that
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individuals are devoid of free-will and that all choices are good if they serve the telos
of the community, and bad when made in terms of individual interests. In his view,
the modern self has "no necessary social content and no necessary social identity" and
it can be anything, "because it is in and for itself nothing." It is therefore "no more
than 'a peg' on which the clothes of the role are hung."64
Although Maclntyre objects to modern Emotivist identification of the self, and
commends the Aristotelean model, he does not recognise that both definitions are
quite similar. On the one hand, the Aristotelean social entity is subordinated to the
social role ascribed to it. The "judgement" of which Maclntyre boasts is not its own,
but is based upon the socially set criteria. For Maclntyre, individuals are constituted
as social roles, entities whose shape is entirely molded by their social environment,
and their self-actualisation is thereby limited to the adequate expression of the social
role they live out in society. In both cases, the self appears as an essentially empty
and transparent vessel, whose content varies with respect to the factors which
surround and occupy it. On the other hand, Maclntyre's definition of individuals of
the Enlightenment maintains that they are in essence vacuous, in need of a social
context and a social content for each of them to acquire an identity, a self. From this
it can be deduced that for Maclntyre, individuals at any given time are socially defined
entities and can therefore have no distinct character of their own.
Maclntyre's Alternative
It is Maclntyre's contention that ever since the belief in Aristotelean teleology
has been discredited there appeared several attempts to justify morality. Through
Nietzsche's critique of the plausibility of modern moral philosophies, Maclntyre
vindicates the validity of the Aristotelean philosophy. Nietzsche contended that the
morality of the European society since the classics has been a sham, a disguise for the
will to power, and showed that its plausibility could not be rationally justified.
According to Maclntyre, the Nietzschean concept of the "great man" "represents
individualism's final attempt to escape from its own consequences."65 Its stance
"turns out not to be a mode of escape from or an alternative to the conceptual scheme
of liberal individualist modernity, but rather one more representative moment in its
internal unfolding."66 By eliminating the plausibilty of Nietzsche's moral theory,
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Maclntyre is now able to suggest that an alternative road to that tread by modernity
consists in the restatement of the Aristotelean tradition in a way "that restores
intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social attitudes and commitments."67
According to Maclntyre, the rendering of the Aristotelean tradition "rational"
requires the elimination of three incoherent characteristics in Aristotelean philosophy.
First, Aristotelean teleology presupposes the presence of an irrational theory of
metaphysical biology. The latter is primarily expressed in Aristotle's belief that some
human beings are by nature free and others slaves, and that "man is by nature a
political animal." Second, it has been noted by Barker68 among others that the
Aristotelean teleology is limited in its own concern with the city-state as an 'end'
while ignoring the growing expansionism of the Roman Empire whose development
presented a glaring alternative; hence, Maclntyre viewing the same limits of the
Aristotelean teleology suggests that the city-state be viewed in "an historical
prespective as only one -even if a very important one- in a series of social and
political forms in and through which the kind of self which can exemplify the virtues
can be found and educated." Thirdly, Maclntyre disputes Aristotle's dislike of
conflict thereby ordering its elimination or management. Maclntyre's argument is
surprisingly Hegelian in the sense that he does see that it is only "through conflict that
we learn what our ends and purposes are."69
Maclntyre proposes to perform his enterprise through a particular study of the
history of morality by dividing it in four particular periods: the Homeric sagas, the
classical city-state, the medieval period and the utilitarian period of the eighteenth to
the nineteenth century. This historical study is meant to show the regularity in the
presence of 'virtues' as qualities in society. He attempts to demonstrate the presence
of a common feature in history: that of practices. The concept of a practice becomes
paramount to his theory as it identifies the presence of virtues with their social
implementation. For Maclntyre, a "practice" signifies any activity promoting a social
good. Practice is, therefore, not simply the mechanical or technical exercise of chess
playing or baseball batting, it represents a good, considered internal to a given 'telos'.
It is 'internal' in the sense that its very application implies an end, not associated with
external goods such as money and fame, but to 'internal' discipline of the soul; the
discipline in virtues refers to such qualities as sportsmanship, honesty and justice.
The pleasure of executing the exercise should not be separated from its purpose; it is
therefore 'internal' pleasure. It is similar to Aristotle's view of the good life, which is
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not an end that is accomplished through a particular deed, rather it is the very practice
of virtues that is at once the means and the end. For Aristotle the private practice of
virtues is also internal to the social end which is also the good life for the individual,
thus allowing the end of individuals and of society to be one.
Although Maclntyre attempts to rid Aristotle's definition of human nature of
its metaphysical biology, he nevertheless maintains a definition that is identical with
it. More specifically, Maclntyre's definition of human nature is itself based upon a
metaphysical biology.70 In refusing to accept the Enlightenment Project's definition
of human nature, and more specifically, the Kantian a priori concerning the equality
between the individual will and the universal will, and by asserting that this Kantian a
priori is itself an invention, Maclntyre bases his conception of human nature on a
theory which denies individuals the capacity to define their sense of self outwith
socio-political context.71 Both Aristotle's and Maclntyre's assertions correspond to
postulates that are considered true or necessary irrespective of experience or anterior
to it, "in other words not derived from experience and considered valid."72 These are
assertions that are normally rejected by scientific reason primarily for their prevalent
arbitrariness, and are ruled out of order. In this sense, Maclntyre, while attempting
to render Aristotelean philosophy applicable to modern definition of human nature by
ridding it of all arbitrary definition based upon metaphysical biology, commits an
identical error when espousing a definition of the self that is equally arbitrary, based
upon an implicit definition of human nature that is metaphysically biological.
So far Maclntyre's solution fails primarily because of the impossibility to
separate the elements of metaphysical biology from Aristotle's teleology. This
impossibility, I contend, is due to the direct relationship existing between the concept
of reason and its capacity to directly characterise human nature. Aristotle's teleology
cannot be separated from a distinct biological definition of human nature that would
make it necessary for individuals to seek society and political association. To do so is
to allow Aristotle's theory to fall into incoherence and arbitrariness for how are
individuals to seek a social telos if it is not in their nature to do so? This failure is
further complicated by the definition that Maclntyre gives to the modern self. In the
first instance, his definition appears in line with the classics. However, in attempting
to separate Aristotelean ethics from its metaphysical biology, he not only claims that
the self is a vacuous entity, but more importantly, that this very self is empy of all
natural inclinations toward being socially motivated. As a result, Maclntyre's
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solution appears to be itself guilty of preferring a distinct definition of human nature
that is as metaphysically biological as Aristotle's, but which is ultimately an
impoverished version, since it denies any nature content whatever; Maclntyre's
individuals cannot even claim to be social 'by nature'. In fact, Maclntyre's rejection
of subjectivity as the basis for the disintegration of socio-political unity, and his
emphasis on the virtues are reminiscent of Plato. Could Maclntyre be expressing a
Platonic idea of the virtues rather than an Aristotelean idea of the mean ? This may
well be the only answer to the characterisation of his historical study of morality.
Maclntyre's historical study of morality is based on the theory that moral
discourse becomes less intelligible as social formations are replaced by others, the
latter representing but a distorted copy of the original.73 It is evident that, in this
sense, the rise of individualism does not reveal the necessary presence of
"individuality" as such, but is rather the expression of a distorted and misunderstood
moral language. Also, such a distortion is seen as independent from any specific
'individualist' reaction, for it is brought on by time. In this denial of any presence of
'individualist' action, the conflict between individual and society cannot take on the
same significance as it does for Hegel and Marx. It cannot be interpreted as a cry for
freedom, for there can be no such thing; it is merely the expression of a morally
distorted society. Similarly, society can never become oppressive, it is merely the
confusion brought on by a distortion of the moral language that is being expressed.
Maclntyre's characterisation of the individual resembles to a great extent a
Platonic shortcoming. Barker discusses Plato's destruction of the basis of
personality by demonstrating the implied vacuity of the self prevalent in the citizens of
the Republic. For Barker, "too often it is true that it is an ineffective, unindividual
type of mind which identifies itself with a wide range of interests" as the character of
such a citizen. Maclntyre's assessment of the individual can be objected to, as does
Barker to the Platonic idea of the citizen when he states: "we must first know
ourselves as separate individuals, in order to transcend such knowledge, and to know
ourselves as part of a wider order, and as serving a wider purpose. It is exactly this
power of knowing ourselves as separate individuals which Plato really destroys."74
Plato does so through the abolition of property, an action which has been interpreted
by Hegel to constitute Plato's denial to humanity of a distinct sense of subjectivity.
Like Plato and Aristotle, Maclntyre does not seem concerned with the
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oppressive nature of the "distorted" virtues. Although his solution points back to a
society wherein the virtues expressed were coherent, he ignores the oppressive nature
of these societies which abounded not only through slavery, but also through state
oppression of farmers and artisans. Although Aristotle did associate the value of the
virtues with man rather than with his Homeric social function, he nevertheless,
considered men of virtue as relating to one class of Athenian noblemen. Hence,
unconsciously Aristotle continued to express Homeric standards. The definition of
an "Athenian nobleman" did not include those who were not owners of slaves, nor
did it include those Hellenistic farmers who lived on the outskirts of Athens. Even if
Aristotle was not expressing a Homeric evaluation of virtues, would not the distortion
that occurred in the transition from the Homeric society to that of fourth century
Greece be a hindrance to the purity of the Aristotelean virtues, even by Maclntyre's
standards? Undoubtedly they must if Maclntyre's theory is to remain consistent, thus
admitting that even Aristotelean philosophy is not the perfect model of society which
Maclntyre claims it to be.
In Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy, Hegel makes a distinction between
substantial morality and reflective morality. Substantial morality represents the
principle of common Greek morality which is already established in society and has
in general the relation of the "substantial;" it is, therefore, socially maintained and is
divine. On the other hand, reflective morality is the expression of the subjective will
of the individual. It is the action based upon individual reflection and not on the
prescriptions of state institutions. It is the action of individuals which stems from
their own convictions, and after moral deliberation. Individuals come themselves to a
decision and determine their actions accordingly.
This distinction is not found in Plato's writing. Plato's concern concentrated
on the need for subjective evolution in relation to the state, but he neglected the
recognition of freedom of the individual conscience and the right to subjective
reflective morality. Although Plato includes the individual subject in the empirical
actions of the will, he does so while conceiving of the individual in the universal
sense. Plato's systems of reality in the moral realm includes all the functions
pertaining to the common wealth, and the supplying of daily individual needs. He,
however, relegates these functions to the realm of external necessities, hence, as lying
outside of the Objective Idea; they are found universally without being developed out
of the Idea of the mind itself.
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Plato's theory of the state is basically concerned with the notion of justice. In
speaking of justice Plato meant "that the mind in its totality makes for itself a law as
evidence of the existence of its freedom. In a highly abstract sense my personality,
my altogether abstract freedom, is present in property."75 Since justice is for Plato
the entire being which realises itself when each individual learns to do the assigned
tasks to a level of perfection, then it is only as "determined individuality that man
reaches what is law for him; only thus does he belong to the universal Spirit of the
State, coming in it to the universal of himself as a "this"."76 What Plato calls
'universal' comes into being and is actualised necessarily outside of the Idea, while
expressing a content which is identical to it. Hence, the actualisation of the Idea must
be done through a function which is a means, the latter in turn acquires its intent
through the subjective will of the individual, within which the Objective Idea is
necessarily present, and which demands an act of subjective reflective decision for its
enactment.
According to Hegel, the "individual conscience proceeds from the subjectivity
of free-will, connects itself with the whole, chooses a position for itself, and thus
makes itself a moral fact."77 This aspect of individuality is ignored by Plato who felt
that this very subjective quality of individual social existence is what had wrought the
ruin of Greece. It is therefore not surprising that Maclntyre who seems to have
adopted a Platonic view of historical social evolution, despite his criticism of Plato,78
proceeds to deny individual subjectivity as well. Maclntyre's theory of teleology has
succeeded in inheriting the shortcoming found in classical Greek philosophy. While
this explains the criteria according to which human nature is defined, as well as the
reason why Maclntyre develops such a theory, it does not explain how this theoretical
development effects the theoretical outcome of his solution.
Maclntyre set out to achieve his objective through several steps. First, he
attempted to separate Aristotelean teleology from metaphysical biology, hence from
the positing of a teleology in nature. To achieve this he forwarded a theory of the
virtues. In basing his theory on the virtues Maclntyre's success is twofold: through
a historical study of the nature of virtues, he affirms the presence of virtues in society
rather than through a teleology in nature, implying that the presence of virtues
transcends social formations. Also, the very nature of the virtues which ascribes
them to action, or social roles, rather than to a metaphysical quality in humanity,
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allows Maclntyre to bridge the gap between 'Is' and 'Ought'. It does so as it shows
that the evaluation of humanity is done in terms of the results of human actions rather
than in terms of some inpalpable quality whose evaluation varies with the personal
criteria or reflection of the subject. Evaluative criteria based on the practice of
activities places the evaluativeness in the social realm and divorces it from the
subjective realm, thereby denying the individual the freedom of subjective self-
determination. It is, therefore, imperative for Maclntyre to deny the individual this
subjectivity in order for him to reach a solution which allows him to bridge the fact-
value gap.
The theory of virtues presupposes a social teleology. Individuals are bound
to aim toward "the good life" in society according to the virtues which are posited in
society as means. Individuals' telos is bound to society, and to the achievement of
the virtues, which implies that they are basically social and aim to live a 'good life'
within society, guided by social rules. This definition of a telos lies in contradiction
with the type of nature Maclntyre attributes to individuals. For, according to
Aristotle, reason is the human telos within which individuals also define their nature.
Reason, telos and human nature are all social; the structure of human teleology is
syllogistically derived wherein the telos is reached through a subjective
acknowledgement and positing of its objectivity in the means, which is also an object
through which the telos is realised, if only externally. For Aristotle, reason is social
teleology, human beings are social by nature; therefore their telos is reason. Whereas
Maclntyre states: Virtues are social, individuals practice virtues, individuals are
social. For Maclntyre individuals, as ontological entities, are essentially neither
virtuous nor social, they become both as each practices virtues in society.
A question is bound to arise at this point: if individuals are neither virtuous
nor social, why would they enter a society and practice the stated virtues, positing
them as their telos? Only a Hobbesian may answer this question; an Aristotelean may
not. The Hobbesian would say that it is the necessity to preserve one's life which
would prompt each individual to enter into the commonwealth and accept all arbitrary
laws of society except those which might put this life into danger. As to Maclntyre,
the answer consists in the fact that individuals were never outside of society, they
therefore have never made the choice to enter it. This answer remains to lack an
answer to the second part, why would individuals posit the virtues as means, why
would they not posit material accumulation, agriculture,...etc as means to the same
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end? Maclntyre remains silent.
Maclntyre's refusal to recognise the presence of human subjectivity has still
further implications. His view of humanity as essentially malleable has so far been
shown to signify the presence of the basic traits of the Hobbesian liberal definition of
human nature. From this implication rises another which can be expressed in answer
to the following question: how does Maclntyre envisage the coming into being of the
transition from the modern social formation to a society which has adopted his
solution for a 'rationalised' Aristotelean theory of teleology? In other words, how are
individuals, entities incapable of self-determination, to choose the road toward the
virtues when they are presently living within a society which corresponds to their
nature (hence the nature Maclntyre attributes to them)? Maclntyre's answer in After
Virtue is rather pessimistic, for he suggests a solution similar to that made at the
turning point in history which took place after the decline of the Roman Empire,
suggesting a construction of "new forms of community within which the moral life
could be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the ... new dark
ages which are already upon us."79 The construction of these new communal forms,
he suggests, is to be made through a slow evolution in the history of virtues; as to the
latter's possibility for survival, Maclntyre states "if the tradition of the virtues was
able to survive the horrors of the last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds
for hope."80 Maclntyre's solution reflects again a Platonist view of history.
According to Plato, society is able to recover its purity through a slow and steady
return to its origins. However, neither Plato nor Maclntyre are able to suggest how
individuals are to decide to turn from their present society towards another which is
guided by social virtues when they lack any form of subjective will, and are entirely
formed by society.
Maclntyre's analysis suggests that society is now at an impasse awaiting the
miraculous appearance of a "very different St Benedict."81 This is a conclusion that
would certainly reflect the reasons for which postmodernism raised its objections to
modernity and its impasse. For Maclntyre, like Weber before him, is a thinker of his
age, readily sensing and depicting the dilemma of the individual of his time. While
Weber predicted freedom as choice, Maclntyre denounced it as a sham. The
following Part deals with the type of freedom postmodernism senses as possible and
desirable in the present, and which appears as a revolt or a renunciation of the
positions of both authors. Theirs is a flight from purely capitalist and the purely
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moral, but falls short of a possible Hegelian synthesis. To an illustration of this
theory of freedom of the present we now turn.
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Part III. Postmodernity and Subjectivity:
an Unfinished Project
Postmodernism, as an intellectual movement, appears to express a variegated
critique of modernity, a modernity which goes beyond what Maclntyre defines as the
Enlightenment project. Postmodernism is specifically concerned with the socio¬
political and psychological wounds inflicted upon the modern individual, all ofwhich
stem from living in the 'iron cage of modernity'.1 The 'post' in postmodernism
expresses a distinct sense of disbelief, "implying (in the form of conclusion, or mere
premonition) that the long and earnest efforts of modernity have been misguided,
undertaken under false pretences and bound to -sooner or later- run their course; that,
in other words, it is modernity itself that will demonstrate (if it has not demonstrated
yet) and demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt, its impossibility, the vanity of its
hopes and the wastefulness of its works."2 According to Zygmunt Bauman,
postmodernist theories are significant in so far as they offer the opportunity to study
more fully questions concerning value-relativism, while pointing out that this problem
was a necessary product of modernity's quest for the establishment of a universal and
objectively founded moral code. For Bauman, modernity succeeded in demonstrating
"the uncanny capacity for thwarting self-examination; it wrapped the mechanisms of
self-reproduction with a veil of illusions without which those mechanisms, being
what they were, could not function properly; modernity had to set itself targets which
could not be reached, in order to reach what reach it could."3 Postmodernism
responds to this state of affairs by seeking to 'tear off the the mask of 'illusions',
thereby pointing out "certain pretences as false and certain objectives as neither
attainable nor, for that matter, desirable."4
However, unlike Maclntyre whose solution for the appearance of value-
relativism lead him to consider adapting Aristotelean ethics to modern Western
society, postmodernists seem to have adopted a more novel approach. While not
entirely abandoning modernity's concerns with progress, they nevertheless reject "the
typically modern ways" of going about its problems in so far as they do not seek to
introduce solutions which are based on the philosophical search for universals,
absolutes, and foundations in theory.5 As such, postmodern critique seeks to
discredit modernity's reason-centred theories on their own terms, and attempts to
develop solutions that would prove adaptable to contemporary society. It does so
through a questioning of the variety of roads which seem to have led to the Age of
Reason or Enlightenment. This includes the popular Weltanschauung concerning
reason and history, and the progress of reason in history dominating modern Western
thought since the nineteenth century.
142
Before proceeding any further in discussing postmodernism's approach, it is
necessary to give a brief definition of what postmodernism, more specifically, French
post-structuralism, identifies as the elements defining modernity. They are critical of
structuralism both in terms of linguistics (Saussure) and anthropology (Levi-Strauss),
and this because structuralism claims to have brought an end to philosophy in its
attempts to demonstrate that philosophical speculation is unnecessary. For just as the
physical sciences replaced philosophical speculation in the field of matter,
structuralism posited itself as the human science to supersede philosophical reflection
on human nature.6 However, postmodernists agree with the structuralists that
metaphysical assumptions can no longer be genuinely believed, but see the
structuralists as having failed to overcome the attachment to latent metaphysical
concepts.7
In its preoccupation with metaphysics, postmodernism is equally concerned
with modernity's humanism, a philosophical position, as we have demonstrated in
Part I of this study, which places mankind at the centre of the universe. They follow
Nietzsche in contending that the only way to save ourselves from the disillusionment
of our unfulfilled ideals -that is to be like God- is to free ourselves from this
logocentric definition of humanity. To do so they attempt to explode the Kantian
definition of the 'universal ego'. Alongside Nietzsche's critique of humanism lies
that of Martin Heidegger whose effect on French existentialism can hardly be denied.
Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism' (1947) primarily aims to distance the
philosopher's work from Sartre's tendency to read it as philosophical anthropology.8
Heidegger's preoccupation with the creation of new vocabulary aimed to avoid
psychologistic terms such as 'consciousness' and 'subjectivity' consistently
employed by Sartre. To this extent, French postmodernists appear critical of Sartre's
humanism, moving away from a philosophy whose primary raison d'etre is the
analysis of human nature in terms of 'consciousness', toward an emphasis on
linguistic structures and social practices. Moreover, in terms of political ideology,
phenomenologists such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty appear outdated in spite of their
later adherence to Marxism; here too, Marxism, or at least this anthropological form
ofMarxism, is rejected because it is in its very nature logocentric, and thus humanist.
The postmodernists' "incredulity towards metanarratives," i.e. towards a
single interpretation -whether in terms of history, political, economic or
anthropological accounts- of the progress of Western reason, takes its critique of
modernity, and especially modernity's dependence on science, from Nietzsche's
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proclamation 'God is dead'.9 This prise de conscience establishes that the Kantian
'individual will' as the 'universal will', which also represents the 'divine will', no
longer applies, and that if God is dead, so is all unified, homogeneous will. With the
disappearance of the universal will, comes the fragmentation of knowledge, and more
specifically self-knowledge, for knowledge of reality can no longer be based on the
knowledge of my self (because my will is not necessarily the universal will and
therefore has no basis to measure its authenticity or accuracy). Self-knowledge,
originally a product of a stable relationship between Subject and Object of
knowledge, becomes problematic as the moment of anagnorisis, or recognition,
which normally established the Identity of Subject, enters into crisis.10
This knowledge-uncertainty is socially expressed in terms of a crisis of
judgement. In their reading of Kant's Critique ofJudgement, postmodernists point to
the distinction between analytic and synthetic apriori which is taken to correspond to
a distinction between determining and reflective judgement. In a determining
judgement the act or event of judging is previously determined such that the Subject
of consciousness does not act at all; all judgement is determined according to a
structure and a method that is itself predetermined.11 Reflective judgement, on the
other hand, can only occur according to subjective criteria, i.e. without a pre¬
determined theory. In the pursuit of freedom, postmodernists favour reflective
judgement as it defines the individual's ability to judge according to subjective
criteria. Replacing freedom as action, judgements are then replaced by the act of
judging, and the form is replaced by the event.12 This reading of Kant's third
Critique seeks to direct the operation of reason away from its inner coherent form,
i.e. away from scientific knowledge, to a form of 'narrative' knowledge. As with
Kant, knowledge is therefore not based on the nature of the 'thing in itself, but
unlike Kant, it is also not based upon a 'universal' will. Rather it is based upon the
subject's 'narrative' of a given event, the telling of which is responsible for the
changing of the narrator's consciousness, and hence the production of new
knowledge.13
Postmodernism points out the return of the self, in its quest for self
identification, to a state of aimless self-fulfilment and self-negation; it is conceived of
as struggling against the morbid sentiment that the world is infinite, and that it will
never come to accede to the day of judgement. It awaits yet another renaissance, a
rebirth, which cannot resemble the Humanist return to the classics because what
constitutes the present appears as a mere fragment of the past, a simulation, a fake, a
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replica of a history to which the self can no longer belong, nor does it, in any
meaningful manner, express its adherence.14 This sentiment is exemplified in
Foucault's reflection on the Kantian text "Was heisst Aufklarung?," or "What is
Enlightenment?," in which Foucault comments that what made this text meaningful
was Kant's preoccupation with his present, which indicated a new type of
consciousness, one which looks in the present to comprehend the selfs own nature,
not as a historical product, but a product of a history, of an event.15 Here, each
object of study becomes the subject of its own historical narrative. No longer
objectified by history, it becomes its own author and subject thereby seizing in full
force an identity that is of its own making. The act of narrating one's own history is
therefore significant, for the self is only conscious of its own determination in the
very act of narration; it is an act which allows it to recognise itself as the Subject of its
own history, and not an object of predetermined structure.
In postmodernist writing there appears a return to projects16 of freedom, the
essence of which refer us back to the past. However, the conditions of the past are
no longer those which prevail in reality, and the struggle against the old definition of
freedom means also the struggle against the past, elements of which continue to effect
the present. Postmodernism may be viewed as this equivocal and multi-faceted
approach seeking to combine the present and the past, and which continues to put
both in question in terms of the 'truth' of their existence, while proclaiming that this
truth is never the truth, but a truth, and it is a truth of this present that is my own. It
is an attempt to be both participant and spectator in the spectacle of everyday life of
the present. Foucault's preoccupation with the present, the here-and-now, equally
shared by most notable postmodernists such as Lyotard and Derrida,17 defines the
essence of the postmodernist quest: for us to know the future we have to build on a
certainty of the now in an age where all the past certitudes upon which the edifice of
modern society has been established have fallen by the wayside. This is exemplified
in the development of the deconstructionist approach of Derrida, the establishment of
histories by Foucault, Lyotard's scepticism, and Baudrillard's simulations, all of
which appear to be putting in question the bases according to which modern society
defines and exercises its socio-economic and political power in the here-and-now.
Central to these diverse approaches in the study, the deconstruction and
reconstruction of the present, is the question of modern subjectivity. To begin with
postmodernists such as the early Foucault,18 Baudrillard and Derrida deny the
existence of such a notion as subjectivity, for this notion projects the humanist project
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of liberty. However, replacing the centred notion of subjectivity is nevertheless a
notion of creativity in which each individual selfhood is expressed; this creativity is
expressed through the art of narration, or language. Postmodernism does not believe
that subjectivity is viable, because subjectivity in humanist terms implied a notion of
physical and mental creation. In their critique of Hegel and Marx, postmodernists
return repeatedly to the idea that both Hegelianism and Marxism are no longer
applicable to modern society because of the change in the economy, a change which
deprives individuals of self-reproduction in material terms, thereby losing the capacity
to materialise, or actualise their sense of creation.19 Therefore, one cannot speak of
postmodernism's 'subject' in terms of what this particular individual 'produces', but
in terms of this individual's ability to 'create', that is, in and through language.
However, postmodernism continues to be attached to the idea of mental creation, in
so far as it suggests a type of freedom that is ultimate, for mental creativity is
essentially non-physical, and does not demand that individuals be subject to the laws
of objective nature. Furthermore, politically, postmodernism seeks to separate the
individual from the ancient definition of social centrality, to uncover the
power/knowledge control that society exercises over individuals, and to discredit the
belief in the priority that the community had over the individual in classical political
theory.
As to the nature of this 'selfhood,' postmodernism suggests that it consists of
a choice of what appeals to the individual who is the maker and author of his or her
personal history; in Foucault's terms, through the creation of the self by itself, hence
through narration. Only when one narrates one's own history can one be certain of
the content and reliability of this self. As Richard Rorty points out, the modern
liberal self continually redefines its own content through a revision of its
vocabulary;20 a redefinition of terms is needed for every new context within which
the liberal individual finds himself or herself. This implies that the individual will, as
the actualisation of reflective judgment, is continually and consistently exercising its
power and therewith establishes a presence that is undeniable. From this, several
interrelated questions arise: is this will free? What does this freedom imply? How
does it manifest itself in everyday activity? ...etc., answers to which may vary
according to the intensity with which each postmodern author seeks to allow the
individual the possibility of transcending modernity's socially determined structure.
For a definition of postmodernism to be more than a superficial survey of
current opinion it cannot simply rely on the definitions given by its authors -some of
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whom do not accept the classification of their work in terms of what is commonly
called postmodernism21- but will have to impose limitations, socio-political and
historically identifiable boundaries, within which it would be able to establish a line
of thought the content of which may eventually be considered, if at all, as proper
definition of this movement. It will therefore be argued here that postmodernist
socio-political and historical theory is essentially a French-based movement,22
reflecting to a great extent French experience of modernity in terms of both
philosophy and political ideology; and in spite of its claim to be the articulation of the
plight of Western society in general, its methods and ideological bases are invariably
entrenched in French literary culture and philosophy. This is important for several
reasons which will become clearer in this Part where it is argued, contrary to
currently held opinion, that since it is a rejection of French based structuralism (that
of Levi-Strauss in particular) which was in turn critical of Sartre's existentialism and
especially of existential Marxism, postmodernist theory adopts certain points in
common with existentialism via its critique of structuralism: i.e., through the
application of its particular brand of dialectics: in negating the negation of
existentialism, postmodernism returns to an existentialist advocacy of action in terms
of language.
However, postmodernism does not follow Sartre on all counts, but accepts
Levi-Strauss' objection to Sartre's universalising definition of human subjectivity.
Levi-Strauss cannot fully accept the view that "man has meaning only on the
condition that he view himself as meaningful."23 For he concedes that "this meaning
is never the right one: superstructures are faulty acts which have 'made it' socially,"
and concludes that because of this "it is vain to go to historical consciousness for the
truest meaning."24 His objection is based on the view that such a system cannot
belong both to history and to universality because it is itself 'ahistorical'. "It offers
not a concrete image of history but an abstract schema of men making history of such
a kind that it can manifest itself in the trend of their lives as a synchronic totality. Its
position in relation to history is therefore the same as that of primitives to the eternal
past: in Sartre's system, history plays exactly the part of a myth."25 Levi-Strauss
also objected to existential Marxism's attempt to render social a concept that is itself
internalised and purely individualistic. He charges Sartre with making humanity a
prisoner of its own cogito and states that "by sociologizing the Cogito, Sartre merely
exchanges one prison for another."26 For "each subject's group and period now take
the place of timeless consciousness."27 These are indeed the errors that
postmodernism would continue to charge Sartre with, all of which are concerned with
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the claim to 'universal' value implied in Sartre's theory of subjective will. With this
objection to 'universal' will aside, the argument outlined in Chapter II is concerned to
point out the close affinity postmodernism has with Sartre's definition of subjectivity
and its relation to language. It is important to emphasise at this point that the object of
this study is not to claim that postmodernism is a contemporary version of
existentialism. Rather, the point is that postmodernism is a movement that has been
shaped by the diverse philosophical and literary currents present in the France since
the 1930s.28 Postmodernism is far more a 'current' critique of the present than a
reiteration of the past. I argue that postmodernism's cause appears in line with
Sartre's existentialism in terms of how it defines subjectivity and human ontology.
It is equally important to note that postmodernism originates in the readings its
authors make of Hegel (and of Marx and Marxism), and upon which they base their
rejection of modernity and ascertain its failure. Along with Sartre, French
postmodernists base their reading of Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit - and Marx's
views on the connection between production and subjectivity29- on the interpretations
of Hegel by the French authorities on the subject, namely Alexandre Kojeve and Jean
Hyppolite.30 The result of this dependence on secondary sources proves to be
limiting, and indeed, even on postmodern standards of 'truth' claims, cannot be
regarded as the 'truth' about the nature and adequacy of modernity, but only a
particular interpretation of it. Furthermore, this Part examines the postmodern
critique of modernity, the tradition of which starts with Hegel and ends with the
Frankfurt School passing via Nietzsche and Weber,31 and as such is preoccupied
with the following concepts: reason, history, freedom, subjectivity and teleology.
The object of this Part is an ambitious one, and has the potential to be highly
controversial. For it seeks to establish a study and critique of postmodernism that is
based on two points. First, postmodernism is culturally limited, a position that
postmodernists themselves cannot feign to deny, for they uphold in their own
theories the specificity, rather than the universality, of any study and viewpoint;
however, postmodernists seem to set claim to the whole of the modern world in their
critique of the Western philosophical tradition, and by doing so they ultimately
establish foundations for a given 'universality'. Second, it will be argued that in its
emphasis on language and narration as means toward the actualisation of free self
definition, postmodernism demonstrates very strong links with French existentialist
definitions of human ontology and freedom, despite its strong denials and dismissal
of Sartre and of humanism. The present argument seeks to demonstrate that the
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affinity detected between the postmodern movement and existentialism is also present
in the manner in which postmodernists read into Hegel and Marx a claim that has
come out of the dissolution of the Humanist project for liberty, i.e. the actualisation
of subjectivity in terms of creation, or 'production', one which is clearly present in
Sartre's interpretation of the dialectics of both philosophers. Analysis will show that
French postmodern thought has inherited a false definition of what 'constitutes' the
elements of dialectics defining human ontology, and therewith it developed towards a
negative, rather than a positive understanding of its capacities as a critical theory of
the present, as well as those of contemporary society. Finally, it is argued that
postmodern analysis of the present is essential to society's healthy development, but
needs to separate itself from its more 'Romantic' aspects, i.e. that it should seek to
establish freedom as actualised subjectivity in the world according to a Hegelian
definition of 'becoming', rather than a Romantic conception of 'creation'/'invention'.
This Part consists of two chapters. Chapter I outlines Jean-Paul Sartre's
definition of subjectivity as freedom in and through the imagination, the actuality of
which is grounded in language. This definition is achieved through a study of
Sartre's ontology of the subject, the in-itself and for-itself, as well as the relation his
work establishes between being and consciousness/knowing. Once contrasted with
Hegel's definition of the relationship between being and knowing, a distinct, and
more coherent definition of Sartre's project for freedom is then established. This
appears in terms of Sartre's intention to break away from the logocentric, divinity
oriented Enlightenment tradition with which he identified Hegel, and his wish to
return to a Kantian understanding of the individual's responsibility for personal
actions.32 Sartre's criticism of Hegelian/Marxist33 dialectics and of the Hegelian
moment of 'becoming,' establish his intention to break away from the traditionally
held view that freedom as subjectivity is based upon a process of mediation, i.e.
through an other that is object to the self/consciousness who is necessarily subject.
Chapter II presents three distinct postmodern critiques of modernity's failure
to establish a society within which individuals can become free subjects. This
includes Foucault's paradoxical position concerning subjectivity, Lyotard's definition
of the postmodern 'condition', and Derrida's deconstructionist approach. For these
authors, regardless of the method they use to establish their claim against modernity,
it will be shown that in spite of their rejection, and conscious denial of humanism and
existentialism, they nevertheless establish a definition of freedom in terms of
language as action that is akin to Sartre's. If these analyses are correct,
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postmodernism appears as a movement that has been fueled by a disillusionment with
'metanarratives', the interpreters of which remain imprisoned within the confines of
the Romantic notion, stating that subjectivity is strictly an act of creative power;
furthermore, that individuals have no other means to know that they are being denied
their subjectivity than through the writing/creation, of the intellectual, the artist, the
writer, the social critic. This would lead to the conclusion that postmodernism, like
its Humanist and Romantic predecessors, remains a movement glorifying creative
work, and, as such, proves to be self-serving and socially nihilistic.
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Chapter I: Existentialism: The Postmodern Other?
This Chapter has a twofold objective. First, it outlines the existentialist
ontology based on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. It will become clear from the outline
that Sartre sought to break away from the traditional identification of knowing and
being in order to establish a theory that separates consciousness entirely from being
through a specific definition of freedom as imagination. As such, freedom in terms
of self-actualisation is restricted to language, and more specifically to creative writing.
Words for Sartre are action, they are the means by which we affirm our freedom in
the world. However, with this lies the second objective. This break with traditional
identification of knowing and being, which forms the basis of Hegelian and Marxist
dialectics, deprives the process of self-actualisation from the moment of synthesis by
introducing a triad, the ultimate purpose of which is nihilation.
Sartre's theory of subjectivity and freedom is presented here in three sections.
The first provides a definition of subjectivity according to Sartre, taking not only
Sartre's philosophical works, but also his novels as a practical interpretation of the
meaning of this subjectivity in lived world experience. It contrasts Sartre's definition
of being and nothingness, or the in-itself and for-itself, to Hegel's, and demonstrates
that, as a product of their differences, Sartre's definition of what actualises freedom
constitutes a double-negation of reality. Section Two develops the links between
Sartre's ontology and subjectivity as freedom expressed through language. Section
Three presents Sartre's attempt to ground his theory of freedom in a socio-political
context. It therefore presents his development of the Existentialist Marxist ideology,
the aim of which was to divest Marxism of its materialist, fetishist interpretation of
human ontology. Analysis will show that Sartre's reading and adaptation ofMarxism
does not alter his original theory as some commentators on Sartre would wish to
claim;34 rather, his definition of subjectivity as freedom expressed in and through
language appears to have been maintained not only in his Critique of Dialectical
Reason, but also in his later works, such as those on Flaubert and Jean Genet.
Existential Subjectivity
In Existentialism and Humanism,35 Sartre explains that "if God does not
exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being
which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or,
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as Heidegger has it, the human reality."36 An existentialist would find it difficult to
define the essence of the self, for "to begin with he is nothing. He will not be
anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself."37 For Sartre one
simply is; the content of this self depends entirely on both the will and the praxis38
but only after "that leap towards existence"39 has been taken, and has invariably
become part and parcel of the shaping of this existence. Existentialists "believe that
existence comes before essence -or, if you will, that we must begin from the
subjective;"40 this subjectivism implies that each individual "cannot pass beyond
human subjectivity,"41 i.e. that the recognition and constitution of one's subjectivity
represents the highest point in the achievement of freedom as consciousness in the
world, for there is no divine beyond, no transcendent Other whose Being can come to
define the essence of humanity.
In his definition of what constitutes subjectivity, Sartre makes a distinction
between consciousness of the self and the creation of the self.42 Consciousness is
itself an unuttered, unactualised moment of thought, which finds no expression,
either in language or in reflection, but seeks its self knowledge outside of the realm of
thought.43 By contrast, the concrete actualisation of the self lies in the praxis, the
action, of the individual made according to the decision to commit oneself to an
action, only the result of this action constitutes the self in reality. This distinction is
noteworthy on many levels. It appears in this radical form in the early philosophical
essays, and more explicitly, in Being and Nothingness (1943) wherein the in-itself
and the for-itself, the phenomenal world and the self-as-consciousness, inhabit two
exclusive spheres, and are separated by a neant, nothingness, itself a product of
reflexive consciousness. Similarly, in Nausee (1938) Roquentin's reflections on the
world are dissociated from his own activity, and the entire novel represents a
questioning by the self of what constitutes it, and what will give its own entity a
meaning. Roquentin could not be satisfied with the label of Historian, for the
possibilities which constituted his consciousness were limited and inhibited by this
label. In fact, every single naming of a phenomenal existence, a 'sea gull', 'a root',
'a seat', meant to define the essence of things; however, as Roquentin discovers,
these words do not express our consciousness of them, for consciousness is what 'is
not', rather than what 'is', and as such, being and knowing appear as distinct
moments of existence.
It is important to provide a few words of explanation concerning the nature of
Sartre's ontology in a brief definition of what constitutes being-for-itself, being-in-
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itself, and the Other, for this is necessary to establish a distinction between Sartre's
brand of 'dialectics' and Hegel's. For Sartre, being-for-itself is consciousness which
is itself a 'negatites' - a word which expresses all sorts of negations: interrogation,
destruction, and negative judgement, all of which constitute the for-itself as the origin
of negation. Indeed, the for-itself appears essentially as consciousness of non-being.
In one's capacity to interrogate, destroy (eliminate possibilities) and establish a
judgement based on negation of what is - i.e. by recognising what is, one
acknowledges also what is not- one becomes conscious of one's self being conscious
(i.e. the process/activity of consciousness), a process which defines the essence of
the for-itself, or non-being. The for-itself is therefore outside of being, and as such
free. For Sartre, the for-itself is freedom.44 This freedom comes at the price of its
being entirely, and permanently, separate from the in-itself, which occurs because
consciousness reaches and acknowledges being merely as something external. In
doing so, the for-itself is never a thing, an object, but a. force, that is linked to action
rather than to observation. All phenomena belong, as a mass, to the realm of the
being-in-itself that is itself not reflexive, but is objectified through reflection.
Subjectivity as consciousness is, therefore, a nothingness. It is emptiness of being-
in-itself. The point at which Sartre's ontology does not follow Hegel toward a
definition of being in-the-world occurs when Sartre affirms the traditional distinction
between the emptiness of the for-itself and the fullness of the in-itself, i.e. in stating
that "consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far
as this being implies a being other than itself."45 Here, Sartre means to emphasise
that the for-itself never "exists for-itself but only for the object, and that subjectivity is
a consciousness without Subject,"46 In other words, the for-itself is immaterial and
can never be an object, not even that of its own. As it will be shown later, the for-
itself is invariably action, energy, activity, but can never manifest itself as a thingness
or a whatness.
For Hegel, the for-itself is a product of mediation between two elements
which stand in opposition to each other, i.e. thought and nothingness. Being-in-itself
is a phenomenal existence of the thinking 'I' made real through the process of
mediation between the 'I' as conscious thought and the 'not I', or nothingness. As
such, it transpires that Hegel would have agreed with the first part of Sartre's
definition of the for-itself as the product of a negation; however, he would not agree
that thought exists separately from being, or the in-itself, although he would agree
that being-for-itself believes itself to exist separately from being in its first moments,
e.g. the pure being-for-itself characteristic of self-consciousness at the start of the
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'Self-Consciousness' section of the Phenomenology which attempts to establish and
consolidate its certainty in absolute opposition to all positive being. Be that as it may,
for Hegel, thought does not transcend being, but is the product, i.e. consciousness,
of the recognition of the distinction between being and nothingness. Consciousness,
therefore, is transcended by the earlier mediation between something and nothing.
For Hegel, like the point in the middle of the circle, I know that I exist because I can
perceive the nothingness which surrounds me. Were the in-itself (the circle) to be
totally full, as Sartre suggests, then a tautology would ensue, for there can be no
distinction between 7 and not 7, and therefore no mediation. It would simply remain
as the arbitrary utterance 'I am I', the result of which yields no self-consciousness in
the world. Further explanation of Sartre's theory is needed to clarify this point.
For Sartre, the in-itself is defined as what is, the knowledge of which is
intuitive.47 But Sartre reverses the Husserlian definition of intuition by stating that it
is not the presence of the thing to consciousness, but "the presence of consciousness
to the thing."48 This distinction emphasises the separation of consciousness from
thingness. For Sartre, consciousness is the permanent game of reflexivity-reflecting.
Therefore, consciousness, in merely reflecting a reflex, remains an activity which
falls away at the moment that the in-itself vanishes and ceases to exist as thingness.
As such, the knowledge of the in-itself remains a product of negation, or nihilation,
in and through the activity of the for-itself, which would indicate that knowledge "is
neither a relation, a quality, nor an activity; it is the essence of the For-itself insofar as
it is 'present to...'."49 Sartre identifies knowledge in the not-I. For the knowledge
of "this" thing "is possible by emphasizing some specific negation, leaving, at the
same time, the rest of the world in a foggy background."50 The in-itself does not
hold a certain 'external relation', for the relationship of a 'this' to a 'that' must occur
within the for-itself; otherwise, the order of things in the in-itself remains rather
'neutral'. For Sartre, "an external relation is neither objective nor subjective, but
'hangs,... in the air.' It is nothing-, its whole being consists in 'being quoted' by the
For-itself."51
In acknowledging the properties of the in-itself, its internal structure, Sartre
indicates that objects cannot be distinguished from their quality, that is, that a table
cannot be distinguished from its external properties which make it what it appears to
be. As such, if a table is round and red, and has three legs, then it is the
interpenetration of these properties which make it 'this table'. These properties also
enter into my qualification (negative judgment) of 'this table' in terms of its
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potentiality as permanence, i.e. as desired object of admiration, potential for its use as
stool, etc. What's more, it is this potentiality that defines the for-itselfs drive to
'utilise' a 'this'. Given the for-itself's constant preoccupation with a lack, an
emptiness, in its qualifying of a 'thingness' it also identifies the possibility of action
for the realisation of a task, through which it gains recognition as subjectivity in the
present.52 In this sense, things do not exist, nor do they have properties in
themselves, but are there for the for-itself; in taking this position, Sartre seeks to
dissolve any claim to metaphysical content attached to the world as a whole: things
have no properties, no essence of their own, but are acknowledged/perceived through
human consciousness which is responsible for their appearance.
Following from this radical separation between things and thought, Sartre can
only define the Other of the self as another person who is endowed with a subjective
consciousness. Invariably, the Other is never, as it is often considered, an object of
perception, but a Subject. In my encounter with the Other, my subjective world
seems to "disintegrate," when faced with the Other's subjective world. "And this
falling to pieces of my monopolized world is precisely the apparition of the Other in
the universe."53 This falling apart of my universe occurs because in and through the
Other's gaze I am an object in the Other's world, as much as the Other is an object in
mine; to be looked at is to be annihilated in the gaze of the Other, thereby feeling
myself transformed from a Subject to myself as an object. By being looked at I am
transcended, my possibilities are transcended by those of the Other, and this because
I am no longer the sole actor in the situation, nor the sole perceiver; my actions
(intentions) are already perceived and observed by the Other, a situation which
renders my possibilities (what I can and shall do) into probabilities (what I may and
will do). The Other locates me in space, and posits me in time. This occurs because
with the Other's presence I am forced to acknowledge the feeling and possibility of
simultaneous existence which occurs in the present moment within a given space.
This feeling of simultaneity makes me also feel subject to the Other's actions, and
therewith "I am his slave."54 However, the Other's gaze does not endow me with
ordinary knowledge, but is literally a "hole in my universe," and hence a new
dimension which gives rise to specific reactions (shame, pride, alienation...etc.)
proving the Other's existence.
In this encounter with the Other, Sartre's ontology endows the for-itself with
a double stance. On the one hand, I can know myself as I am to myself, i.e. as
being-for-myself, or I can know myself (as did Jean Genet) in and through the Other,
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and therefore as my being-for-the-Other, hence as object. As such there seems to be
a stage when the being-for-itself appears as a 'neutral' zone between being-for-myself
and being-for-the-other, in which subjectivity is uncertain. For in being-for-myself, I
am not quite certain that I am a Subject, for I have not grounded this subjectivity in a
social context, whereas being-for-the-Other "is a fall through absolute emptiness
towards being an Object."55 However, I need not accept this feeling of
'objectification', and am able to annihilate the feelings which reduce me to object
(such as fear, shame, alienation,...) and recapture my being-for-itself, and therewith
my subjectivity.56 This socio-political affirmation constitutes the moment of my
being for-itself not only in my personal consciousness, but also in that of the Other.
The Other is not negligible for Sartre, for its presence decides for me the manner in
which I may eventually perceive myself as self. However, as it will be shown in the
following section, the Other's presence is not always threatening, e.g. if this presence
is made through the written word, it may even be liberating and inspiring. When
presence is physical it becomes threatening, and when word and gaze combine to
point out a personal attribute of my for-itself (such as the case with Genet when he
was called 'thief'), it is then that I become an object of shame, pride ...etc. I am
thereby alienated from my consciousness and become for-the-Other. This distinction
is of primary importance, because, for Sartre, freedom is also actualised in and
through language. It is the language of the Other, that can inspire me, for it has no
direct import on the 'I think' ofmy consciousness or my for-itself.
The presence of the Other is paradoxical to me. It limits me insofar as it
appears as "concrete 'subjectivity,' the bottom of which never can be reached,"57 but
then again, Sartre refers to the Other as the centre, whose life continually posits the
world around his or her needs. The Other is always present, for there will always be
others, but in its being perceived by my for-itself, he or she appears as an absence, a
curious state that Sartre coined the "absent-presence": "I want him to stay object and I
hate to see him subject again! He makes it nevertheless from time to time. The dead
alone stay object for ever."58 This reference to the dead as permanent objects in No
Exit points to the fact that in hell (the future abode of all ill-doers), the feeling of
shame, fear and alienation is all encompassing. It is too late for the for-itself to
recapture its subjectivity through action, for time has run-out, and the possibility of
acting according to nobler thoughts has come to naught. In hell, I bear the full
responsibility of having forsaken my for-itself, and am now subject to being always
considered as object of shame. However, in all of this, the for-itself remains
invariably separate from the in-itself and from for-the-other, and this even when the
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Other stands in opposition to my for-itself making it possible for me to be reduced to
the status of object. In other words, for Sartre there is no possible unity which can
bring all three into a whole that is operable. In the Sartrean world, I stand in a
constant struggle to be subject over and above the world of things and the Other[s].59
I am not, nor can ever be, a part of a harmonious universe in which synthesis
between opposites can occur. This position stands in direct opposition to that of
Hegel60 whose primary purpose was to expose the reason for which this diversity
came about, and presents a method able to undo this explosion of distinct
'consciousnesses' in order to achieve a unity.
Sartre's position regarding Hegel's ontology is crucial to this study. For
although he begins his own ontology according to the Hegelian definition of the
beginning being based in the negation of opposites, Sartre does not follow him in
aiming to achieve a synthesis between the two, therefore to complete the dialectic.
This I shall argue is based upon two elements which separate the two philosophers,
and which are vital to the understanding of Hegelian dialectics, if not dialectics in
general. First, for Hegel, the quality of a thing, as it is in its positive aspect a sub¬
category of being-in-itself, "is the inherent character or being of the thing as it is in
itself apart from all other things."61 Whereas, the quality of a thing regarded in its
negative aspect (negation) is the character of the thing as negating some other thing,
which "is then a being which stands in relation to [negates] other things. As such it is
the sub-category of being-for-other."62 In other words, the in-itself and for-itself are
not totally separate but are mediated; what's more, for Hegel the in-itself includes the
moment of being-for-other, i.e. the in-itself is not necessarily pure thingness, nor is
the other a pure consciousness. For Hegel, as it is for Heidegger, we are not and can
never be conceived of as pure consciousness wholly and completely separate from
our bodies. On the contrary, Hegel adheres to the position that opposites, being and
nothingness, are in fact identical. To understand this it will be important to say a few
words on Hegel's position on knowing and being.
Second, consciousness does not suffice for the actualisation of subjectivity.
Hegel believes that I do not acquire freedom simply through thought, but freedom has
to become real through action, and more precisely has to be recognised by Others as
well. Freedom, for Hegel, can only be actual when it is social. To this Sartre would
agree, but answers that consciousness need not be actualised through an identification
with being, but that it can be freedom through words, i.e. through the creation of
one's own world on paper, the publication of which makes this freedom both actual
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and social. These points demand further explanation.
Sartre's position concerning the absolute separation between being and
knowing points to a difficulty in philosophy since Plato, and finds in Hegel's
philosophy concerning the transition from Logic to Nature an uneasy solution. Hegel
makes the distinction between the categories (elements of thought) which he defines
as having an independent objective being, and sensuous universals, which have a
dependent objective being. However, Hegel does not hold that they are distinctly
opposed. Given that the categories "are the logical conditions of all experience, of all
consciousness," they are that part of consciousness which consists in sensuous
universals. Hegel adheres to the "belief in the objectivity of universals" which
"consists in what is sometimes called the identity of knowing and being."63 This
indicates, contrary to Sartre's position, that the subject (the knowing consciousness),
and the object (being), are identical. Consciousness is therefore neither external to,
nor absolutely different from, being. Their identity is based upon their being "two
different aspects of one reality."64 The establishing of the identity between subject
and object is necessary to overcome the self-contradictory Kantian theory of the
existence of the unknowable thing-in-itself. On this both Sartre and Hegel would
agree. However, Sartre objects strongly to Hegel's conclusions, i.e. that subject and
object are identical because "the object itself is precisely what thought makes of it."65
For Sartre, consciousness can never be identical to being because it is distinctly
negative; it annihilates being and therefore cannot identify itself with it as thingness,
but identifies itself with it as an annihilated thingness, i.e. nothingness.66
But, for Hegel, "Being means being for consciousness,"67 and there is no
other type of being. It is in the nature of being to stand in relation to a subject/or
which it is an object. However, subject and object are not simply identical, but also
distinct. They cannot be simply identical, otherwise there would be no absolute
separation between them, for the object would then be within the subject. Similarly,
they cannot be simply distinct because this would mean that the object is outside of
thought, and hence unknowable. This leaves Hegel with the conclusion that "thought
overreaches the gulf between itself and its object, - or that the separation between
thought and thing is a separation within thought itself."68 What differentiates Sartre's
position from Hegel's is the concept of mediation between thing and thought. In the
case of being-in-itself and being-for-self, there is of course the process of being-for-
other which acts as medium. As defined above, being-for-other for Hegel is a sub¬
category of being-in-itself, it is its negative aspect. When I identify a stone, the stone
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is not-I, but it is also my conception of it which makes me identify it as such.
Therefore, the not-I of the stone is the stone being-for-other. For Hegel, being-for-
other is not Sartre's being-for-the-Other, for the other in Hegel is not necessarily
-although it can be69- an other person, but may be anything that is not-I. It is not
another consciousness through which I disintegrate as consciousness, but is a
moment of distinction and overcoming, a moment ofAufhebung.
It is now clear that for Sartre, Hegel's being-for-other is in fact
consciousness, the not-I, but is also the being-for-itself. Not so for Hegel, for whom
the moment of being-for-self is in fact 'becoming', or absolutely determinate being.
Hegel would suggest that Sartre's definition of for-itself is erroneous because as the
moment of nihilation, it suggests that no particular idea of being is determined
because the moment of actually determining this being as a 'this' is left unresolved; it
remains the not-I of perception. Hegel's answer to this dilemma comes in the
resolution of the contradiction of the I and not-I through the process of becoming
which is the unity of the two. With this Hegel forms the triad of his dialectical
method, where being is the thesis, nothingness (consciousness) is the antithesis, and
becoming the synthesis. The latter is then posited as the thesis of yet another triad
which includes all the contradictions and resolutions of former triads, bringing the
original 'being' toward higher degrees of determination, i.e. toward the Absolute
which is itself infinite. This implies that the infinite, or determinate being, was
already present at the very start, indicating that within being there already existed its
opposite, non-being or infinity. It also indicates that the present, this moment of
determinate existence is indeed becoming, or what is actual. The difference between
Hegel's actual differs from Sartre's real in so far as it is both being and becoming all
at once.70 Whereas the real for Sartre is purely determinate being, and hence can
only signify being.
In Hegelian terms, Sartre, although rejecting the Kantian theory of the thing-
in-itself, commits a similar error that Hegel calls 'understanding' which opposes itself
to 'reason'. The understanding "believes that two opposites, such as being and
nothing, absolutely exclude each other," whereas "reason admits that ... this
exclusion is not absolute and is not incompatible with the identity of the two
opposites."71 Hegel's positing of reason in this manner is in fact not a novelty, but
has been explicitly stated by earlier writers. Heraclitus, the Yedantists, Plotinus, and
Spinoza all believed in the unity of opposites, and therewith identified the truth as
one, and the many proceed from the one, or is the one. Hegel's deductions are based
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upon this familiar theory which implies the necessary union between the one and the
many. On the other hand, Sartre's vision of the world consists not in unity but in
plurality of consciousnesses. When facing the Otherfs], the for-itself produces a
double negation, thereby making it plural. Sartre seems unable to explain this
phenomenon and claims that "the answer involves an insoluble antinomy," which is
unexplainable, "it is so."72
Sartre cannot accept Hegel's identity of opposites because it would mean that
the individual is unable, and therefore unfree, to think independently from the
senusuous universal, and that imagination is identical to perception. In The
Psychology of the Imagination, a treatise on phenomenological psychology published
in 1940, Sartre rejects the idea that imagination is a vague or faded perception.
Although the objects of both are the same, what distinguishes the two is the
conscious attitude toward the object. In imagination, the object is posited as either
absent, non-existent, existing elsewhere, or neutralised (i.e. not posited as existing).
For now it is clear why consciousness, at least in imagination, cannot depend on the
nature of being. In order to posit an object as non-existent, the very act of
imagination must perform a double nihilation. Imagination, like the Hegelian triad,73
performs a three point movement. However, unlike this dialectic, it does not achieve
synthesis, but a double nihilation. According to Sartre, the imaginative act is
"constituting, isolating, and nihilating."74 "It constitutes the world as a world, for
before consciousness there was no 'world' but only full, undifferentiated being. It
then nihilates the world from a particular point of view and by a second act of
nihilation isolates the object from the world -as out-of-reach."75 By positing thus the
final moment of the overcoming of negation with another negation, Sartre does not
reach an actualised moment, a determined state of being-in-the-world, but a
determined state of being in consciousness which is imagination, i.e. life in thought.
This accounts for the for-itself's attachment to its non-sensuous being.
However, how can this be a theory of being at all? The answer to this lies in Sartre's
original pre-occupation, namely, the question of freedom. How is one to be free in
the world when the world itself is a prison from which one would not be able to
extricate one's self if following Hegelian ontology? In this early book, Sartre had
already established the direct links between nothingness and freedom: "in order to
imagine, consciousness must be free from all specific reality and this freedom must
be able to define itself by a 'being-in-the-world which is at once the constitution and
the negation of the world'."76 In other words, consciousness, the for-itself, must be
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able to establish a consciousness of the "unreal."77 This occurs because the unreal
"is produced outside of the world by a consciousness which stays in the world, and it
is because he is transcendentally free that man can imagine."78 It is essentially this
freedom, which, in its own way, 'nihilates' the determined being of Hegel, also
allows the individual to establish his/her own self independently of the social world.
This is a world that Hegel identifies as the universal with which the individual must
eventually identify. For Sartre one has a choice, and a responsibility for this choice.
For Sartre, to be free one has to choose. This is because it is in choosing that
one may be able to give shape to one's self. In Existentialism and Humanism, Sartre
states that "when we say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one of us
must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he
chooses for all men."79 As such, Sartre seems to hold that there is a common feature
which permeates humanity, and that one's decision for one's action in the world must
follow the Kantian imperative of knowing consciously that one is choosing what
others would be allowed to do as well. He adds that "if ... we will to exist at the
same time as we fashion our image, that image is valid for all and for the entire epoch
in which we find ourselves. Our responsibility is thus much greater than we had
supposed, for it concerns mankind as a whole."80
This responsibility fashions the existential angst. According to Sartre,
anguish is "far from being a screen which could separate us from action, it is a
condition of action itself."*1 This anguish exists because, unlike the individual
formulating the Kantian categorical imperative, the existentialist has not the advantage
of being able to rely on a God from whom he/she has acquired a definition of human
essence. Rather, "the existentialist... finds it extremely embarrassing that God does
not exist, for there disappears all possibility of finding values in an intelligible
heaven. There can no longer be any good a priori since there is no infinite and perfect
consciousness to think it. ...we are now upon the plane where there are only men."82
However, it is also within this action that reality is constituted, and lies the essence of
selfhood which manifests itself and does not rely on a pre-thought consciousness.
This explains Sartre's demand that consciousness and actuality be distinct, for one
may be conscious of many things, but it is only in action that one is able to ground
this potential into reality. Only in leaping into existence (and is not thrown in it as
Heidegger suggests) does the potential shape reality and bring forth human essence.
Yet where is, or what constitutes freedom? For Sartre pure subjectivity, and
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hence freedom, is an absolute truth incarnate in Descartes' "I think therefore I am."
Unlike Descartes and Kant, however, Sartre wishes to underline the fact that this type
of knowledge is not one which depends on an innate understanding of human nature
given a priori,83 but it is a reflective knowledge, which understands human essence
through the inter-subjective interaction of this consciousness with the world, i.e. with
other individuals. Here the cogito is a universal, for "when we say "I think" we are
attaining to ourselves in the presence of the other, and we are just as certain of the
other as we are of ourselves. Thus the man who discovers himself directly in the
cogito also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own
existence. He recognises that he cannot be anything (...) unless others recognise him
as such."84 Moreover, for Sartre, "we will freedom for freedom's sake, and ... in
thus willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely on the freedom of others
and that the freedom of others depends upon our own."85 If the choice of an action is
an expression of freedom, how authentic, may be asked, is the relation, if any,
between the conscious I think and the active I dol In other words, although Sartre's
rejection of Hegel's dialectics places emphasis on the primacy of thought as source of
freedom, how is this freedom in fact actualised?
If freedom to exist is to be authentic, it should follow that the definition I give
to my essence materialises accordingly. These are questions to which the corpus of
Sartre's post-war writing sought to formulate an answer, bringing him closer to
Marxism. For in the definition he gives of freedom in Existentialism and Humanism,
as well as in Being and Nothingness, Sartre's individual, like Roquentin, seems to be
stumbling endlessly in a world that is inhabited by other individuals whose only
means to self-knowledge is each other. The world is itself mute, and in fact hardly
inter-subjective, for Roquentin seems to need no external stimulus, no human
relations, and the world around him is external to him and to a large degree alien. It
is a world he did not shape, did not fashion, and is merely observing. The pebble,
the tramway seat, the tree root are objects which give no meaning, and yet constitute
entities (expressions of a given social context) against which he can exercise his own
self-questioning. The book ends with Roquentin's reflection on a song whose writer
and singer seemed to have left their own essence in it, and left it to be recognised by
others as what told the story of their existence. For Roquentin, the book he wants to
write takes on a similar meaning. It will justify and register a reason for his
existence, it will help narrate, if only in the future, the meaning of the past that he has
lived, and with this a shadow, a glimpse of his own essence. In this manner,
Roquentin conceives of himself as a prisoner of a world in which he is able to reflect
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his essence, but from which he remains separate. It is therefore possible to express
one's uniqueness in the world, but that one has to remain separate from it.
Roquentin's - Sartre's free individual's - world emerges as that sphere of existence
filled with obstacles and illusions, alien and terrifying. There is no sphere in which
social, political and economical relations or conditions are relevant. History is my
history, the one that I have written, or have yet to create, all "in respect of concrete
circumstances."86
When defining the road to the actualisation of freedom in Being and
Nothingness, Sartre insists that consciousness only comes after the act, for
consciousness itself is unreflected (irreflechi) and can only acquire meaning and
content once reflected, i.e. in terms of an act, an objectification of the will.87
However, once reflected, the meaning and content of this consciousness appears
invariably as belonging to a past moment, an earlier self who, since, has been altered
by the very action this reflection has brought about. This clearly indicates the neant,
the nothingness contained within the Cartesian cogito's I think; for Sartre, since
consciousness cannot reflect prior to an act, then it must be concluded that it is empty.
As Hugh Silverman points out, this definition of consciousness breaks with the
Husserlian and Cartesian view by proposing that the self is an "active, individual
nonself."88
This accords with Roquentin's discovery that there are no adventures. He
bases this on the logic that adventures are stories, and "one does not live a story."89
It is an established act which acquires the defining meaning of adventure in terms of
its conclusion; hence one is forced to live one's experiences only through the relating
of an event, rather than through the very act of living it. Roquentin faces the
disillusionment of the present: if one can only tell of life after having lived it, then one
is forced to do one or the other, i.e. that "one can either live or tell; not both at
once."90 In other words, in order to make sense of life one has to record it as it
occurs, and then only later by reading it as a literary work, listening to it as a piece of
music, or looking at it as a work of art, can one conceive of the meaning of this life in
its totality. It is important that it be seen in its totality, for Sartre defines existential
humanism to be "this relation of transcendence as constitutive of man (not in the
sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity
(in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but forever present in a human
universe)."91 The self-surpassing suggests the process of overcoming, the Hegelian
and Derridean Aufheben, which is present in synthesis thereby requiring the putting
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together of the diverse elements which make up the totality of an individual life.
Author, Existentialism and Language
Also present in Roquentin's experience of the world, and of this self that he is
seeking to define, is the absence of a certainty in language. While staring at a seat in
a tramcar, Roquentin murmurs to himself: "it's a seat, as a sort of exorcism. But the
word remains on my lips: it refuses to go and rest upon the thing ..." "Things are
delivered from their names. They are there, grotesque, stubborn, huge, and it seems
crazy to call them seats or to say anything whatever about them." These thoughts are
continued in his visit to the public park, as are his reflections upon the absence of
preceived relations between the words 'root' and 'seagull' and the images of these
things in themselves; upon this he comes to the understanding that "I understood that
there was no middle way between non-existence and this swooning abundance.
What exists at all must exist to this point: to the point of mouldering, of bulging, of
obscenity. In another world, circles and melodies retain their pure rigid contours.
But existence is degeneration."92 These Platonist preoccupations suggest, like
Plato's mistrust of the phenomenal adulteration of the purity of the idea, that the
choice, the intent upon an action, even if this be the simple naming of a thing, limits
other possibilities that are potentially present in the nothingness of consciousness.
Therewith appears the recognition of the limitations imposed upon one's choices,
which are made by a world the present of which, in this context, seems unbearably
limiting and alienating, and within which one is forced to live life from without, to fit
in, rather than 'create'.
Yet there is a second side to this pre-occupation with language. Roquentin
seizes upon these limitations through the use of words; the absence of the 'middle
way' between non-existence and the abundance of things lies in the absence of the
naming, the identifying of action, the process of becoming free which Sartre attempts
to formulate later in Being and Nothingness. These are the words which will define
being, as distinct from simply existing. Words will come as the writing of this
history, my history, takes shape, and therewith the meaning of my being. For until I
am able to define the process of this becoming93 in the form of a story that I can relate
and through which I can objectify my being, I merely exist as an empty
consciousness. In this sense, I would fully agree with Silverman who argues that
"since this self is not an ego and is without content, without a meaning to define it,
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there is surely no name that characterizes a particular self, no word that will serve as
the predicate noun or adjective indicating who the self is."94 However, as the
existing self has no name, no word describing its nature or its content, it,
nevertheless, does acquire a meaning, a self, in the very act of objectifying itself,
albeit for simply the mere moment of this action. Its meaning is momentary, the time
it takes to act, or utter a sentence, and then this self is altered by this act thereby
becoming other to itself (i.e. the self before the act occurred). As such, the words
uttered to express the first moment of an acted consciousness cannot be taken as final,
and will have to wait until this self ceases to act, collect the essence of all previous
actions in their totality, compose one last narrative which may be used to define it.
Hence, words, although not defining the immediate vacuous self, do arise, and are
indeed necessary, as Roquentin suggests, for the recognition, the knowledge of this
lived life.
In this distinction between existing and being, the existentialist angst appears
as the absence of this certainty present in the naming of the nature of what I am. In
Nausea, what frightens and nauseates Roquentin is the recognition that whilst he
pronounces the words, 'root', 'seagull' and so on, he acquires no image of these
things, and therewith recognises the futility of the words uttered, and consequently
the futility of the words he uses to write his life. Roquentin's knowledge of his
subjectivity seems elusive, for the action which determines being comes always from
without and not from within; the angst is that of not knowing, not having the power
to alter the situation in which we are, but continue to shoulder the responsibility of the
actions we voluntarily make within pre-existent circumstances. The self is not the
author of its conscious act, for the self is not the other in which it recognises itself, in
which it is reflected onto itself, through which it becomes conscious and acquires a
value. The self is therefore forever a reflection from without, which brings us to the
first moment in which this self is formed and which Sartre defines in What is
Literature? (1947) and Dirty Hands (1948).
Given the fact that in Being and Nothingness the self is experienced as an
"absent-presence,"95 and that in Existentialism and Humanism, the self is identical to
all others, and whose choice it takes to be equally universal, Sartre suggests in What
is Literature ? that the freedom is intimately bound up with the activity of the writer
whose work appears to the readers in terms of a universal definition of the meaning
of being, thereby freeing them. Sartre views the relationship between the writer and
the reader in terms of dialectical aufheben, i.e. that the "creative freedom" of the first
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must be recognised and solicited by the second such that "the more we experience our
freedom, the more we recognize that of the other; the more he [writer] demands of us,
the more we [reader] demand of him."96 Here, Sartre puts in clearer focus the inter-
subjective activity he proposed in Existentialism andHumanism. Writing and reading
become the medium through which this exchange and universalisation of the essence
of the self occurs. For Sartre, language "is a prolongation of the senses, a third eye
which is going to look into our neighbor's heart. We are within language as within
our body. We feel it spontaneously while going beyond it toward other ends, as we
feel our hands and our feet; we perceive it when it is the other who is using it, as we
perceive the limbs of others."97 Words and writing are therefore the active
objectification of human essence; they constitute an act which captures without
altering the meaning of freedom. It is also an act which is never static. For in its
dialectical relation with the reader, it demands that the source , i.e. the writer, follow
the movement of the time, of the epoch.
Furthermore, Sartre states that "there is the word which is lived and the word
which is met. But in both cases, it is the course of an undertaking, either of me
acting on others or the other upon me. The word is a certain particular moment of
action and has no meaning outside of it."98 While words are action and constitute the
active being in the world of the writer, they are not the only mode of action that has
the merit of becoming universal, and therefore socially recognised. Creative action
occurs in all mediums of life. However, only those who act, i.e. create, acquire a
definition of the essence of their self. Others would have to act, not as readers or
observers, but as doers. This occurs because consciousness is able to seize upon
many possibilities for its own nature, however only in action can it determine what
this nature might be.
The dialectical relationship between writer and public is clearly stated in
Sartre's Saint Genet, comedien et martyr (1952) whose self-identity was pronounced
when he was called "Thief!" by his adoptive parents. The word 'thief, with all the
weight of its social implications, became the identity with which Genet sought to
express his now defined essence. Genet's essence is thus socially pre-defined,
condemning him to a life-long affirmation of this identity; as such Genet became a
Being-for-the-Other. This occurs because Genet's consciousness became fixed on
one form of otherness with which it consistently identified; it was no longer
nothingness awaiting the moment of action for its definition, but expressed a
reflection that has become its own. Genet is invariably other to his unreflective
166
consciousness, and as such is alienated from the possibilities which may have defined
his essence in other terms than 'thief. This self-alienation leaves Genet an absolute
freedom to be evil, for what should have existentially bound him to others within
society should have been his choice of what is better for all," which in this case was
entirely negated. In this Sartre points out the power of words as action in the world,
and more so in terms of the dialectical relationship they maintain between the author
and the receiver.
Language, Subjectivity and Existentialist Marxism
Sartre's complete integration of existentialism as an 'ideology' of its time
within a Marxist philosophy is introduced in Search for a Method (1957), the
prefatory essay in Critique ofDialectical Reason (1960). In the former, Sartre seems
not only to abandon his earlier critique of Hegel's dialectic, but goes beyond the
outlining of the dialectical relationship between the self and language to include the
Marxist definition of the formation of the social structures and its role in promoting
our self-knowledge, i.e. freedom. Our knowledge of our 'self occurs on two levels:
we are not only the existentialist actors, the knowers, but, as with Genet, we are the
known.100 As known, we belong to a class of which we constitute both its
consciousness and interests. For Sartre, class consciousness does not merely stop at
the manifestations of external contradictions defining it, but "is that contradiction
already surpassed by praxis and thereby preserved and denied all at once."101 It is
our identification with, and attempt to overcome as a unit, a we, the elements which
constitute our class. Hence, the social self, what acts in line with others on the same
level, operates by maintaining a common language and praxis, which defines its
entity within the context of class struggle.
In Search for a Method, Sartre's definition of subjectivity is twofold. First,
he points out his complete acceptance of the Marxist thesis that "men themselves
make their history but in a given environment which conditions them."102 Sartre
rejects, however, the Marxists' interpretation of this in terms which portray the
individual as an "inert object, with the nature which it has received, contributes to
precipitate or to check the 'course of the world'," because it implies that "there would
be no difference between the human agent and the machine."103 Rather, Sartre
proceeds to define the social subject in terms which avoid such simplistic
interpretation. He takes this statement to mean "that man in a period of exploitation is
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at once both the product of his own product and a historical agent who can under no
circumstances be taken as a product."104 Second, Sartre expresses this same
dialectical ontology of object-subject in terms of semiology and Hegelian dialectics;
on this he states that "for Hegel, the Signifying (at any moment of history) is the
movement of Mind (which will be constituted as the signifying-signified and the
signified-signifying; that is, as absolute-subject);"105 he contrasts this position to
Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel, showing it as characteristic of a critique by the
individual will to express, (i.e. act), a subjectivity which breaks away from the
conditions of the historically defined social world.
The individual, although responsible for his/her actions is liable, nevertheless,
to act according to the class in which it exists. The conflict between individual acts
and social acts bring about social consciousness and therewith class consciousness.
On another level, this synthesis, this overcoming through action also occurs in
language, hence signs. Although this seems to have altered Sartre's definition of
subjectivity as the sum of the actions of a particular self, it does not. For just as
individual consciousness is itself a neant, a void, determined only in action, so is
class consciousness in need of a we act to define both its collective and social self.
However, what makes the we act effective must, as inter-subjective necessity, be
maintained through language. In Critique ofDialectical Reason,106 these two levels
constitute Sartre's "dialectical circularity" of self wherein the self totalises; in other
words, in this dialectic, the self passes from its own determined being as action
(praxis) into the mode of social consciousness and subjectivity through the use of
language, itself a medium of action.
On the surface, Sartre's embrace of Marxism appears to have completely put
in question the existentialism ofNausee and Being and Nothingness, for it threw the
individual into the folds both of a History, and of a social Dialectic. However, it
would be altogether untrue to claim that Sartre's existentialist Marxism abandoned
Roquentin's quest for freedom through self-knowledge, or that of the achievement of
the individual of the pour-soi, Being-for-itself in a socio-political context. For Sartre
extended his theory on the knowledge of the self through the writing of its history,
the history of a given life in and through action, developed in Nausee, to philosophy.
In Search for a Method, Sartre pronounced Marxism as "the philosophy of our
time,"107 and existentialism as a peripheral "ideology." But philosophies are now
"totalizations of contemporary knowledge,"108 that is, the story of the present; only
this story, this adventure, does not involve that of one individual's life but that of the
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structure of the present. In this context, Marxism becomes very important, and
inaccurate as it may have seemed to Sartre, nevertheless necessary for the
understanding of the modern self. For this self can only become conscious of its
being once it is reflected through its action in the world. Therefore, an understanding
of the world becomes a necessary element.
It can then be argued that Sartre's 'discovery' of Marxism was merely an act
of necessity, and not a necessary identification with the philosophy itself. However,
like any adopted system, Sartre had to develop the tools to fit existentialism within the
Marxist framework, and this was done in the Critique through the development of the
dialectical method. There, Sartre criticised Marxism on two levels: first, as historical
materialism; second, as dialectical materialism. For Sartre it was existentialism's
raison d'etre "to reconquer man within Marxism."109 In Search for a Method, Sartre
introduced the progressive-regressive method. Its object of social-historical
experience was formed through projects as the crucial mediation connecting economic
determinants with concrete action, which he judged was lacking in Marxism's
account of historical materialism. In his account of the project, Sartre sought to
account for the subjective experience on the social level:
Only the project, as a mediation between two moments of
objectivity, can account for history; that is, for human
creativity. It is necessary to choose. In effect; either we
reduce everything to identity (which amounts to substituting
a mechanistic materialism for dialectical materialism) -or we
make of the dialectic a celestial law which imposes itself on
the Universe, a metaphysical force which by itself engenders
the historical process (and this is to fall back into Hegelian
idealism) -or we restore to the individual man his power to
go beyond his situation by means of work and action. This
solution alone enables us to base the movement of
totalization upon the real.110
As such, the progressive-regressive method would seek to give back to the individual
in history the essence of the universal cogito\ for only in defining the progress in
history as that of identifiable projects, products of individuals in isolation or in
groups, would the making of the human self in history emerge. What remains
disturbing in this approach is Sartre's readiness to posit the individual as an absolute-
subject, a creator, in other words a god. He reproaches Marxism for overriding the
role of the individual as creator, as actor in the History of the present. On this he
states:
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It is inside the movement of Marxist thought that we
discover a flaw of such a sort that despite itself Marxism
tends to eliminate the questioner from his investigation and
to make of the questioned, the object of absolute
Knowledge. The very notions which Marxist research
employs to describe our historical society -exploitation,
alienation, fetishism, reification, etc. -are precisely those
which most immediately refer to existential structures ... In
view of this default ... existentialism, at the heart of
Marxism and taking the same givens, the same Knowledge,
as its point of departure, must attempt in its turn ... the
dialectical interpretation of History.111
In Critique, Sartre presented the dialectic in the Hegelian-Marxist version as
both the method of thought and the structure of reality.112 He maintained that the
dialectic centred in human reason, and argued strongly against the Marxist
interpretation which locates it in nature, which he took to imply that individuals were
determined by nature. This also reflects his rejection of Marxist dialectics as having
been derived from Hegelian dialectics, thereby making the explicit identification of
consciousness with being. In his interpretation he followed both Kojeve and
Hyppolite who decisively rejected the notion of a dialectic of nature.113 Like the
Humanist Pico della Mirandola before him, Sartre refused to allow nature any
determining factor on human reasons and motives for action. Although
acknowledging that nature constituted the preconditions for human life, he denied that
human knowledge could reduce itself to the model ofmatter.114
Also present in the Critique is a more evolved theory of totalisation. Within
this new concept of History, and projects, the individual is able to totalise the events
which make up this life thereby achieving a complete narrative of this essence within
the whole of History. In Sartre's words, "the investigator must, if the unity of
history exists, grasp his own life as the Whole and the Part, as the link between the
Parts and the Whole, and the relation of the Parts among themselves, in the dialectical
movement of Unification. He must be able to make the leap from his own singular
life to History."115 However, this totalisation is never in itself a process through
which the individual in history experiences being-for-itself. On the contrary, the
individual remains alienated, the narration of the totality belongs not to the
consciousness of the moment of action, but to the writer of History: "In the world of
alienation, the historical agent never entirely recognizes himself in his act. This does
not mean that historians should not recognize him in it precisely as an alienated man.
However this may be, alienation is at the base and at the summit; and the agent never
undertakes anything which is not the negation of alienation and which does not fall
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back into an alienated world."116
With this we are left to ponder the meaning of this liberation, this freedom that
Sartre proposes. If one remains incapable of acknowledging one's act in terms of the
totality of the Whole as a Part, is there a moment in history when one ceases to be
alienated? This position points to possible answers, which may to a certain degree be
related. First, the agent, writer or reader of history, remains outside the totality in so
far as he/she seeks freedom in the imagination. In this sense, freedom is always my
freedom, but it may also be the freedom that I may transmit to others through words.
This would only be truly actualised through words that are means to action in the
present. What is more, this freedom is also atemporal; it can transcend both time and
space, and in so doing it is the ultimate in human freedom which is both individual
and inter-subjective. This type of freedom demands that one creates through
language.
The second answer to this may be found in Kojeve's reading of Hegel's
Phenomenology, and more precisely his theory concerning the end of History. Allan
Bloom defines Kojeve's theory of history:
...the most striking feature of Kojeve's thought is his
insistence...that for Hegel, and for all followers of Hegel,
history is completed, that nothing really new can again
happen in the world. ...Kojeve easily shows the ineluctable
necessity of this consequence for anyone who understands
human life to be historically determined, for anyone who
believes that thought is relative to time -that is, for most
modern men. For if thought is historical, it is only at the end
of history that this fact can be known; there can only be
knowledge if history at some point stops.117
Unlike Kojeve, Sartre does not believe that History has ended, but that we await the
end of history; for we remain in anguish, desperately seeking to fulfil the
nothingness, the existence of which is necessary, as long as the socio-political and
economic elements constituting our existence remain to force us into mediation
through objectivity, and thus alienation. In fact, Sartre believes that it is with the
demise of Marxism, which is the philosophy of this epoch the conditions of which
make its presence necessary, that humanity will overcome scarcity and therewith its
enslavement to the object. For, unlike Hegel, who defends the idea of actualisation
through the other as the only means to self actualisation and hence freedom, Sartre
believes that all such activity is alienating activity, which alters the self through
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mediation; it denaturalises the self, making it an other unto itself. The difference
ultimately lies in the fact that actualisation for Hegel and Marx consists of an inter-
subjective socially active actualisation that is achieved through the other (where this
other is an object that is either human or otherwise), whereas Sartre seeks the
establishment of the absolute-subject, the individual whose presence is merely
creation, in other words to establish the divine nature of humanity. In this insistence
on individuals always remaining as subjects, as ends in themselves, Sartre remains
quite Kantian.
It is clear from Sartre's critique of both Hegel and Marx that he does not see
freedom as an activity through which subjectivity actualises itself. He charges Hegel
with 'idealism' and Marx with 'materialism', and in both cases the charge remains
attached to a neglect of human agency, and the imposition of a transcendent other
(universalism, fetishism). However, even within the social context, the Sartrean
subject is invariably faced with the choice between being and nothingness; whereas
for Hegel as well as for Marx, the affirmation of being is itself a process and not a
static state of existence; not a moment, a segment of a history, but the active
actualisation of this being. This is not done through a benevolent Universal force,
nor through complete identification with the object produced, but it is consciousness
reflected and reflecting. For Sartre, consciousness is merely a reflection of an action
in a static moment of recognition; otherwise, it is void. Furthermore, consciousness
of action is always alienating when passing in or through an object; for "the meaning
of human labor is that man reduces himself to inorganic materiality, in order to act
materially upon matter and to change his material life. Through transubstantiation,
the project that our bodies engrave in the thing assumes the substantial characteristics
of that thing, without entirely losing its original qualities. Thus it comes to possess
an inert future, within which we shall have to determine our own future."118
This form of action is therefore alienating and dehumanising in its effect.
However, for Sartre there exists a purer form of action, that of words. As writer, the
individual is then able to express both the meaning of a life, its essence, its progress,
but without the alienating effect of material labour. Words are the purest form of
action as free self actualisation through knowing. Moreover, the writer may be
capable of freeing the reader simply through the written word, -i.e. through
imagination- an action which remains pure and non-alienating. Writing and reading
involve imagination, and are therefore liberating experiences, but it is in writing that
complete self-actualisation lies, for the actualisation of the imaginative sense occurs in
and through words (action).119 For the writer not only narrates his/her personal
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history, but also that of his/her class, socio-political and economic identity. Within
the being of a writer, the totalisation in Critique becomes possible, thereby
anticipating the moment of post-History, or post-industry where no one would have
to labour and express the self and its essence through nature. Only then can self-
creation, as freedom of imagination and thought, become a possibility.
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*Cf. Part II, Chapter I and the discussion ofWeber's definition of freedom in Enlightenment
society.




^Quentin Skinner, (ed.), The Return ofGrand Theory in the Human Sciences, (Cambridge
U.P., 1985), p.45.
^Cf. especially, J. Derrida, 'Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences', Writing and Difference, trans. A. Bass, (London: Routledge, 1978), pp. 278-293. Derrida
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metaphysical logocentrism, due to their attachment to a particular heirarchical view of humanity.
Also, cf. J. Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. I.H. Grant, (London: SAGE, 1993);
M. Foucault, 'What is an Author?', Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. D. F. Bouchard,
(Oxford U.P., 1977); J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, trans. G. Bennington & B.
Massumi, (Manchester U.P., 1984).
^This is most clear in Sartre's misinterpretation of Dasein's essence which he believed lies
in its existence, thereby promoting a mistaken belief that Dasein, as existence, privileges 'human
reality's' subjectivity. Fuller discussion of subjectivity in Existentialism will be elucidated in
Chapter Two of this Part.
"This proclamation was in fact first introduced into the philosophical discourse by Hegel in
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford University Press, 1977), p.455, §752: "The
Unhappy Consciousness ... is the consciousness of the loss of all essential being in this certainty of
itself, and of the loss even of this knowledge about itself -the loss of substance as well as of the
Self, it is the grief which expresses itself in the hard saying that 'God is dead'."
^Thomas Docherty (ed.), Postmodernism, (Cambridge U.P., 1993), pp. 24-25.
I*This form of determinism is present in Baudrillard's theory of simulation, Foucault's




l^This is expressed in Baudrillard's theory on simulation, and Derrida's critique of Hegel's
Phenomenology of Spirit.
l^In this case, Foucault is commenting on how our consciousness is shaped by an event;
for Kant wrote his reflections following the events of the French Revolution, an event which
inspired him to write the article advocating that the attainment of enlightenment was present in the
very act of revolt. Cf. Section on Foucault in Chapter II below.
1 ^Project is here mentioned in the plural to distinguish it from the earlier Enlightenment
project in the singular. For although postmodernists, (and this will be the main argument in this
study), are critical of the logocentric approach of modernity, they nevertheless pursue a project of
freedom in a fragmented form, which does not succeed in separating itself from logocentrism of
human nature, but proceeds to posit each individual life as its own centre thereby allowing the 'old
metaphysical world' to be populated by amultiplicity of centres.
l^Derrida's preoccupation with the present is not identical to Foucault's for his is an
attempt to de-centre the logocentric approach which makes of the present its focal point for decision
making. Further discussion of this point is expounded in the treatment of Derrida's work present in
Chapter Two of this Part.
18It is important to note at this point the distinctness of Foucault's work from that of the
postmodernists. Although essentially not a postmodernist, Foucault's work, as we will see in
Chapter II of this Part, appears as the bridge between the post-structuralist to what is more
commonly known as the postmodernist position. It would be hard to understand Lyotard's critique of
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Subjectivity in history. In this sense, Foucault's work should have been put in a separate category
alltogether, but given the demands of organisation and structure of the text, it has been placed as first
in the chapter on the postmodernists.
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Production and General Economy of the Sign; also, Derrida mentions this in his article From
Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve; Lyotard is very critical of the
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Postmodern Condition; Foucault's critique of Marxism and of the Frankfurt School runs also along
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^Richard Rorty , Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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1988), p. 34. Also, Jean Baudrillard, Baudrillard Live, ed. Mike Gane, (London: Routledge, 1993),
pp. 21-23.
22This is not to disregard postmodern writers in Germany, or in the United States, but that
as Peter Dews and others have recognised, postmodernists are equally post-structuralists, the majority
of whom are French, and belong to the French intellectual elite.





27Ibid., pp. 249-50 [my italics]. It is precisely this brand of 'timeless consciousness' that
postmodernists do not accept either in Sartre or in Hegel. Consciousness is this moment in which I
shape my judgement and consequently act upon it. It cannot be something that is latent in
everything I think and do, because I cannot be conscious of any moment which preceeded the 'now'.
2^That is, postmodernism shares with Sartre's existentialism a deep interest in German
phenomenology, more specifically Husserlian scepticism regarding positivist reason, but unlike
Husserl and more in line with Sartre's position, it maintains equal aversion to teleological -socially
bound- reason.
29Although there is a general critical spirit of the capacity of Marxism to resolve the
problems of Modernity, as Sartre has defined it, it is mainly in Jean Baudrillard's work that a
stringent critique of Marxism is clearly outlined. Although Baudrillard's critique may have some
relevance here, his work is not fully expounded for several reasons. First, a complete critique of
Marxism, such as the one implied in Baudrillard's work, is not needed to establish the definition of
modernity in Hegelian terms. Second, the schematic outline of Baudrillard's position would have
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and that of postmodernism, and not the Marxist interpretation of Hegel, itself in need of far reaching
study that cannot be undertaken in this work. References to Marx and postmodernism's critique of
Marxism will be made in the same spirit that most postmodernists interpret Marx, i.e. as the failed
actualisation of a philosophy which appeared as the only alternative to capitalism until the end of the
1960s. Elsewhere, all references to modernity and its definition refer to the Hegelian model.
30phis point is mentioned here as reference. I chose not to enter into this fully because a
full expos6 would make the presentation much too long, and would not add much to the argument I
am trying to make. However, it will be mentioned briefly where required with the necessary
citations and notes.
31Cf. Michel Foucault, "Qu'est-ce-que les lumihres?", Magazine Litteraire, (Paris: mai,
1984), p. 39.
32Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet, (London:
175
Methuen, 1970).
33These critiques Sartre expresses in Being and Nothingness (1943) Book III against Hegel
in particular, and in Critique ofDialecitical Reason (1960) against Marx.
34Such arguments are presented by Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France:
From Sartre to Althusser, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
35Existentialism and Humanism, is a commentary that Sartre presented in defense of
existentialism against the polemics expressed by both sides, right and left, and in doing so he
proceeded to define what it implies in practical terms.
36ibid., pp. 27-28. Sartre defines Heidegger's Dasein by the French expression "rdalite
humaine," by which he means "human existence not in the abstract Scholastic sense of "existentia"
but in the sense of concrete, lived existence with its possibilities of transcending; human existence in
opposition to the existence of a thing, which is blocked into itself." W. Desan, The Tragic Finale,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 30; cf. also, M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, (Halle: Niemeyer,
1929), p. 42; also De Waelhens, La Philosophic de Martin Heidegger, (Louvain, 1942), p. 35.
37Existentialisme et humanisme, ibid., p. 28.
38Sartre often employs praxis to express action, activity, a doing.
39Ibid. p. 28 my italics; it is important to note here that the leap here is important, for it
eventually justifies Sartre's own leap, so to speak, toward the recognition and embracing ofMarxism
as the philosophy of the age. Without this leap, it would seem impossible for Sartre to have adopted
a Marxist strategy which situates the individual living an existential present within a theory of social
interaction and an identification with the present in terms of constitutive conditions and not simply





43In Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, (London: Methuen, 1966), Sartre
defines consciousness as that which exists outside being, and therefore which is excluded from the
phenomenon of existence; its appearance or experience is always that which lies in and through
being, but does not constitue it.
^Ibid., p. 436; this position will be explained further in the discussion below on the nature
and extent of freedom in Sartre's philosophy.
45lbid., lxxiv.
4^W. Desan, op. cit., p. 29.




51 Ibid., p. 51.
52Sartre, B&N, op. cit., p. 200.
53Ibid„ p. 256.
54Ibid„ pp. 268, 339, 351. Desan, op. cit., p. 68. Desan cites an interesting passage from
Sartre's Roads to Liberty, Vol. Ill, The Reprieve, where the look has not only an epistemological
value concerning the existence of the Other but also concerning my own existence: (Daniel in a letter
to Mathieu, the philosopher): "And you too, skeptic and scoffer as you are, you are seen. But you
don't know it. I can easily describe that look: it is nothing; it is a purely negative entity: imagine a
pitch-dark night. It's the night that looks at you, but it's a dazzling night, in fullest splendor; the
night behind the day. I am flooded with black light; it is all over my hands and eyes and heart, and I
can't see it. Believe me, I first loathed this incessant violation of myself; as you know, I used to
long to become invisible, to go and leave no trace, on earth or in men's hearts. What anguish to
discover that look as universal medium from which I can't escape! But what a relief as well! I know
at last that I am. I adapt for my own use, and to your disgust, your prophet's foolish wicked words: 'I
think therefore I am,' which used to trouble me so sorely, for the more I thought, the less I seemed
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supports me to continue thus forever. I am infinite and infinitely guilty. But I am, Mathieu, I am.
Before God and before men, I am. Ecce homo." (p. 407).
^Sartre, B&N, ibid., p. 275.
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^Cited in Desan, ibid., p. 72; B&N, ibid., p. 292f.
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ibid. p. 72f.
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60cf. Part II, Chapter I, "Hegel's Enlightenment".
W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1924), p. 142, §
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self-relation." G.W.F. Hegel, Science ofLogic, trans. W.H. Johnston & L.G. Struthers, (London:
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72Sartre, B&N, op. cit., p. 301.
177
73Cf. Part II, Chapter I.
7^Trans. Introduction, B&N, op. cit., p. xiii.
75Ibid„ pp. xiii-xiv.
7^Cited by H. E. Bames, ibid., p. xiv; Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, (New York:
Knopf, 1952), p. 269.
77Ibid.
78Ibid.; Sartre, ibid., p. 271. Italics added.
79Sartre, Existentialisme et humanisme, op. cit., p. 29.
80Ibid.
8^Ibid. p. 32 my italics.
82Ibid., p. 33.
83This distinction is of primary importance to Sartre. In fact, Sartre is highly critical of
Descartes' formula as it does suggest that being is there identical with consciousness. For Sartre, it
would be more precise if Descartes would have stated: "I think that I think then I am," the result of
which would be the double nihilation of the second I think and the I am leaving one with the formula
that I know that I exist because I think. Cf. Translator's introduction, B&N, op.cit., pp. vii-x.
Also, Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale, op. cit.
84Existentialisme et ..., op. cit., p. 45.
85Ibid„ pp. 51-52.
86Ibid„ p. 51.
87Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Bames, (London: Routledge,
1991); cf. Part IV, ch. 1.: Freedom: The First Condition of Action, pp. 433-481.
88Hugh Silverman (ed.), "Sartre's Words on the Self," Jean Paul Sartre, (Brighton:
Harvester Press, 1980), p. 87.
89Iris Murdoch, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, (London: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 39.
90Ibid. p. 40.
91Sartre, Existentialism , ibid., p. 55 my italics.
92Jean Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Hamish Hamilton, (New York: New Directions, 1962);
also cited in Murdoch, ibid., p. 41.
97Sartre establishes this notion of Becoming in his later works Search For A Method
(1960), and Critique ofDialectical Reason (1960), however I do believe that this very notion, albeit
not in terms of the Hegelian Aufhebung, was implicitly present in Sartre's earlier definition of
existentialism.
"Silverman, op. cit. p. 87.
93This is defined by Sartre as follows: "Selfness represents a degree of nihilation carried
further than the pure presence to itself of the pre-reflective cogito -in the sense that the possible
which I am is not pure presence to the for-itself as reflection to reflecting, but that it is absent-
presence." Being & Nothingness, op. cit., p. 103.




"This is clearly argued in Existentialism and Humanism, ibid., p. 29.







*06jean paul Sartre, Critique ofDialectical Reason, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith, (London:
178
NLB, 1976), henceforth will be referred to as Critique.
lO^Search, 0p cjt; p 30.
^^Ibid., p. 4; Critique, op. cit., p. 15.
*09Cited in Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to
Althusser, op. cit., p. 267.
1 ^Search, op. cit., p. 99.
Ullbid., p. 175; Critique, op. cit., pp. 107-108.
I l^Critique, ibid., p. 119.
11^A. Kojbve, Introduction to the Reading ofHegel, trans. J. Nichols, (New York: Cornell
U.P., 1980), p. 217; Jean Hyppolite, Genese et structure de la phenomenologie de lesprit de Hegel,
(Paris: 1946), pp. 35, 235, 246.
^^Critique, op. cit., pp. 149, 124.
II ^Critique, ibid., p. 143.
116Search, op. cit., p. 99n.
H^Koj&ve, op.cit., pp. x-xi.
11 ^Critique, op. cit., p. 246.
' 19This, of course, is reminescent of the humanist association of verba and res, the word
and the thing (in which case it is here the deed, but as isolated moment of existence all acts become
objectified moments, or things that can be captured through language).
179
Chapter II: Subjectivity & Freedom in Postmodernist
Critique of Modernity
This chapter seeks to define what constitutes for each of the three authors,
Foucault, Lyotard, and Derrida, subjectivity as actualised moment in society. It has a
twofold objective. First, it examines the definition of liberty as subjective self-
actualisation in the world of each author, and shows how this definition breaks with
the earlier definition of liberty given by Flegel. Second, it points out the elements
uniting the authors' diverse approaches in what they define as constituting the
actualisation of subjectivity in contemporary society with that of Jean Paul Sartre. It
has to be mentioned that Foucault's work is not taken here to be a classic
representative of the postmodern standpoint, such as it is identified for instance by
Jean-Frangois Lyotard. However, Foucault's influence on postmodernism is quite
evident, which renders its examination necessary. Moreover, Foucault's work is
itself a continuous commentary on the phases of postmodernism. His early writings
express in clear terms the early phase of postmodernist concern with the absence of
freedom in modernity. Whereas his later writings respond to the earlier stages in a
manner that may have seemed, and have indeed been deemed by authors such as
Habermas, to stand in opposition to earlier positions. The present examination of
Foucault's work takes into consideration these changes, and makes an effort to
interpret them in terms of his later work. Therefore, the section on Foucault presents
the author's adherence to Hippolyte's interpretation of Hegel, the critique of
Enlightenment rationality, and what constitutes an 'author' in society. Lyotard's
work is concerned with the effects of technology, innovation, national and
international politics have on the individual in society; in his political writings he takes
pains to show that individuals in society have been deprived of an ideology that is
capable of arresting the capitalist system in its mad progress toward the
dehumanisation of the species. Finally, Derrida presents a philosophical discussion,
which attempts to ground subjectivity in a de-centred conception of existence, i.e. in
and through the deconstruction of language.
Foucault's Paradoxical Subject
In "L'Ordre du discours,"1 an inaugual address delivered at the College de
France, Foucault names as his mentors Dumezil, Canguilhem, and Jean Hyppolite.
Of the latter's work he made a special mention. Foucault remarked on the importance
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of Hyppolite's work which he saw as having "traversed and formulated the most
fundamental problems of our age."2 For Foucault, Flyppolite's gift to contemporary
philosophy resided in his "alterations" of Hegelian philosophy. Of these alterations
Foucault cited five. First, Hyppolite's translation of the Phenomenology, one which
granted the Phantom-like shadow of Hegel, "prowling through the Nineteenth
Century, and with whom men struggled in the dark," a presence. Second, Hyppolite
asked the question: "can any philosophy continue to exist that is no longer Hegelian?"
Third, Hyppolite brought Hegel's philosophy into modern context, and made
modernity the "test of Hegelianism and, beyond that, of philosophy;" fourth,
Hyppolite succeeded in transforming the Hegelian theme of "the end of self-
consciousness into one of repeated interrogation" of established generalisations,
which in turn helped "reestablish contact with the non-philosophical" upon which
there appeared the possibility of founding a philosophy that was "always present,
uncertain, mobile all along its line of contact with non-philosophy, existing on its
own, however, and revealing the meaning this non-philosophy has for us."
Hyppolite rejected Hegelian philosophy's attempt at totalising because of its failure to
withstand the "extreme irregularity of experience;" and finally, "if philosophy must
begin as absolute discourse, then what of history, and what is this beginning which
starts out with a singular individual, within a society and a social class, and in the
midst of struggle?"3
In this address, Foucault makes the claim that "our age, whether through logic
or epistemology, whether through Marx or through Nietzsche, is attempting to flee
Hegel."4 More specifically, Foucault believes that our age is in fact anxious to
overcome dialectics, the existence of which has dominated philosophy since Plato,
and which found their expression as the ultimate 'science of truth' in Hegelian
philosophy. Foucault identified the birth of a new era, or at least the recognition of
the need for one, in the work of Nietzsche, and the issue of reason and metaphysics.
In his earlier writings, Foucault produced extensive studies of social structures the
histories of which, although in line with the Enlightenment's drive to establish reason
as the ultimate arbiter for the actualisation of human freedom, demonstrated how this
very drive to reason was its own undoing, i.e. from these institutions domination,
unreason and unfreedom emerged. This proof that the Enlightenment project for
freedom has failed, and that dialectics were unable to account for this failure,
provided further conviction that contemporary society is in need of going beyond
eighteenth century philosophy, to one which is able to abandon Hegelian
phenomenology and scientific reason, in order to answer the question "how is it that a
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human subject [is able to take] itself as the object of possible knowledge? Through
what forms of rationality and historical conditions? And finally at what price?"5
This said, however, Foucault's position concerning Hegel altered in his later
writings. In the conclusion to his last work "What Is Enlightenment?"6, which
interprets Kant's text carrying the same title, Foucault in fact places his own work
within the same tradition as that of Hegel and Critical theory in a manner which
appears quite paradoxical; it is important to quote him at this point:
We can opt for a critical philosophy which will present itself
as an analytical philosophy of truth in general, or else we can
opt for a critical thought which will take the form of an
ontology of ourselves, an ontology of actuality; it is this
form of philosophy which, from Hegel to the Frankfurt
School passing through Nietzsche and Max Weber, has
founded a form of reflection in which I have tried to work.7
In "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present"8 Jiirgen Habermas looked with
uneasiness upon Foucault's last article as he attempted to place it within the author's
overall work. This uneasiness is based upon a radical break that Foucault makes with
his earlier writings. Habermas cannot contain his surprise when confronted with
Foucault's talk of "an 'ontology of actuality' leading through Hegel, Nietzsche, and
Max Weber to Horkheimer and Adorno,"9 and with Foucault's claim to belong to the
said tradition, nor understand how Foucault, the 'theoretician of postmodernity',
whose work aimed to 'explode' the very idea of an ontology of the subject held by
this same tradition, takes upon himself to make such an unbelievable break with his
earlier philosophy.
Habermas' bewilderment is justified; however, it is equally widely known to
be typical of Foucault to rework his earlier theories, clarify them and even change his
position. Moreover, Foucault himself admits that his own consciousness of the very
content of his analysis of the crisis of modernity remained, for the better part of the
his work, obscure until the moment he thought of the study ofpower as the medium
of his political concerns,10 a 'prise de conscience' which eventually led him to
articulate a more elaborate theory of the ontology of the present. By this, Foucault
did not presume to study 'subjectivity' as an ontological reality, but the coming into
being of a certain belief in such an ontology, which he defines as one of the major
elements, the knowledge of which is needed to identify and define the crisis of
modernity. Moreover, Foucault's talk of the 'disappearance' of the subject, which he
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explicitly discusses in a collection of essays on language, is itself directed against the
claim to subjectivity as 'exclusive' to, and inherent in, the person of the
philosopher,n
On this point it would be necessary to distinguish two periods in Foucault's
work. The early period, 1960s and early 1970s, reflects Foucault's preoccupation
with the events preceding and following the upheavals ofMay '68 in France. During
this period Foucault perceived what may be called the 'eclipse of the author and the
celebration of the text', a view upon which Derrida,12 and to a certain degree
Lyotard, based their philosophy. Foucault believed in the end of the idea that only
the author is subject, for he perceived in the events which took place during the May
'68 upheavals the clarity of perception of the multitude and its capacity to 'create' its
own life-world. This, however, was not to last, and in the second half of the 1970s,
Foucault began the journey back to Hegel and dialectics in terms of an elaboration of
a theory of Power, further developed into a preoccupation with the diversity of
Power, its application and generation in the four volumes ofHistoire de la sexualite,
and culminating in the article "What is Enlightenment?" wherein he recognised quite
clearly his adherence to the Hegelian and, what the postmodernists term the
modernist, tradition. It is hoped that it will become clear from the following
discussion, that Foucault's paradoxical position on the nature of freedom, subjectivity
and authorship is based upon his preoccupation with the interpretation of the events
shaping his present. This is alluded to in his final article where he suggests that
Kant's question reflects the philosopher's interpretation of the effects of the French
Revolution. It will be made clear in the following discussion that Foucault's claim
concerning the death of the subject occurs in terms of the May '68 events, the
aftermath of which permitted the thought that each individual is capable of a making
of the self, independently of both existentialist philosophers and Marxist activists.
However, like Kant before him, he reached his conclusion too soon, and realised
with much disillusionment that a dialectical relationship of power is indeed present,
and is the activity which shapes our subjectivity: hence his later identification with
Hegel.
In the following discussion, emphasis will be placed on two aspects, both
products of the first period of Foucault's work: Foucault's critique of modernity and
its metaphysical account of history, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, how
this account may be transgressed at once, not merely through the writing of
'histories', but also in what defines and permits the development of subjectivity in
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contemporary society, i.e. knowledge/consciousness. The first period illustrates the
'ideal' that Foucault pursued, i.e. the 'creation of the self independently of society.
In discovering the dialectics of power, Foucault did not abandon therewith the belief
that individuals are capable of self-making; indeed, he believed, as Hegel did before
him, in the freedom to make one's self in terms of one's activity, and not through the
mere acceptance of a social function; however, unlike Hegel, and more in line with
Weber, he perceived socio-political pressures used by institutions as means of
oppression and stultification of the senses. Like Sartre, he conceived of freedom as
existing in the realm of thought, and hence remaining as actuality merely in the mind
and not in lived experience. In this context, it remains befitting that one should
consider his critique of modernity as the dominant feature of his thought, and as what
influenced to a great extent the development of postmodern thought.
In The Archaeology ofKnowledge Foucault defines the traditional theory of
history:
Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the
founding function of the subject: the guarantee that
everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the
certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it
in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject
-in the form of historical consciousness- will once again be
able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those
things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in
them what might be called his abode.13
As such, history, as traditionally practiced and conceived, enacts a teleological
totalisation of past and present. Unlike this tradition, Foucault sought to study the
present not as the mere continuation of the past, but as its product. Foucault's study
of modernity through history is discontinuous. He seeks to understand the present
by a study of its origin and not as the final product of a predestined evolution. He
recognises this explicity:
I would like to write the history of this prison with all the
political investments of the body it gathers together in its
closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested
in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the
past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing the
history of the present14.
The reasons underlying Foucault's refusal to follow a metanarrative account of
history are part of the critique Foucault directs to modernity and its understanding of
its own ontology, i.e. its own nature and the factors which lent to its coming-into-
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being. Foucault is critical ofmodern historians in general, and Marxist historians in
particular, for their professed claim to knowledge of the truth about history. For
Foucault historical writing is of supreme importance due to the effects it engenders in
the active political life. Liberals and Marxists alike each produce their own
interpretation of a past that is meant to transcend time and blend into the reality of the
present. Such interpretations "erase the difference of the past and justify a certain
version of the present."15 They give unmerited power to the authors and engender a
distortion of what is present. In this position, Foucault is ultimately Hegelian insofar
as he sees the study of history as a study of this moment whose qualitative and
quantitative properties are the conditions which combined to allow its coming-into-
being in this fashion, all within a given historical period whose outcome might be
identical or opposed to that of the element under study.16
On the other hand, Foucault criticises an element in Hegel's theory of history,
viz. the Hegelian model which suggests that Enlightenment's reason is the foundation
upon which modern socio-political institutions and behaviour are based. For it
suggests a belief that reason is ultimately unifying. Foucault's studies of the history
of prisons, the birth of the clinic, the history of sexuality and of madness all
demonstrate the development of a different reason, one, as is stated by Schiller,
which separates and distinguishes. The discontinuous nature of this reason is
manifested in all aspects of modern society; it has altered to a tremendous extent its
historical develpment, its purpose and its nature. Within it, the individual, while
subjected to the mutilating effects of scientific reason, has lost all sight of an
immediate or distant unity with the objective universal. Foucault contests the
interpretation of a reality based upon such a teleological understanding of modern
reason, but would disagree with the attempt to overcome this problem through the
creation of purely economically interested societies, in which the care for the self as
freedom becomes limited to the extent that individuals' success can only be achieved
in the market.
Foucault's historical discontinuity lies at the heart of his analysis of modern
reason. Like Hegel, he chose to look at the history of the present, but unlike him he
saw the Age of Enlightenment as the modem break with its past, not its continuation:
History becomes divided, in accordance with an ambiguity
that it is probably impossible to control, into an empirical
science of events and that radical mode of being that
prescribes their destiny to all empirical beings, to those
particular beings that we are. History as we know, is
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certainly the most erudite, the most aware, the most
conscious and possibly on which all beings emerge into their
precarious, glittering existence, History has become the
unavoidable element in our thought... In the nineteenth
century, philosophy was to reside in the gap between history
and History, between events and the Origin, between
evolution and the first rending open of the source, between
oblivion and the Return. It will be Metaphysics, therefore,
but only in so far as it is Memory, and it will necessarily lead
thought back to the question of knowing what it means for
thought to have a history. This question was to bear down
upon philosophy, heavily and tirelessly, from Hegel to
Nietzsche and beyond.17
Here, Foucault is making a distinction between the period of history before (history),
and after (History) the eighteenth century . Foucault is marking here the great turning
point in the Western episteme where the transformation of the archaeological
foundations takes place in two stages. The first is an attempt to incorporate new
knowledge within the old structure of representation. At the second stage the whole
method of representation is abandoned. By representation Foucault means the
essence of language. In the Classical age language lost its original representative
'being' and became a "function: a system of verbal signs that represents
representation."18 What distinguishes it from other sign-system "is not so much that
it is individual or collective, natural or arbitrary, but that it analyses representation in a
necessarily successive order. It cannot represent thought instantly, in its totality: it
must arrange it, part by part, in a linear order."19 For Foucault, when viewed from
an extreme point, "language in the Classical era does not exist: it functions. Its whole
existence is located in its representative role, is limited precisely to that role and
finally exhausts it."20
The transformation undergone by language since the end of the seventeenth
century speaks clearly of the changes transforming Western culture. For Foucault
"from the seventeenth century, it is this massive and intriguing existence of language
that is eliminated."21 This function of language as the medium in which signs first
originate, and things can be known, ended in the nineteenth century when language
became one object of knowledge among others. It was, however, the needed
medium for the ever growing scientific discourse, an added status which forced it to
submit to further processes of specialisation made in view of the need for a higher
degree of purity and neutrality. Due to this process, language became once again, a
problem, a barrier, as well as a medium of expression:
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Philology, as the analysis of what is said in the depths of
discourse, has become the modern form of criticism.
Where, at the end of the eighteenth century, it was a matter
of fixing frontiers of knowledge, it will now be seeking to
destroy syntax, to shatter tyrannical modes of speech, to turn
words around in order to perceive all that is being said
through them and despite them.22
Thus conceived, language, just as did teleological reason and history, seems to have
lost its unity and is now reduced to an object of study, a useful instrument of
expression whose constituting mechanism is employed at different levels or degrees
of density depending on the subject at hand: lower density for scientific expression,
higher density for philology, interpretation and criticism. Foucault's analysis of the
development and transformation of language sheds a direct light on the spirit of the
age: one of separation and specialisation. In maintaining this position, Foucault not
only recognises how language ceased to express the life-world in terms of free-play,
but also seems to stand in contradiction to the positions held by both Sartre and the
postmodernists in so far as they place great emphasis on the role of language as the
medium of socio-political analysis and establishment of selfhood. Yet Foucault only
seems to contradict them, for in his critique of modernity as overly mechanised and
objectified life-world he also adds that language itself, as the expression of this life
has equally suffered from this development. Language here is a clear indicator of the
life-world, not separate from it.
Foucault's view of the discontinuities which occur in modernity's 'historical'
narrative, itself expressed in an objectivised and neutralised language, shows him to
be distrustful of modernity's use of history, and that he would perceive with much
sympathy the Weberian distrust of history as a base for the knowledge of the self as a
'subject' in and through history. He would agree with Weber on the degree to which
the content of history may, and does, alter each individual's perception and
knowledge of modern society, and the nature of the road towards 'infinite' progress,
for he seeks to explode the very idea of a vacuous 'infinity' of life in modernity.
Foucault sought to demonstrate that all knowledge eventually leads to further
refinement of the application and seizing of 'power' within society. For Foucault, the
use of history as a 'justification' for what is only masks, and very cleverly, this
'infinite' 'will to power', thereby allowing mechanisms of control to be dissimulated
under the guise of the 'will to knowledge'. Unlike Weber, however, Foucault does
not see bureaucracy as the only hope for any society to maintain freedom-as-
rationality; on the contrary, he sees bureaucracy's drive towards absolute
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objectivisation of human relations as yet another vehicle whose object continues to be
the masking of the 'will to power'.
Foucault aims to promote a greater proliferation and circulation of knowledge,
all types of knowledge, both specialised and general, in the interest of the public. In
the wake of the May '68 upheavals, it appeared that specialists of knowledge, such as
the intellectuals and philosophers, have become redundant, and that the masses can
very well do without them. For, until then, at least in France, the intellectual has
traditionally been the product of two different aspects: "his position as an intellectual
in a bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production and within the ideology
it produces or imposes" on the one hand, and "his proper discourse to the extent that
it revealed a particular truth, that it disclosed political relationships, where they were
unsuspected," on the other. However, following the May '68 "upheavals," Foucault
recognises a distinct shift in the role that was traditionally played by the intellectual,
which took away from the latter the monopoly of knowledge; "in the most recent
upheaval, the intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain
knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he
and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves."23 Just as this 'event' in
history marks the discontinuity of the intellectual as a traditional figure, it also marks
the coming into consciousness of the masses of what intellectuals truly represent;
intellectuals finally appear as the very "agents of the system of power," and "the idea
of their responsibility for 'consciousness' and discourse forms part of the system."
As a result, Foucault would then demand of the intellectuals that they should fulfil a
new function in society. Theirs is no longer the role of placing themselves
"'somewhat ahead and to the side' in order to express the stifled truth of the
collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform" them
into "its object and instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge,' 'truth,' 'consciousness,'
and 'discourse.'"24 It is therefore not up to the intellectual to provide the masses with
theory, but it is the responsibility of the intellectual as a member of a social collective
to express a theory that "does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is
practice."25 Hence, the role of the intellectual dissolves in the sea of knowledge that
is common to all. This is what Foucault understands by the disappearance of the
subject from history. For the responsibility for the struggle against the intricate
objectifying system of power is the responsibility of each and every individual which
cannot be theorised, but only practiced on the "local and regional" levels. In other
words, it is "a struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining
power where it is most invisible and insidious. It is not to "awaken consciousness"
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that we struggle (the masses have been aware for sometime that consciousness is a
form of knowledge; and consciousness as the basis of subjectivity is a prerogative of
the bourgeoisie), but to sap power, to take power; it is an activity conducted
alongside those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe
distance. A "theory" is the regional system of this struggle."26 The "we" that
Foucault uses here may very well denote the "intellectual" class to whom he clearly
believes that he and his interlocuter, Gilles Deleuze, belong. Therefore, the
intellectuals can no longer see themselves as a separate, rather privileged, class of
society, but have to recognise that they too have been the instruments and legitimises
of power against which they now have to take up the struggle in terms of a theory that
is itself practice.
How does this responsibility of the intellectual toward the unravelling of
power express itself? Foucault answers: in and through the language of
transgression, or more precisely in and through the expression of a language which
breaks with all taboos, which "opens onto a scintillating and constantly affirmed
world, a world without shadow or twilight, without that serpentine "no" that bites
into fruits and lodges their contradictions at their core."27 Transgression is the
method through which the logocentric, metaphysically centred universe is put into
question, for in its being as the overcoming of limits, it enters into "the space where
the divine functions."28 Philosophy now has to question "an origin without
positivity and an opening indifferent to the patience of the negative." It is the nature
of transgression, which is neither positive nor negative, which allows it to supersede
dialectics, for in the questioning of the divine "no form of dialectical movement, no
analysis of constitutions and of their transcendental ground can serve as support for
thinking about such an experience or even as access to this experience."29
What sort of language is this that intellectuals may use in order to discover the
"experience of finitude and being, of the limit and transgression?"30 Foucault admits
quite easily that there is no such language, and it would not help to express such
experience in analogy for this would cause it to fall back into dialectics; rather, he
suggests that it would be better to allow this experience to speak "from the depths
where its language fails, from precisely the place where words escape it, where the
subject who speaks has just vanished, where the spectacle topples over before an
upturned eye -from where Bataille's death has recently placed his language."31 In
this Foucault identifies the breakdown of "philosophical subjectivity and its
dispersion in a language that dispossesses it while multiplying it within the space
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created by its absence;" and yet he acknowledges that one may not see this as the end
of philosophy, "but rather the end of the philosopher as the sovereign and primary
form of philosophical language."32
However, if the disappearance of the intellectual, (and the death of the
philosopher), as 'subject' did take place due to the May '68 events, does this mean
that subjectivity itself vanishes, and is denied any existence? In effect, the earlier
writings cited above indicate that this might very well be the case; that is, that
Foucault sought to behead the original claimants to 'subjectivity' in humanism,
namely the artist, the author, the composer. Nevertheless, in so doing, he also
aspires, and this is particularly clear in his comments on the May '68 upheavals, that
every individual, in so far as this individual is a possessor of knowledge, is capable
of creating, as a product of his/her own curiosity, a self that is of his/her own
making, i.e. the possibility of making a subjectivity of one's own. In an interview
which took place in 1984, shortly before his death, Foucault answered, in response
to the question what would individuals do with the plethora of knowledge accorded to
them through the media, that "one of the main functions of teaching was that the
training of the individual should be accompanied by his being situated in society. We
should now see teaching in such a way that it allows the individual to change at will,
which is possible only on condition that teaching is a possibility always being
offered."33
Does this, however, indicate that the subject, who is his/her own creator, is
freed from the exclusive claims to creation and subjectivity traditionally coveted by
the writer, the poet, the philosopher? In the article "What is an Author?," Foucault
makes a clear distinction between what constitutes and defines a simple 'writer', and
an 'author', where the latter's work is clearly defined in terms of its originality and
creativity. He drew the distinction between Ann Radcliffe, whose work introduced a
new genre of literature in the nineteenth century, namely the Gothic Romance, and
creative writing such as that of Marx and Freud. For Foucault, Radcliffe's novels
cannot be called 'creations' for their uniqueness "means that there are certain elements
common to her works and to the nineteenth-century Gothic Romance ... On the other
hand, Marx and Freud, as "initiators of discursive practices," not only made possible
a certain number of analogies that could be adopted by future texts, but, as
importantly, they also made possible a certain number of differences. They cleared
the space for the introduction of elements other than their own, which, nevertheless,
remain within the field of discourse they initiated."34 That is, Marx and Freud seem
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to have 'transgressed' the language of their age, and ventured to introduce differences
which eventually came to express discursive practices. According to this distinction,
it is obvious that Foucault does not regard all writers as authors, and what's more,
not all knowledge is equal in importance. Would this indicate that Marx and Freud
had both a more developed 'subjectivity' than Ann Radcliffe, and if so who is able to
make such a distinction?
What distinguishes Radcliffe's novels from Marx's and Freud's appears to be
basically social in character, at least in terms of the amount of knowledge the work
produced seems to be able to generate. In determining and introducing a set of
'differences', Marx and Freud were able to inspire a whole tradition of thought, a
host of complementary books written and discussed on the subject their work has
differentiated. How would this distinction, however, relate to subjectivity? In
essence, for Foucault subjectivity cannot be defined in terms of authorship, for he
makes clear that the act of having written a book, albeit a substantially original and
creative book, means that one is an author by 'function,' but not an 'ontological'
subject. This is clear in the essay "What is an Author?" in which he refers quite
constantly to the writer as "author-function." Foucault invariably insists on breaking
away from the Humanist tradition which sought to glorify the author, and endow
him/her with divine qualities.
Yet Foucault remains, nevertheless, attached to two very important positions
which somehow lie in contradiction with this claim. First, that subjectivity is the
product of a form of consciousness, a consciousness of the self, and especially of the
moment at which this self is able to be self-created through a specific type of care.
For this consciousness to come about, it must do so, as Weber would agree, through
unmediated knowledge, i.e. knowledge which is not party to the manipulation and
alterations of the systems of power. It is therefore achieved through reading and
writing, through the media and through thought. On the other hand, Foucault
maintains that thought itself, in so far as it functions, is no longer a theory, but
echoing Sartre he states that "as soon as it offends or reconciles, attracts or repels,
breaks, dissociates, unites or reunites; it cannot help but liberate and enslave. Even
before prescribing, suggesting a future, saying what must be done, even before
exhorting or merely sounding an alarm, thought, at the level of its existence, in its
very dawning, is in itself an action -a perilous act."35 Therefore, language as the
medium of thought exchange is itself an action, a very strong and influential act, one
that would ultimately change the order of things, and by being such it is a medium
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through which subjectivity may be actualised. This of course would stop us from
denying subjectivity to intellectuals whose primary 'activity' and function in society is
to disseminate knowledge, for although the average individual may know, he/she
must know through a source, and not simply from his/her function in society.
Otherwise, why would the intellectual/philosopher/writer/novelist... etc. produce any
work at all; indeed, why would Foucault himself be engaged in such a philosophical
debate?
Foucault's answer to this lies in his affirmation that it would do every one
much good to forego the knowledge of the source of the information, i.e. for each
individual to ignore on purpose the author of the work that is being read. Yet at one
and the same time he acknowledges the necessity for 'curiosity', for it signifies for
him a certain amount of 'care', a preoccupation and deep interest in the subject of
knowledge at hand.36 Would not one who cares for the quality of knowledge
express some curiosity as to the origin of this knowledge? Indeed, despite Foucault's
consistent claim that an author's name is of no importance, and that he wished to ask
publishers to produce unnamed, unsigned books,37 the distinctions he makes
between Radcliffe, and Marx and Freud, are based on what these names signify; and
what's more, Foucault himself does not hesitate to place his own signature
underneath the article that demands that names be unknown. We are therefore forced
to reject Foucault's assertions concerning the importance of authorship, or at least
recognise Foucault's effort to be one of deep desire to distance his own theory of
language from that of Humanism. Yet we are forced to concede, and, in this, to
agree with Habermas, that Foucault's position regarding subjectivity is at best
paradoxical, and lends support to the belief, as his later writings on sexuality indicate,
that he is in quest of a definition of subjectivity that is highly individual. In this
Foucault follows Weber who suggests that freedom for self-constitution is and ought
to be a freedom from the shaping of the self by the system of power and institutions;
but unlike him, he does not propose a socially coherent ideology, or rather any
schema for a social context. In Foucault's world, the individual is left to shoulder the
responsibility of both the social and private spheres of his/her life, a responsibility
that is offset by the availability of a wide variety of knowledge from which
individuals choose what their needs demand.
Following the idea of the language of transgression, which in light of his
analysis of Bataille's texts he took to be expressed in our sexuality, Foucault
proposed in the series History of Sexuality the act of the creation of the self as the
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only means through which any real knowledge of this self may be known to the
subject who is this particular selfs creator. However, this is not an act that would
allow one simply to acknowledge one's own sexual nature; on the contrary, given
that the experience of sexuality is taken by Bataille to signify la petite mort, 'the little
death,' sexuality appears here as a metaphor for what accords the individual the
transgression of the limits of being, i.e. death, but while still alive. Therefore, the
knowledge of the self through sexuality pertains also to the knowledge of being and
non-being at once: it is the movement of aufhebung, the retaining and passing away
of being. This brings back a familiar line of thought prominent in postmodernism,
one which seeks to break away from a socially imposed understanding of the self,
and proposes that any explanation emanating from such a description is itself rooted
in metanarratives, i.e. preconceived teleology. The notion that one may be able to
create the self, the content of one's subjectivity, and that this be the only means by
which subjectivity may be expressed and acknowledged, demonstrates that Foucault
remains bound to the logocentric idea of creation as subjectivity, and restricts this to
the realm of 'thought-inspired' activity. Which is to say that, much in the
existentialist tradition of Sartre, it is not necessarily intellectual, or even linguistic; but
nevertheless, it is an activity that may very well be silent, as the silence of the
language of transgression, but it is thought which shapes and determines being as
subjectivity. Therefore, action as such may not be necessary for subjectivity, but
thought is, and action, i.e. the verbal expression of thought, is none other than a by¬
product of its actualisation. I would agree with Richard Rorty38 who sees Foucault's
weakness in the fact that his work seems unwilling to propose a solution, because it
sees its main purpose as the accurate definition of the problem, the recognition of the
here-and-now as a social reality which is, and not one that is peered at through a
given ideology, or an 'ought', this 'ought' being either positivist or teleological. As
such, the recognition of the problem is the reflection on the now, as presence, and
does not imply, as Foucault consistently made clear, action.
Foucault's critique of modernity does not stop at analysing how reason
affirms itself and maintains a hold on discourse, but goes beyond it to see how it
transforms and shapes the progress of humanity. Social organisation represents for
Foucault the epitome of the exercise of reason in a social context. Foucault's
historical study of institutions and relation of power are not performed with the
purpose of studying the phenomenon of power, but to discover the different modes
by which in the Western culture individuals become 'subjects'.39 In The Order of
Things Foucault sends this message:
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To all those who still wish to talk about man, about his reign
or his liberation, to all those who still ask themselves
questions about what man is in his essence, to all those who
wish to take him as their starting-point in their attempts to
reach the truth, to all those who, on the other hand, refer all
knowledge back to the truths of man himself, to all those
who refuse to formalize without anthropologizing, who
refuse to mythologize without demystifying, who refuse to
think without immediately thinking that it is man who is
thinking, to all these warped and twisted forms of reflection
we can answer only with a philosophical laugh -which
means, to a certain extent, a silent one.40
Clearly, Foucault's message is directed to the "human sciences," which are the fields
of psychology, sociology, and literary/cultural studies, together with the mass of
disciplines formed from their sub-division. The rise of these disciplines heralds for
Foucault the return to representation. Unlike Classical representation which lacked a
concept of individuality, this type is based upon the study of the unconscious, the
dark side of humanity, the Other. These disciplines try to provide the subject with a
definition of the true self, subjectivity, values, which traverse the whole of one's
actions in the world. Foucault's laughter -transgression- stems from his belief that
the 'subject' they are aiming to define does not and cannot exist under the auspices of
modern reason, for the method of representation of all modern human sciences breaks
with the Classical association of representation and consciousness. The separation of
these two concepts results in a constant process of demystification, the unveiling of a
truth that is less apparent, but more profound.41 In their very purpose, these
disciplines are posited to transform human beings into subjects, and they do so
through a method of "objectification." They represent modes of "inquiry which try to
give themselves the status of sciences; for example, the objectivizing of the speaking
subject in grammaire generale, philology, and linguistics. Or again, ..., the
objectivizing of the productive subject, the subject who labors, in the analysis of
wealth and of economics."42 In their multiplicity, they pose as the fragmentation of
the unity of the social entity as subject and object in society, and henceforth fragment
the very essence of philosophy, in both the Platonist and Hegelian sense, viz. a
comprehensive understanding of the unity of the self both as an individual and a
social element. This explains philosophy's silence; for as expressed earlier in terms
of transgression, philosophy has not, at least not yet, developed a language of
transgression, and therefore it stands silent, for in its silence it nevertheless speaks; it
speaks every time an individual is able to think and will his/her own subjectivity.
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In Foucault's study of the subject, the human sciences appear to posit to
consciousness an Other that is itself, and that in the final synthesis becomes
objectified; it becomes its own telos. Just as for Hegel this period of "self conceit" is
bound to be dissolved because of the authentic character, the will to truth, of
consciousness, where a union with the authentic universal will come-into-being,
Foucault's analysis of reason, which he associates with the Nietzschean "will-to-
knowledge," sees consciousness to be impaired, incapable of arriving at a complete
synthesis, for it has been deprived of its antithesis; this allows the creation of an
empty subject, because there is no guarantee for any type of universal or even
collective/social knowledge. For Foucault:
Even in the expanded form it assumes today, the will to
knowledge does not achieve a universal truth; man is not
given an exact and serene mastery of nature. On the
contrary, it ceaselessly multiplies the risks, creates dangers
in every area; it breaks down illusory defences; it dissolves
the unity of the subject; it releases those elements of itself
that are devoted to its subversion and destruction...; its
development is not tied to the constitution and affirmation of
a free subject; rather it creates a progressive enslavement to
its instinctive violence. Where religion once demanded the
sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation
on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of
knowledge.43
Just as reason's other, unreason, lies hidden in the confines of the Asylums, so is the
human Other denied any conscious existence. To modernity, reason with its carefully
concealed madness stands as humanity's true 'end'. The future is, however, not as
bleak as one imagines, for in his analysis of the exercise of power over the
individual, Foucault recognises the presence of individual resistance to such forms of
objectification, thereby answering to the short-comings of Maclntyre whose
definition of the nature of individuals does not permit any form of independent
subjectivity to emerge. In his discourse on the "Subject and Power" he expresses a
hopeful note:
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are,
but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build
up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political
"double bind," which is the simultaneous individualization
and totalization of modern power structures.
The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social,
philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the
individual from the state, and from the state's institutions,
but to liberate us both from the state and the type of
individualization which is linked to the state. We have to
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promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of
individuality which has been imposed on us for several
centuries.44
In the third volume of History ofSexuality, Le Souci de soi, Foucault argues
that in spite of its 'positive expression of liberty' (in Berlin's sense), stoicism has
shown itself to be one ofWestern Civilization's earliest forms of the "culturing of the
self" where one is meant to reflect upon one's nature in order to subordinate it to
one's will45 thereby gaining a specific knowledge of the self. What's more,
stoicism, although confined to the realm of individual thought, had an essentially
social dimension, for it sought to become fully aware of what unites and
distinguishes individuals. However, this philosophy seems to promote a very
passive position, one which refuses to put into action the product of one's thought.
The action that Foucault took upon himself to fulfil is that of his unwillingness to
adhere to a given position, and yet he does. In writing, apparently the most passive
and most un-active of actions, Foucault sought to touch our minds through words,
and hence through thought, and by doing so, and in spite of his unwillingness to act,
he fulfilled his own subjectivity through action, for the thought he inspired is, in his
own words, "in itself an action -a perilous act."
In his earlier writings Foucault expresses a great deal of affinity with
existentialist preoccupations. Both are concerned with the liberation of the individual
from an identity that has been imposed in and through social convention. Both
perceive language, (not as a unitary system, but a constant flux in terms of content
and structure), as the medium through which individuals may ultimately define/create
their selfhood. What's more, both seek to ground this subjectivity in an act of
narration. For Foucault, as for Sartre, words are actions: their capacity to inspire the
self cannot be taken simply in terms of what is socially and politically established, but
goes beyond this to allow for self-creation. It is significant that for Foucault the
distinct fall of modernity's reason into madness occurs at the time when language
itself became incapable of expressing our thoughts. As language became 'function'
instead of 'action', it lost its capacity to permit the expression of any type of
subjectivity. This occurred because language became objectified, permitting the mind
to fall into the world of things. For Foucault, language as function indicated the
objectification of thought which also meant the death of the subject as independent
thought. With this death came the death of the philosopher as subject, for as the 1968
revolts showed, the philosopher/intellectual was no longer representative of the
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'objective', 'independent' truth, but was already, in and through his/her use of
language as function, deprived of any original and subjective thought. Like the
others, the philosopher became an object of power.
In 1968 Foucault expressed quite openly a favourable opinion regarding
Sartre's role during these events. Foucault praised Sartre's attempt to raise "the
intellectual and political consciousness of the French public."46 Sartre was equally
alluded to as a leftist intellectual with whom Foucault identified: "if the left exists in
France ... I think an important factor has been the existence of a left thought and a left
reflection ... of political choices made on the left since at least 1960, which have been
made outside the parties ... It is because, through the Algerian War for example, in a
whole sector of intellectual life also ... there was an extraordinary lively left
thought."47 Foucault is clearly referring here to Sartre, Francis Jeanson and Les
Temps modernes, which constituted the centre for opposition to the Algerian War.48
However, Mark Poster is quick to point out the change in Foucault's thought since
1968, and argues that it involved Foucault's development of a theory of
Power/Knowledge in the 1970s. Poster contends that "after May 1968 Foucault
carried out a reorientation and clarification of ideas that substantially altered the
direction of his work. ... Foucault both came to terms with the problematic of
Western Marxism and carried it to a new level."49
In his later writing, and especially with reference to Hegelian philosophy,
Foucault seems to have abandoned the radical claim that the 'subject' of society is
dead, and to pursue the Hegelian notion of becoming, while maintaining the
postmodern 'incredulity toward metanarratives'. The result is to be found in the
History of Sexuality, in which the creation of the self sought a synthesis, a
reconciliation between the self and its social and political reality. Unlike Derrida who
refused to acknowledge the interpretation of texts within a given context, Foucault
sought to define the act of creating the self, in thought and through narration, in terms
of a given historical, social and political context. Yet, his attachment to narratives and
the idea of self-creation in thought remain true to their existentialist origins, and
incorporate, if only indirectly, Sartre's critique of the Hegelian dialectic and the
moment of synthesis. In the process of self-creation, there is also the disbelief in any
given social truth, which makes of this act of creation an individualistic, non-social
act. As to the conflict that would necessarily arise from the multiplicity of
'consciousnesses', Foucault does not give an answer, and in remaining silent he
seems to be echoing Sartre's incapacity to account for this explosion; all that is
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indicated is the claim that "it is so." In the following sections it is shown how
Lyotard takes up Foucault's critique of the intellectual, and how Derrida attempts to
establish a language of transgression in the form of a deconstruction of texts.
Lyotard's Postmodern Condition
In The Postmodern Condition,50 Lyotard defines the word 'postmodern' as
designating "the state of our culture following the transformations which, since the
end of the nineteenth century, have altered the game rules for science, literature, and
the arts."51 These transformations, Lyotard suggests, are present "in the context of
the crisis of narratives."52 In his text Lyotard seeks to distinguish science from
philosophy, where recent science defines uncertainty and philosophy is taken to be
one of the more recent originators of metanarratives in Western society. However, it
is modernity's project that sought to posit philosophy as a science whose object "does
not simply seek regularities, but also seeks "the truth" (some unmovable, eternally
existent truth), and is therefore obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game."53
Lyotard defines postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives,"54 due to the
fact that the influence of science on socio-political life has become such that
'metaphysical philosophy' and its 'metanarrative apparatus of legitimation' is "being
dispersed in clouds of narrative language elements .... Conveyed within each cloud
are pragmatic valencies specific to its kind."55 Although we all live at the intersection
of many of these narratives "we do not necessarily establish stable language
combinations," and there appear "many different language games" which give rise to
"local determinism."56
Lyotard claims that postmodernism is the corrective antidote to modernity's
failure, for it seeks to free modernity from the 'universalising' Idea, or reason, which
meant to make of philosophy a science of truth. Postmodernism is the beginning of
the actualisation of the modern project; on this he states: "a work can become modern
only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its
end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant."57 Two claims coexist in
Lyotard's definition. First, that modernity is not a 'finished' project, but a failed one,
which demands that postmodernism acts as the vehicle needed to perform the
necessary act of reculerpour mieux sauter, i.e. step back to better jump; second, that
postmodernism is an integral part of modernity's achievement, a claim that would
force one to wonder if the accomplishment of modernity's project lies as the end of
198
the postmodern telos. In this case, how would both projects differ; where do they
meet to seek the same end; and finally, what defines this end?
As discussed in the preceeding chapters, modernity's telos consists of the
achievement of freedom through a distinct sense of subjectivity. The method of
achieving this, however, seems to have taken on different forms, passing through
different channels. Nevertheless, subjectivity as freedom remained a common telos
regardless of the variety of forms this telos has taken. Lyotard sees the modernist
project a valid one, but criticises it for its incapacity to overcome the rigid forms it
imposes on itself in the name of 'universalising reason,' without which it would have
been able to express a dimension of human subjectivity that is "unpresentable in
presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of
a taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the
unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them
but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable."58 In this emphasis on
the 'unpresentable', Lyotard advocates a subjective expression that is at once
collective and individual, but which also defies any form of 'pre-established'
definition. This in fact appears quite Sartrean, both in terms of the identity of the
individual with the collective, and the rejection of a presentation as the form, as
opposed to a form.
What distinguishes the postmodern artist or writer from the modern resides in
the fact that the former "is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the
work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished rules, and they
cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar
categories to the text or to the work."59 On the contrary, it is the content of their
work that will eventually "formulate the rules," which imparts to each work of art the
character of "an event," whose appearance comes after the fact, and hence "too late"60
for a rule to be put into operation. This analysis of the postmodern presupposes that
all creative projects have a unique character endowing them with the freedom to be,
regardless of any 'universalising' characteristic, any single Idea, any unique truth. In
this case, subjectivity as freedom no longer denotes the Kantian 'universal ego' and
'universal will,' but breaks free from any element or law of conformity, whether
social or aesthetic, while nevertheless retaining a common ground, a so-called
'nostalgia for the unattainable'. What unites individuals, therefore, may appear as the
postmodern condition itself, rather than some given Kantian 'universal will.' Lyotard
suggests that modernity is caught in the Kantian aesthetic of the sublime, for "it
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allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing content; but the form,
because of its recognizable consistency, continues to offer to the reader or viewer
matter for solace and pleasure."61
Lyotard observes that what denies the subject true knowledge of freedom is
his or her incapacity, within the determined structure of modernity's systematised
knowledge, to be able to express the Kantian sentiment of the sublime, i.e. "a strong
and equivocal emotion: it carries with it both pleasure and pain;"62 but also one that
cannot be known, because of its 'unrepresentability'. The sublime "takes place ...
when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle,
come to match a concept."63 For the postmodern it is not necessary "to supply reality
but to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented."64 Lyotard
seems to be alluding to the sublime which shines from within, the true essence of the
subject whose only expression can only take place through the 'invention' of mere
'allusions' rather than be substantialised through any concept. Lyotard takes Sartre's
separation of the thing and consciousness to its ultimate, for he too is careful to point
out that no measure of actualisation is able to allow subjective expression in society.
At best, subjectivity can only be perceived through make-shift inventions.
In this sense, far from having become a subjectivity that is unique and
"paralogical,"65 and as such free, for Lyotard freedom as subjectivity in modernity is
forced to deal with the established institutions, products of the Enlightenment
tradition, wherein "the decision makers ... attempt to manage ... clouds of sociality
according to input/output matrices, following a logic which implies that their elements
are commensurable and that the whole is determinable."66 Enlightenment reason
judges its success on the social level by allocating "our lives for the growth of
power," the legitimation of which "is based on its optimizing the system's
performance -efficiency."67 The postmodern position opposes this socially
deterministic approach, particularly the determinism in the Fichtean and Flegelian
traditions which Lyotard quickly dismisses as the products of what he terms the
German Universities of the nineteenth century, whose influence never surpassed the
walls of their classrooms. For Lyotard, more so than for any other postmodernist,
Hegelian dialectics seem to have no import for the modern-postmodern debate; from
the nineteenth century he acknowledges Marxist theory, but this only in terms of its
failure rather than its capacity to analyse the capitalist mode of production. Lyotard
places more emphasis on structuralist, determinist theories of the twentieth century
such as the molecular opinions expounded in Luhmann's systems theory. Luhmann
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suggests that the system can "only function by reducing complexity," and it must
"induce the adaptation of individual aspirations to its own ends."68 Lyotard
demonstrates that such a system operates in a manner such that "the decisions do not
have to respect individuals' aspirations: the aspirations have to aspire to the decisions,
or at least to their effects."69 The operation of administrative procedures aim to
"make individuals 'want' what the system needs in order to perform well."70
Furthermore, such system approaches do not work, and this because inconsistencies
arising from 'the logic of maximum performance' in the socio-economic field, insofar
as it demands "both less work (to lower production cost) and more (to lessen the
social burden of the idle population)," can no longer be tolerated since "our
incredulity is now such that we no longer expect salvation to rise from the
inconsistencies, as did Marx."71
In "The Wall, the Gulf, and the Sun"72 Lyotard speaks of Marxism's failure
to maintain its stance as the alternative to, the redemptive Other of, capitalism. In a
critique of Marxism that has become typical of French post 1968 style, Lyotard states
that "Marxism, the last shoot stemming from both the Enlightenment and Christianity,
seems to have lost all its critical power."73 Just as Christianity, with God's death,
appears to have failed in maintaining its credibility as a liberating 'ideology', and the
Enlightenment's rational society failed to allow a true expression of freedom through
subjectivity to emerge in the practice of reason, so has Marxism's self-positing as the
unity of theory and practice failed both in France during the May 1968 revolt, and, at
the moment that this article was written (1990), in the fall of the Berlin Wall which
brought down with it the whole structure of the Communist East. The fall of theWall
was the last blow to the belief that an alternative to capitalism may be found. Lyotard
laments this final capitalist victory for it seems to have left him, and other intellectuals
from either side of the Wall, with a sentiment of resigned defeat. Lyotard's cries for
'depoliticization' when writing on Algeria, for 'antipolitics' in reference to May 1968,
turned to bitter cynicism narrated in the story of the Sun wherein Lyotard speaks of
the effect engendered by Luhmann's "systems theory ... devoted to the problem of
adjusting or replacing human bodies so that human brains would still be able to work
with the only forms of energy left available in the cosmos -and thus preparing for the
first exodus of the negentropic system far from Earth with no return."74 Lyotard's
individual of the future is posited in the nightmarish image of a brain with no body,
one all-consuming reason that has completely taken over all aspects of humanity; for
as the narrator of this epic, Lyotard claims that "What Man and "its" brain or, better,
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the Brain and its man would look like in the days of this final terrestrial challenge, the
story did not say."75
For Lyotard, Marxism's failure does not merely occur on the 'grand narrative'
level, but exists as well in what it implies in terms of the operation of society, i.e. its
socio-economic relevance. Although Lyotard continues to believe that "with the logic
of Capital, the aspect of Marxism that remains alive" is that "which forbids any
reconciliation of the parties in the idiom of either one of them,"76 nevertheless, he
recognises that the 'proletariat', defined as the "authentic subject of modern human
history,"77 itself a part of this struggle, no longer exists in modern society. What is
even more tragic in Lyotard's eyes, is not merely the absence of the 'proletariat' as a
party in the debate between labour and capital, but also that "the court required (the
court capable of equitably hearing the two parties, labor and capital) didn't exist."78
In the absence of these necessary elements capitalism's victory was inevitable, and
with this victory Marxist criticism has become "obsolete, even tedious;" as the
"ghost" haunting capital's progress, Marxism "has now vanished, dragging the last
critical grand narrative with it off the historical stage."79 This occurred because in the
"process of practical critique, the working classes as such have played, are playing,
and will play no role;"80 on this absence of action Lyotard bases the claim that the
very 'subject' of 'labour', the proletariat, has been denied action-in-the-world due to
the international labour movement's lack of common historical consciousness,
displayed in the movement's dissipation "into local institutions that claim only to
defend the rights of specific groups of workers."81 In their struggle against the
positivism of capitalist society, representatives of Marxism in the West, such as the
Frankfurt School or the group Socialisme ou barbarie, to which Lyotard himself
belonged, "preserved and refined the critical model in opposition to this
[positivism's] process."82 However, Lyotard suggests that this effort was already
out of touch with the development of society, for "the social foundation of the
principle of division, or class struggle, was blurred to the point of losing all of its
radicality; we [Marxists] cannot conceal the fact that the critical model in the end lost
its theoretical standing and was reduced to the status of a "utopia" or "hope," a token
protest raised in the name of man or reason or creativity, or again of some social
category -such as the Third World or the students- on which is conferred in extremis
the henceforth improbable function of critical subject."83 In this critique of Marxism
as no longer representative of what in fact occurs in the market, Lyotard is joined by
Baudrillard,84 who views Marxism as a by-product of the capitalist structure, and, as
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such, its failure to overcome or transcend the class struggle was not surprising, but in
fact to be expected.
In his account of Marxism, however, Lyotard does not adhere to a Sartrean
critique of this philosophy. To a great extent Lyotard's critique would be critical of
Sartre on this point, for it is necessarily post-Sartrean. For Sartre, Marxism was the
philosophy of the day, i.e. in the 1960s when he was writing the Critique of
Dialectical Reason and Search for a Method, whereas even in the late 1960s and early
1970s, Marxism (especially in France after 1968) proved to be incapable of leading
individuals in society toward freedom. The failure of the French Communist Party to
lead the students and workers into a real and effective struggle against the heavy
handed bureaucracy of De Gaulle's government, left most intellectuals in France
entirely disillusioned with Marxism and its capacity to challenge the status quo of
capitalist bureaucracy. For these reasons, intellectuals in France left Marxism behind
as simply a by-product of capitalism, and therewith its theory of liberation.85
Lyotard suggests that given the state of affairs in postmodern society, which
he claims is changing in such a fashion that "the old poles of attraction represented by
nation-states, parties, professions, institutions, and historical traditions are losing
their attraction"86 and may not be replaced, the new society will depend on "each
individual's industriousness," and is "referred to himself."87 However, Lyotard
refuses to acknowledge this development as a fall into a type of social atomism, a
view which he sees as being "haunted by the paradisaic representation of a lost
"organic" society."88 On the contrary, for Lyotard although the self "does not
amount to much," it nevertheless exists within a set of social relations that is both
complex and mobile, and whose only means to knowledge, and therefore power, is
dependent on the "messages that traverse and position him [i.e. the self] at the post of
sender, addressee, or referent."89 All types of mobility are dependent on these
"language games effects."90 For Lyotard, language games, in spite of their "vague"
limits, may "even be solicited by regulatory mechanisms, and in particular by the self-
adjustments the system undertakes in order to improve its performance."91 This
indicates that in spite of his rejection of Parsons' and Luhmann's Systemstheorie,
Lyotard nevertheless maintains a view of society that is based on the idea of a
'system' that "can and must encourage such [language game] movement to the extent
that it combats its own entropy."92 Hence, what distinguishes his theory from the
organic theory is the fact that language mobility has very vague limits, and is
dependent on the narratives of individuals, or particular selves, rather than on
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bureaucracy and socio-political organisation. In any case, the self in Lyotard's
'system' remains subject to the messages it receives and transmits, messages which
originate from other individuals, or, in some cases, institutions. The self-regulation
of the system indicates that there nevertheless remains a separation between the
'whole' and the 'individual' component, a distinction which renders Lyotard's
rejection of both, the positivism of systemtheorie and the Marxism of critical theory,
questionable. For what differs between Lyotard's position and theirs is Lyotard's
emphasis on language and language games, an emphasis whose purpose, it will be
argued, has much to do with Lyotard's definition of the elements which allow
subjectivity and freedom to be actualised in contemporary society.
Lyotard's definition of subjectivity and freedom appears in the first instance in
his criticism of the modern intellectual in France. When speaking of the intellectual
and his or her right to represent public opinion, Lyotard echoes Foucault when stating
that "for a long time, in the West, philosophers have been exposed to the temptation
of the role of the intellectual, they have been tempted to turn themselves into the
representatives of an authority. And there are not many, since Plato, over twenty-five
hundred years, who have not succumbed to this temptation. It seems to me that
Lyotard would like to belong to this minority; that's what he told me to tell you."93
Lyotard's distinction between philosopher and intellectual resides in his belief that
intellectuals are the active expression of the capitalist state, the legitimators of
authority, the technocrats, physicians, engineers...etc., who "help their fellow
citizens to believe in authority in matters where there isn't any, to legitimate this
authority."94 By contrast, a philosopher "refuses to appear before your eyes and ears
as an authority, as he is asked to do."95 This refusal signifies for Lyotard a social
duty that is inherent in the philosopher's raison d'etre. More importantly, it defines
Lyotard's mission within a society whose entire organisation relies on the legitimation
of its authority. Although Lyotard's refusal to speak on behalf of others may seem to
indicate that he finds it 'unethical' to do so, the very act of appearing with or without
synchronisation of voice-image is itself an expression that is making a public
statement, a statement which seeks to establish the difference between an 'intellectual'
and a 'philosopher', which is a statement on behalf of both groups. In this sense, the
statement not only appears self-negating, but also elitist, for it brings into full view
the Platonist image of the 'Philosopher King,' unfolding the theory that only the
philosopher is free from the 'illusions' spun out of the discourse of intellect and
capitalist authority. It is this discourse of legitimation that Lyotard finds oppressive
in society, and with which he associates the lack of freedom which exists. Lyotard
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suggests quite strongly that individuals in society should not be bound by contracts
and agreements, but should be able to break free from these social inventions.96
Unlike Plato in this respect, Lyotard does not conceive of his mission as a
philosopher to uphold some form of the 'social good', but believes in an
individualistic, almost anarchic expression of freedom in society, where individuals
are able to consider only what they seek as legitimate. This is of course a negative
freedom, one which acknowledges self-consciousness as no more than knowledge of
the world, and is reminiscent of Sartre's in-itself.
These elements bring into focus the position that Lyotard accords to himself
and his work, and it appears that with the failure ofMarxism to stand in opposition to
the established capitalist system -due to the absence of its labouring body whose
function has now been altered and in its own post-industrial context has become part
and parcel of the bourgeois structure and polemic- philosophy has to establish itself
as a discipline that is capable of putting in question the legitimacy of the authority of
the state and its bureaucratic machine. The question now remains: how is philosophy
to succeed in its enterprise?
Lyotard answers this question by stating that philosophy has to discover
means by which human freedom can be achieved through a liberation from the chains
of 'capitalist illusions'. Freedom then is defined as a liberation from the idea that
reason's capacity to give individuals the knowledge would necessarily give each of
them the 'power' to be ruler of his/her universe. Capitalism's enslavement of the
labour force, and Marxism's failure to advance consciousness of human solidarity
among members of the labour force, announce in clear terms the failure of the
Enlightenment project. Lyotard's alternative to all these 'metanarratives' consists in
his belief that politics, or more specifically political institutions and the system
concerned with power distribution, is itself part and parcel of the oppressive human
condition. His position represents an attempt to learn from the lessons of the failure
ofmodernity, that of stepping back -in terms of no longer believing that there is some
'absolute' solution that may be reached with respect to the postmodern condition- in
order to better avoid the mistakes of the past, the mistaken hopes which vanished
along with the May 1968 demonstrations and the Berlin Wall. Herein lies Lyotard's
answers to our questions. Postmodernism remains, as modernity was, concerned
with the actualisation of freedom in the world; its retracting of steps is exemplified in
its incessant search among the philosophies of the past for answers that will help
resolve the dilemmas of the present. Lyotard's disillusionment with both capitalism
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and the Marxist concept of a united workers' consciousness, leads him to develop a
theory of freedom in society that is based upon a specific form of existentialism, one
which views subjectivity in terms of individual rather than collective creative
expression through language, thereby rejecting form for activity. As such, Lyotard's
theory reflects Sartre's pre-occupation with words as action, which is not embodied
in an ever lasting phenomenal form, but is changing through both repetition and
interpretation. Language is thereby the medium which allows expressions of
subjectivity to appear in a variety of forms and structures; it is what comes closest to
the definition of this eternally 'unrepresentable', or sublime, in the human essence.
Derrida's Differance: the Deconstruction of Language
With Jacques Derrida we encounter postmodernism's polemic against the
philosophical tradition since Hegel.97 Derrida presents his case against modernity in
the form of a rejection of philosophy, which aims to set it free, more specifically, 'to
vomit it.' This is viewed in the sense of setting philosophy back in the general field in
which it has always wanted to dominate, and from which it continually sought to
extract itself, the domain of fiction and other writing practices.98 Derrida wishes to
'behead' philosophy, to strip it of its claim to being the logic of all logics, the
narrative of narratives, and the only way to do so would be to set it free in the 'sea of
texts.'99 This rejection of philosophy lies at the heart of Derrida's ideology which he
calls 'the critique of logocentrism'. Derrida identifies the "history of humanity," or
the history of the Western world as a 'phase', or a 'structure' representing the
moment at which claims to universality in philosophy and science occurred, i.e. when
the notion of Aoyoa became prevalent in writing. Derrida's rejection of philosophy
appears as a complete revolt against not only Western philosophy in general, but
more particularly what this philosophy rendered legitimate in terms of the socio¬
political and economic practices of the imperial West.
In his rejection of philosophy, Derrida has been considered as one whose
work is best understood as a variant branch of hermeneutics, albeit constituting a
more radical100 position than other hermeneutics philosophers such as Paul Ricoeur
and Hans-George Gadamer of whom he is often critical. Derrida's connection to
hermeneutics is based upon the method he employs in rejecting the logocentric
position of philosophy, i.e. through 'deconstruction' of language. Hermeneutics, as
the philosophy of interpretation, does not claim to provide one objective truth, nor
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does it reduce understanding to knowledge. Contrary to logocentric, Enlightenment
philosophy of knowledge, hermeneutics assumes that understanding as such is itself
one view of truth, and not the objective and absolute truth, and that in fact
understanding is an interpretation of truth. Unlike Kantian epistemology which
establishes itself as scientifically founded, and hence objective truth, hermeneutics
sees knowledge as dependent on contexts of understanding. In its quest for
knowledge, hermeneutics abandons the Enlightenment tradition's dependence on the
scientific study of phenomenon and espouses interpretation of texts. There are limits
within which hermeneutics succeeds in operating, and according to which it claims to
avoid the charge of relativism while refusing to rely on 'fact of the matter' (i.e.
empirical data) based truth claims.
Derrida uses hermeneutics to break away from logocentrism by removing
emphasis from the 'privileged standpoint' of the speaker and directing it toward the
interpretation of text, speech...etc.; in other words, he seeks to remove any 'special'
authority the speaker has over the hearers. In his attempt to do so, Derrida's
deconstruction of texts resembles to a great extent Lyotard's use of a desynchronised
television message which meant to put emphasis on the nature of the message rather
than the image of the speaker.101 Both authors seek to deny another group of authors
(for Lyotard the intellectual, for Derrida, the Enlightenment philosopher) authority
claims, while maintaining for themselves an authoritative position: Lyotard speaks
with the authority of the philosopher, and Derrida, that of the interpreter of
philosophy. Where Lyotard's focus is on the dissociation between image and
speech, i.e. between phenomenon and language, Derrida's is on linguistic structures.
Derrida is critical of the Western tradition since Plato which he charges as having put
emphasis on speech rather than the written text, arguing that it is only in the
understanding of the structure of language that a given meaning may be established.
Although critical of Saussure's linguistics, Derrida's conception of grammatology
nevertheless incorporates "Peirce's notion that we think only in signs, and Saussure's
view of the arbitrariness of the relation of the sign and what it signifies."102
Derrida's critique ofmodernity includes that of the idea stating that objective,
scientifically based truth is derived from a close observation of phenomena in the
here-and-now. He challenges the concept ofpresence, which is linked to the method
of observation, and which provides an unmediated access to the 'thing-in-itself in the
here-and-now by putting emphasis on reading rather than seeing. He makes his point
by using the term 'differance' which phonetically sounds like 'difference', but when
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written with an a, differance means both to differ, and to defer. The term in itself
seeks to indicate that speech is not adequate in conveying the true, or intended,
meaning of the speaker, and that knowledge is dependent on context, therefore on
diverse features of experience, both different, and deferred. Thus, a distinct and
innovative knowledge of Plato's text may occur to one living in the twentieth century
through a different method of interpretation, i.e. through deconstruction.
Yet deconstruction goes beyond the simple activity of 'reading', for it is
concerned with an interpretation of a text which refers to other texts; it is concerned
with what Bataille sought in the reading of Hegel, i.e. the excess, the transgression of
the text's limits, the generation of an "intersecting and indefinitely expandable web
called textuality."103 In this sense, interpretations are therefore always timely, since
they do not depend on immovable knowledge, but on the self-understanding of the
interpreter, the time and discipline. In general, they are judged on the plausibility of
the interpretation, the coherence of the assertions and the usefulness of the
interpretation in terms of its capacity to answer timely problems. The past and the
present are thereby blended into one moment of interpretation, a process which
allows the shedding away (bracketing) of presently unneeded, useless or
anachronistic understanding of ideas - for now, but not forever; this allows for the
flexibility of admitting that one may forever rewrite one's understanding of both past
and present, the present in the past and vice versa. Therefore, for Derrida, the
present is never this moment that I speak, think or write, but always what it seems to
me this text means, meant, or attempted to mean, and what this meaning changes for
me, for my own present Weltantschauung. By taking away the immediate access to
the notion of the present, Derrida poses a challenge to both positivism and
phenomenology.
Derrida's position concerning the present challenges modernity's
understanding of history and of knowledge on different levels. First, it succeeds in
challenging the Kantian assumption that knowledge is cumulative and that humanity
is invariably destined to be able, through the power of reason, ultimately to accede to
perfection. Second, it succeeds in putting in question the centrality of knowledge, the
assumption that there is only one answer, one truth, to every single question. Derrida
shows in his reading of Plato's text that in fact there is at least one other reading that
has been ignored, and that there may be others that no one is aware of. On the other
hand, modernity's reading of history and its texts is also one form of reading, and so
far is the earliest and most dominant, a fact that even Derrida's deconstruction cannot
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deny. For the sake of non-circularity, what interests us here is the answer to the
question concerning what constitutes the particular usefulness of the interpretations
Derrida proposes, as opposed to countless others, to the resolution of the socio¬
political problems of today's society. It becomes rather unclear, when one is
confronted with Derrida's textual deconstruction, what it is exactly that the author is
driving at, for it remains uncertain whether the exercise is meant to demonstrate the
author's ability to practice bracketing, or to reveal some heretofore undiscovered
truth. Given hermeneutic's emphasis on understanding rather than knowledge,
interpretation ultimately demands that interpreters be prepared to deal with socio¬
political and historical questions that are invariably posed within the framework of the
present, and this because of hermeneutics' dependency on context. The question that
ought to be asked, then, concerns what Derrida considers truth, as such, to be.
Derrida is often interpreted as denying the presence of truth, whereas it is
most likely, as Hoy and Sarup suggest, that he is in fact trying to avoid making
assertions as to the nature of truth. In Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles Derrida states that
"there is no such thing either as the truth of Nietzsche, or of Nietzsche's text...
Indeed there is no such thing as a truth in itself. But only a surfeit of it. Even if it
should be for me, about me, truth is plural."104 If Derrida's attitude toward the
search for truth and truth claims dismisses them as "trivial, and not the main issue for
his concerns;"105 it may equally indicate that what we read and interpret is never
anybody else's truth, but our own, the product of our personal understanding,
necessarily and ultimately unconcerned with the interpretation that others make of the
same narrative, text, speech, ... etc. When this truth is my truth, unconcerned with
the truth of others - and that's if they have any that may be related to mine - it also
indicates that essentially I do not need, either physically or emotionally, to be
subjected to the truths of others. In this case, Derrida's denial of the charge of
relativism, and his emphasis that all interpretations are indeed in need of being read
within a context, would indicate that in fact there no longer is a socio-political context
within which individual interpreters need to take into account the interpretations of
others; i.e. interpreters appear largely autonomous. In his account of truth and
context Derrida appears, to a certain degree, in line with Sartre's definition of the
truth for my for-itself. For Sartre as it is for Derrida, truth is what I make of this text
that I read. It is my freedom expressed in and through the act of imagination. The
author of the text has no say in what I, or my thought, make of the words written. I
also need no transcendental socio-political context on which to base this imaginative
act; on the contrary, I need to make complete abstraction from this context, from the
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world of logocentrism and thingness, in order for my thought to be completely free.
Seen from this existentialist viewpoint, Derrida's refusal to restrict interpretation to a
socio-political context appears as thought's ultimate claim to freedom.
However, in view of Derrida's critical attitude toward Humanism which he
deems as having straight-jacketed individuals into a lonely autonomy, and his
agreement with Hegel that individuals are essentially socio-historical beings, this
interpretation of Derrida's position seems, at first glance, questionable. Yet if one
returns to the parallel made earlier with Lyotard, it may appear that interpretation is
indeed separate from the life-world, or more specifically, as Rorty observes,
interpretation (philosophy in general) is the preoccupation with a distinct reading of
philosophy that is not the problem that the man on the street deals with or ponders,
but of philosophers such as Rorty himself, Derrida and Heidegger.106 Interpretation
is therefore left to the expert, the philosopher, who appears on television to warn
against the ideological bias of the intellectuals, and is also the one who takes it upon
himself to express in philosophical language that philosophy is dead, and lays claim
to the contemporary truth that there is no truth. Indeed, it would seem that it is
Derrida's prevalent disregard for socio-political and historical context which led to
Foucault's critique. Foucault is critical of Derrida's method insofar as it seems to
blind "him [Derrida] to the fact that Plato's critique of writing is really about truth and
not about the difference between writing and speech,"107 as Derrida's deconstruction
would have us believe. Hence, in his attempt to dissuade modernity from continuing
along the Enlightenment tradition of rationality and its obsession with the one truth,
Derrida seems to have run the risk of losing sight of the forest of context by only
dealing with textually bracketed trees.
Derrida's answer to this objection by Foucault is decidedly anti-
hermeneutical, or at least breaks away from the hermeneutical dependence on context.
In Limited Inc., Derrida asks: "Is there a rigorous and scientific concept of context?
Or does the notion of context not conceal, behind a certain confusion, philosophical
presuppositions of a very determinate nature?"108 He then declares the intention to
"try to demonstrate why a context is never absolutely determinable, or rather, why its
determination can never be entirely certain or saturated."109 Derrida makes his point
by insisting that at each moment a sign, a word is written it, in this very moment,
goes beyond the real context, which includes "a certain 'present' of the inscription,
the presence of the writer to what he has written, the entire environment and the
horizon of his experience, and above all the intention, the wanting-to-say-what-he-
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means, which animates his inscription at a given moment."110 At the very moment
when a text is written, it inevitably breaks with its context, and is thereby "abandoned
to its essential drift."111 This break, or what Derrida calls rupture, occurs both in
time and in space. By virtue of its essential iterability, "a written syntagma can
always be detached from the chain in which it is inserted or given without causing it
to lose all possibility of functioning, if not all possibility of 'communicating,'
precisely."112 The very spacing itself within the written text allows each iterable sign
to be separated from its original chain, "from other elements of the internal contextual
chain," as well as from its reference to a present "whether past or future in the
modified form of the present that is past or to come."113
It is in terms of this complete rejection of the traditional conception of context
that Derrida equally breaks free from existential humanism's earlier definition of
subjectivity as establishing its 'existence' through the written text. For Derrida, as
the author of any work, my writing can never establish me as a subject, at least not
the subject I wanted to establish, in my interpreter's reading of my text. Subjectivity,
the very act of creation, is thereby annulled, or more specifically disempowered, for it
cannot convey my subjectivity, the meaning of my life that I have put down in
narrative, to others. However, this distinction is directly negated by the very absence
of a socio-political context for interpretation that Derrida adheres to. If my text is
altered once it is interpreted according to others whose interpretations do not truly
affect, or have any truth claim on my own interpretation, then what would allow
anything to stop me from acknowledging my subjectivity according to my own
written text? Hence, interpretation taking place outside a given context continues to
run the risk of being interpreted, rather against its will or its author's will, according
to the humanist interpretation of subjectivity. This conclusion, however, does not
pretend to claim that Derrida's aim is to agree with humanism on this point, but
merely to point out that his rejection of limits leave his theory prey to interpretations
which ultimately bring about its own self-negation.
However, unlike what his critics claim, Derrida does indeed write within a
context, and it is the context of modernity. It would be erroneous to claim that
Derrida's work shirks its socio-political responsibility, for he invariably addresses
questions which are central to the modern philosophical debate, i.e. those concerned
with subjectivity, and self-consciousness. What interests us here is his critique of
Hegel, more precisely, Hegel's concept of Aufhebung to which he contrasts
differance. It is in differance that Derrida seeks to break with the Hegelian
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logocentric and presence-bound aspect of the theory of becoming. Derrida is
especially critical of Hegelian 'dialectics', which he considers as the very system
which maintained and brought to modernity the logocentric idea of metaphysics
through its use of binary opposites. However, before entering into a discussion of
Aufhebung and differance, a few words are needed to explain Derrida's definition of
metaphysics, binary opposition and their relations to writing.
Derrida is critical of metaphysics which he defines as 'being-for-presence,'
for several reasons. First, metaphysical systems of thought are logocentric, i.e. they
depend on a logos, a unitary foundation, an essence of our present beliefs; in this
sense, it also indicates a longing for, or a dependency on, truth emanating from a
'transcendental signifier'. Derrida's critique of logocentrism is metaphorically
expressed in Feu la cendre,114 which consists of a contemplation of the diverse
meanings of one specific sentence: il y a la cendre [there exists there ashes]. Among
the multiplicity of meanings of this sentence, there appears over and over again two
particular interpretations: otherness and finitude. In la/there lies otherness, and in the
ashes lies the other, the negation, of any existing being. As such, the sentence comes
to mean: there lies the ashes of.... Here, otherness signifies what is no more, which
is unknown, and which terrifies in its absence. Yet in the same sentence there is
certitude; the verb 'exists' pertains to certainty of the presence of negation, or
absence. The sentence itself expresses the certainty of non-certainty, the presence of
absence, the negation of negation. As such, this sentence expresses in logocentric
fashion the use of binary oppositions. These include: signifier/signified,
sensible/intelligible, speech/writing, diachrony/synchrony, space/time,
passivity/activity. Derrida is critical both of structuralists and phenomenologists for
not putting these oppositions in question, for not putting them under 'erasure'.115
A second reason for Derrida's attack on metaphysics is concerned with what
he calls phonocentrism, i.e. the argument which holds that speech is the immediate
and hierarchically superior form of expression of consciousness and knowledge,
whereas writing is taken to be an inferior form of speech, or second to it. Derrida
believes that oppositions between intelligible and sensible, soul and body, have been
inherited by modern linguistics in the form of the opposition between meaning and
word, or more specifically in this context, speech and writing. Derrida is critical of
Saussure's contention that linguistics should be a study of speech alone rather than of
speech and writing. This is a contention that is shared by Jakobson, Levi-Strauss
and most semiological structuralists. Derrida believes that behind this bias there
212
exists a particular view of human beings which assumes that they can express
themselves and "that they can use language as if it were a transparent medium for an
inner truth about their being."116 It is not Derrida's aim to discount the importance of
speech, but to point out that speech, in so far as it is spontaneous, may indeed be a
second-hand form of writing, as writing was considered second to speech.
The third reason for Derrida's criticism of metaphysics has to do with the
nature of binary opposites that are central to logocentric systems of thought. As
ideologies, binary oppositions draw sharp distinctions between conceptual opposites,
thereby making alternative conceptions harder to identify. Adherence to distinctions
such as truth and falsity, meaning and nonsense, centre and periphery make
alternative thinking difficult. Derrida, in differance, suggests a method which allows
the breaking down of the oppositions by which we are accustomed to think and
which ensure the survival of metaphysics in our thinking: matter/spirit, subject/object,
veil/truth, body/soul, text/meaning, interior/exterior, representation/presence,
appearance/essence, etc. Differance implies that such oppositions can be
deconstructed in such a way as to show that one term relies and inheres within the
other. This is exemplified in Derrida's commentary on Freud's paper "Das
Unheimliche." The un in unheimlich presents itself as the opposite of heimlich;
whereas Freud recognises that far from being opposed to it, unheimlich "can mean
both that which is homely, familiar and within our ken and, on the other hand, that
which is hidden, dangerous, uncanny, and unconscious."117
What becomes clear in Derrida's critique of logocentrism in the context of
writing is the presence of a need to consider the unconscious in language. Derrida
refuses to accept Saussure's contention that in language, the signifier is directly
related to the signified. There is no arbitrary one-to-one correspondence between
them. On the contrary, he sees "the sign as a structure of difference: half of it is
always 'not there' and the other half is always 'not that'."118 Signifier and signified
operate in such a way as to include a third dimension, one that is not considered in the
Saussurean model, but which resembles to a certain extent Lacan's idea of the real,
which lies beyond language. For Derrida, this realm lies in our unconscious in such
a way that it expresses itself inadvertently in our choice of words; we choose words
which express not only the 'meaning in context' but also their opposite, such as he
demonstrated in Freud's unheimlich, and Plato's Pharmakon. This third dimension,
if we may call it thus, is expressed in Derrida's fascination with excess, or
transgression of the text, and which he sees as expressing an interpretation of the text
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that may have escaped even its author, in other words of what the author may have
thought but was unaware of himself or herself thinking it, but which has become
clearer for the reader in a different place and deferred time. On this account Terry
Eagleton explains: "Nothing is ever fully present in signs. It is an illusion for me to
believe that I can ever be fully present to you in what I say or write, because to use
signs at all entails my meaning being always somehow dispersed, divided and never
quite at one with itself. Not only my meaning, indeed, but I myself: since language is
something I made out of, rather than a convenient tool I use, the whole idea that I am
a stable, unified entity must also be a fiction."119 In effect, Derrida's 'third
dimension' is comparable to Sartre's idea of the imaginative act on several counts.
First, in the concept of erasure, the double meaning within a word such as unheimlich
operates at one and the same time as identification and negation. It is an expression
of the second stage of the 'imaginative act' in Sartre's triad, i.e. isolation of a given
concept so as to allow it to be suspended between imaginative thought and the
phenomenal. In Derrida's differance this occurs in the process of reading a text from
which the socio-political context is abstracted, when a different meaning appears, the
text of the writer is then seen in a third dimension: it is identified and isolated. Freed
from logocentrism, texts are then read with the intention of liberating the reader (and
in a certain manner, the writer), which occurs when being and consciousness (context
and thought) are made distinct.
With this purpose in mind, what Derrida seeks to do in deconstruction is in
fact quite opposite to Hegel's dialectics; for where Hegel seeks to establish the
moment of 'becoming' or 'synthesis' between two binary opposites, Derrida
"stresses the irreducibility of metaphor, the difference at play within the very
constitution of literal meaning."120 In effect, Derrida seeks to hold in all
consciousness the diversity, opposition, and ambivalence between meaning and the
author's assertions. He seeks to show that our use of metaphors is often the
underlying message that we seek to express, but that it is itself thwarted, redirected,
according to the logic we use, a freedom which can only occur through a distinct
separation between context and thought. He is hostile to Hegel's dialectics, the
application of which signifies the continued oppression of the individual meaning in
and through socio-political institutions; therein lies the unfreedom of the Hegelian
system, for consciousness becomes limited by being. In his use of differance,
Derrida seeks to 'erase' all oppositions, undoing yet preserving them. According to
Eagleton, "deconstruction disarticulates traditional conceptions of the author and the
work and undermines conventional notions of reading and history. Instead of
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mimetic, expressive and didactic theories of 'literature' it offers textuality (ecriture).
It kills the author, turns history and tradition into intertextuality and celebrates the
reader."121 According to his critics, Derrida appear to be making of the reader the
master of the text. His/Her interpretation signifies what is true. Thought needs to
take into account what justifies its interpretation of a text, but must hold fast to its
purpose, i.e. to dissociate its own reading from the author's logocentric context.
The question raised by many commentators and critics is concerned with what
this method of deconstruction may be responsible for, particularly in terms of the
identity of the self. Deconstruction seems to threaten the modern (Enlightenment)
view of self-identity as unified and stable consciousness by celebrating
"dissemination over truth, explosion and fragmentation over unity and coherence,
undecidable spaces over prudent closures, playfulness and hysteria over care and
rationality."122 As Sarup states, deconstruction suggests that "the reader, like the
text, is unstable. With deconstruction the categories 'criticism', 'philosophy' and
'literature' collapse, borders are overrun,"123 thereby discarding any type of sense
certainty. The only alternative to this state of affairs is a necessary return to context,
from which Derrida sought to extricate deconstruction. For Eagleton, "meaning may
well be ultimately undecidable if we view language contemplatively, as a chain of
signifiers on a page; it becomes 'decidable' and words like 'truth', 'reality',
'knowledge', and 'certainty' have something of their force restored to them when we
think of language rather as something we do, as indissociably interwoven with our
practical forms of life."124 Thus, it appears as if for Derrida the constitution of the
self, as it is for Foucault, lies in the personal interpreter's capacity to interpret and
comprehend a given text, in a given epoch. Nevertheless the author's text influences
interpretation; it does so in the third dimension, i.e. in a manner that the author was
not personally aware, but has done so unconsciously in the choice of words. For
language is itself an expression of our essence, it is what we do, i.e. it is what
defines who we are and who we believe ourselves to be. Subjectivity, unlike that of
existentialist humanism, is therefore not simply that of writing, but also of reading.
Yet in many ways, this position which seems to overrun Sartre's assertion that I am
what I have written, in fact remains one with it, for I am the interpretation of the text
that I have written; I am the product of a differend, 'sous rature', erased yet preserved
nevertheless. I the writer can only identify my identity, interpret my subjectivity,
once I have put the final bracket in my personal biography. Therefore, I can only
define my subjectivity at the end of my life, because at every moment I seek to read
what I have written I am likely to find a differand in the interpretation ofmy identity.
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With Eagleton's suggestion we return to seek in Derrida's differance signs of
action, or, more specifically and in Hegelian terms, of actualisation. Unlike the
process of Aufhebung, which Hegel defines as the unity of both what 'transcends'
and what is 'transcended', hence a unity of action and passivity, differance does not
proceed toward a synthesis of opposites, but insists, as explained earlier in terms of
deconstruction, on keeping the opposing meanings under 'erasure', in juxtaposition.
Implied in the process of Aufhebung is also the moment of 'becoming', or more
precisely the accomplishment of 'Determinate Being'. In Determinate Being there lies
the germ of identity in difference, that is, the coming into consciousness of the / as
the unity of the I and not-I. For Hegel, the stability of this identity depends on its
acceptance and happy co-existence, rather than its struggle, with its other, the not-I.
Here, Identity does not exclude, but on the contrary presupposes that its negation be
present in its self-identity. On this Hegel states: "Thus Being-in-Self is, first,
negative relation to non-existence; otherness is external to and opposed to it; so far as
Something is in itself it is removed beyond the sphere of otherness and of Being-for-
Other. But, secondly, it also has Not-being in itself, since it is itself the Not-being of
Being-for-Other."125
In comparison with Hegel's Aufhebung, differance ultimately stands in
metaphorically defined bi-polarity. This demands that opposite meanings remain in
check thereby refusing to take the final step toward Aufhebung. In fact, it is not the
object of differance to guide us toward synthesis, nor any type of actualisation, for it
is there to point out diffusion, alternatives, hidden unconscious meanings, and not to
point to any one particular answer. Derrida defines differance as both strategic and
adventurous. "Strategic because no transcendent truth present outside the field of
writing can govern theologically the totality of the field. Adventurous because this
strategy is not a simple strategy in the sense that strategy orients tactics according to a
final goal, a telos or theme of development of the field."126 He justifies the telosless
or aimless dialectic of differance by the fact that empirical study is itself aimless and
has proven itself to be in "opposition to philosophical responsibility,"127 and that "if
there is a certain wandering in the tracing of differance, it no more follows the lines of
philosophical-logical discourse than that of its symmetrical and integral inverse,
empirical-logical discourse."128 Moreover, in the absence of a centre lies the reason
for which anything is possible, and therefore, "the concept of play keeps itself
beyond this [empirical-logical] opposition, announcing, on the eve of philosophy and
beyond it, the unity of chance and necessity in calculations without end."129
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In reading Hegel, and more specifically Bataille's reading of Hegel's
Master/Slave dialectic, Derrida points out the limitations of the Hegelian dialectic in
terms of Hegel's conscious effort to restrict the economy of his own choice of
meanings, which eventually permits only one unique interpretation of the dialectic and
its outcome. Whereas Bataille, in reading into the metaphor of Master/Slave -what
Hegel calls130- 'real' consequences, proposes a different outcome while keeping with
the Hegelian Aufhebung. This 'real' reading of Bataille interprets the Master/Slave
dialectic in terms of a 'real', 'lived' struggle for life and death, which however does
not lose the metaphorical dimension concerning the coming into being of self-
consciousness intended by Hegel. The excess that Bataille points out in the Hegelian
text is expressed in the distinction Bataille makes between lordship and sovereignty.
Unlike lordship,131 the meaning of which is restricted to "the putting at stake of life,"
which is "a moment in the constitution of meaning, in the presentation of essence and
truth,"132 sovereignty implies also mastery. However, mastery is specifically the
domain of the slave who is not officially master, but is so in practice. This denotes
the ambiguous and already dialectical moment borne out of the words in the text
defining the Master/Slave dialectic. The excess of the text becomes clear when, in
lordship only one aspect is defined, that of 'putting one's life at stake', whereas in
sovereignty there is already implied the consequence of this act, i.e. its differend.
For Derrida, Hegel's Aufhebung as the "economy of life restricts itself to
conservation, to circulation and self-reproduction as the reproduction of meaning,"
leads to the situation where "everything covered by the name lordship collapses into
comedy;" and this occurs because "the independence of self-consciousness becomes
laughable at the moment when it liberates itself by enslaving itself, when it starts to
work, that is, when it enters into dialectics."133
For Derrida what exceeds dialectics is the absurd, the comic: "laughter alone
exceeds dialectics and the dialectician: it bursts out only on the basis of an absolute
renunciation of meaning, an absolute risking of death, what Hegel calls abstract
negativity. A negativity that never takes place, that never presents itself, because in
doing so it would start to work again. A laughter that literally never appears, because
it exceeds phenomenality in general, the absolute possibility of meaning."134 It is
laughable because it expresses "the anguish experienced when confronted by
expenditure on lost funds, by the absolute sacrifice of meaning: a sacrifice without
returns and without reserves."135 Derrida finds the notion of Aufhebung tragi¬
comical because "it signifies the busying of a discourse losing its breath as it
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reappropriates all negativity for itself, as it works the "putting at stake" into an
investment, as it amortizes absolute expenditure; and as it gives meaning to death,
thereby simultaneously blinding itself to the baselessness of the nonmeaning from
which the basis of meaning is drawn, and in which this basis of meaning is
exhausted."136 This indicates that Derrida follows Kojeve and Sartre's interpretation
of Hegelian/Marxist dialectics, expressed in the idea that the subjectivity of the slave
can only come about through the slave's capacity to view his/her own worth in terms
of a product, a thingness. It does not read this as a metaphor, and ignores later
assertions made by both Hegel and Marx, indicating that self-consciousness is not
necessarily what is produced in and through objects, but lies primarily in the activity
itself.
In taking up the notion of sovereignty instead of lordship, Bataille and Derrida
attempt to break, through the use of dialectical method, the continuity of dialectics.
Laughter is directed toward the "non-sense" that the use of sovereignty imparts to the
Master/Slave dialectic. It is non-sense on two grounds. First, because it is evident
that the logocentric history of philosophy seeks to show us that work is "the meaning
of meaning, and techne as the unfolding of truth."137 Second, because the binary
opposition of being/nothing used by Hegel as the basis for the struggle for life and
death, the wrenching of meaning from non-meaning, the meaning of life from death,
may be off-set by the idea of sacrifice. Moreover, one need not enter into a struggle
for life and death to understand what death is, for as Bataille states, "the death of the
other is always the image of one's own death,"138 and hence it suffices for us to
witness death in order for us to experience the fear and anxiety associated with it. In
this case the reality of the struggle, its actuality and posited necessity, lose all
significance, and according to Derrida and Bataille unveil the limited, 'restricted',
extent of Hegelian Aufhebung. For Derrida, Hegel's phenomenology -indeed
phenomenology in general- "corresponds to a restricted economy: restricted to
commercial values, one might say, picking up on the terms of the definition, a
'science dealing with the utilization of wealth,' limited to the meaning and the
established value of objects, and to their circulation. The circularity of absolute
knowledge could dominate, could comprehend only this circulation, only the circuit
of reproductive consumption."139 Whereas, what Bataille and Derrida in their quest
for a "general economy" seek to achieve is "the absolute production and destruction
of value," the exceeding energy as such, the energy which "can only be lost without
the slightest aim, consequently without any meaning."140
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It is necessary to make some preliminary points concerning this reading of
Hegel, and the Master/Slave dialectic. Indeed, it is necessary to return to Foucault's
critique of Derrida and deconstruction, for in this sense interpretation seeks -almost
maliciously- to tease the established dialectic in this arbitrary misreading, thereby
diverting the attention from the text which deals with consciousness toward a play on
metaphor, the ambiguity of which was established in translation. Both Bataille and
Derrida seem to enjoy playing on the metaphor of the Master/lord, but seem to ignore
the other metaphor Slave/bondsman,141 in which case the bondsman is not arbitrarily
forced into slavery, but has consciously defined his position; as such the laughter
would undoubtedly cease as the act of entering into bondage is made through an
expression of individual will, one that is conscious of its fear of death, i.e. fear of a
"negation without independence, which thus remains without the required
significance of recognition."142 For Hegel, death is also metaphorical, it signifies the
"natural negation of consciousness,"143 for consciousness is inherently present in life
as a natural and necessary phenomenon, the absolute negation of which must be death
even if this be in life. Yet both Bataille and Derrida seem to choose which metaphor
to [bracket] while treating the rest of the text in terms of 'reality'. This is of course
done in the service of pointing out some inherently logocentric, in Hegel's case more
restricted, aspects of dialectics, and to establish an other to dialectics, a differend, one
that is not its extreme opposite, for otherwise differance will have to lapse into
dialectics anew, but that is itself different and deferred, more precisely, one that is
able to discover its limits and go beyond them; but to what end? How is the
discovery of a differend to dialectics particularly beneficial in resolving the problems
arising from logocentrism; in other words, how is this challenge to Hegel's dialectics
instrumental in providing a solution for the stunted subjectivity and unfreedom
experienced in contemporary society?
Although differance 'solicits'144 the determination of beings and Being, it is
not an entity unto itself, and it "governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere
exercises any authority."145 In its activity, differance seeks to subvert the need for
any centre, and "kingdom," and in so doing it posits itself as "the historical and
epochal unfolding of Being or of the ontological difference. The a of differance
marks the movement of this unfolding,"146 because it signifies the difference, i.e. the
dialectical nature of Signification. Differance thus appears as the ultimate negation,
the difference and deferred moment of identification, and more specifically self-
identification. In terms of action, unlike the Hegelian Aufhebung, differance does not
consider the moment of synthesis or any form of actuality, for its presence is
219
restricted to interpretation and thought, and because of its deferral it is not even a
moment that may find in speech a context according to which its activity, as actuality,
may be defined in socio-political terms. Derrida categorically refuses to bestow a
name on differance, for he sees it as the liberation of human thought from the chains
of metaphysical language and its ordering of the universe; in this context, it is the
freedom expressed in the selfs identification of itself and its own subjectivity without
a reference to a metaphysical Other. For Derrida, the postmodern self will seek to
forego the centre "without nostalgia, that is, outside of the myth of a purely maternal
or paternal language, a lost native country of thought."147 Differance is the activity,
the concept, the recognition of which affirms, "in the sense in which Nietzsche puts
affirmation into play, in a certain laughter and a certain step of the dance."148 Derrida
concludes that "the alliance of speech and Being in the unique word, in the finally
proper name ... is inscribed in the simulated affirmation of differance."149 Our
existence outwith the centre remains a certainty because "Being/ speaks/ always and
everywhere/ throughout/ language."150
However, the expression of subjectivity does not necessarily indicate who, or
what this subjectivity is, because for Derrida the very necessity of centring our
thinking on the idea of 'man' is itself logocentric and should be renounced. He
recognises that "what is difficult to think today is an end of man which would not be
a teleology in the first person plural."151 For "the we, which articulates natural and
philosophical consciousness with each other in the Phenomenology ofSpirit, assures
the proximity to itself of the fixed and central being for which this circular
reappropriation is produced."152 Here Derrida expresses his essential opposition to
Hegel's dialectics, and indeed to all phenomenology, for in their preoccupation with
the 'telos of man' they express a predominantly Humanist idea: "The we is the unity
of absolute knowledge and anthropology, of God and man, of onto-theo-teleology
and humanism."153 Standing between this classical phenomenology and
Heidegger's, Derrida appears to side with Nietzsche whose proposal for a "change of
terrain" is "a change of 'style'", and this style "must be plural,"154 What this change
of style means for the new "man" Derrida writes of only in metaphor,155 suggesting
that there are at least "two ends ofman," each of which is a differend to the other.
Derrida recognises that "in the last analysis my opening is not justifiable,
since it is only on the basis of differance and its "history" that we can allegedly know
who and where "we" are, and what the limits of an "era" might be.156 This
exemplifies the manner in which Derrida treats history and its importance. Lyotard's
220
'incredulity toward metanarratives' is expressed in Derrida's work in terms of the
incredulity toward the necessity for one Hegelian account of history, rather than a
history of each component, each entity. Derrida recognises the need to define the
history of differonce, rather than history in general, but adds that this history will help
us understand who and where we are. This implies a history of the use of language
as means toward the actualisation of subjectivity in society, and therewith human
freedom. However, how is this history of differance in any way not a metanarrative?
Derrida's answer lies in his categorical refusal to attribute a name to differance, for
"differance is not."157 Since differance is none other than an underlying function of
the process of actualisaton, it remains imbedded in freeplay, and thereby unnameable
and decentred.
Insofar as differance operates primarily through the medium of language and
interpretation, it appears limited in character. Although Derrida seems specifically
interested in what reflects the knowledge of subjectivity, its actualisation, it is
nevertheless limited to thought rather than action. If subjectivity is limited to the
realm of language and consciousness, it will do little to alter the world it lives in, a
condition which will eventually prove self-defeating and deceptive. Although not the
divine nature intended for subjectivity in the definition given to it by the Romantics,
or even the Humanists, it nevertheless needs to operate in the world, and this not
merely according to simple consciousness, but also in deed. It cannot simply think
itself into subjectiveness without the actualisation of this subjectivity. In this sense,
differance may resolve the problem of consciousness, but what of action? Implied in
differance is the notion that once consciousness is achieved action will follow, but
there are no arbitrary connections, no explicit formulae to ascertain that such action
would certainly ensue. And what of its nature: how is it constructed, perceived? The
limitation of the recognition of subjectivity in and through differance cannot be
expected of the population of a whole society; its presence, at least in the first
instance, is limited to the nature of intellectual activity in which each intellectual may,
through the interpretation of the written word, become conscious of his/her
subjectivity. With Derrida one is faced with yet another intellectually limited essence
of subjectivity in which only intellectuals have the capacity to fully comprehend
human nature, albeit according to their own personal interpretation, and its activity as
subjectivity in the world. The preoccupation with the actualisation of subjectivity
through language harks back to the notion of 'creation', more precisely self-creation
(for the other is always there for me), and therewith remains within the confines of
the centredness it sought to annihilate. In this sense, differance appears as a
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reworking of a version of Sartre's being-for-itself. In its capacity to point to the other
while effectively negating/nihilating its essence, differance is consciousness that
refuses to be the slave of any context, any thingness; as such, it appears as pure, free
throught. Pure, in so far as it rejects all that has gone before it in terms of
knowledge; and free as it never has to succumb to the influence of past logocentric
contexts, and more so, because it no longer has to suffer Derrida's interpretation of
Hegel's notion of 'becoming', i.e. the affirmation of thought as self-consciousness
through labour and production. Differance is the power of thought set free from the
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"in fact, Derrida's analysis starts with Plato; in the essay 'Plato's Pharmacy' Derrida
criticises the separation between philosophy and poetry at its origins, i.e. in the analysis of the use
of the word pharmakon in Plato's writing. This single word can be translated in either of two ways,
as 'cure' or as 'poison', and, like a drug, which way it is taken will make all the difference in the
world. Derrida seeks to emphasise that just as the hemlock, which can also be used as a drug, given
to Socrates with the intention of poisoning him, Socrates also uses both rhetoric and metaphysics to
prove that by taking the hemlock he is really being cured. Words for Derrida have a similar 'narcotic'
effect which leads us to take reality as a dream, or dreams as reality, and charges that philosophy has
so far lost sight of the difference. Cf. Derrida, Dessimination, trans. B. Johnson, (Chicago, 1981).
For our present purposes, I mention Hegel as the representative for the modern tradition, or the
Enlightenment tradition, with which Derrida is truly concerned.
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qui interesse Jacques Derrida, dans le rapport complexe qu'il entretient avec la philosophic, c'est de la
rejeter, comme il le dit lui-meme, de la rendre, de la vomir. Vomir la philosophie, c'est la remettre
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differance, is very similar to Hegel's Aufhebem, that which distinguishes them, as we shall see later
in the text, is the limit, the economy of meaning that Hegel imposes on Aufheben, but that Derrida
seeks to explode. Derrida would add that Hegel is necessarily caught in this limit because of his
attachment to logocentric system of thought.
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130in Science ofLogic Hegel explains: "Reality may seem to be an ambiguous word, since
it is employed for different and even opposite determinations. In the philosophic sense, for instance,
a merely empirical reality is spoken of as a worthless existence. On the other hand, if a thought, a
concept, or a theory is said to have no reality, the meaning is that it has no actuality; while in itself
or as a concept of the idea, for instance, of a Platonic Republic might very well be true. The idea
here is not denied its value, and it is allowed to remain by the side of the reality. But as opposed to
"mere" ideas and "mere" concepts, the real is taken as the only truth. -If it is a one-sided sense in
which external existence is taken as the criterion of the truth of a content, it is equally one-sided if
the idea, the essence or internal feeling is imagined as indifferent to external existence or is even
regarded as excellent in proportion as it is removed from Reality.", Science ofLogic, op. cit., vol. 1,
p. 124.
131"Baillie, the English translator of Hegel's Phenomenology, translates Herrschaft as
"lordship," while Hyppolite, the French translator, translates Herr as maitre, making the "master's"
operation maitrise. Maitrise also has the sense of mastery, of grasp, and Derrida continually plays
on this double sense, which is lost in English. The difference between sovereignty and lordship
{maitrise) is that sovereignty does not seek to grasp (maitriser) concepts but rigorously to explode
them.", translator's note, Writing and Difference, op. cit., note 8, p. 334.
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343Cf. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, op. cit., translated by A.V. Miller whose
definition of Master and Slave is Lord and Bondsman.
142Hegel, ibid., p. 114.
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444Ibid., Derrida defines the verb 'solicit' in its old Latin sense of sollicitare, i.e. "to shake











3^30n this Derrida returns to a Nietzschean distinction between the superior man and the
superman: "The difference between the superior man and the superman. Beneath this rubric is
signaled ... the division that is announced, perhaps, between two releves of man. We know how, at
the end of Zarathustra, at the moment of the "sign," when das Zeichen kommt, Nietzsche
distinguishes, in the greatest proximity, in a strange resemblance and an ultimate complicity, at the
eve of the last separation, of the great Noontime, between the superior man (hohere Mensch) and the
superman (Ubermensch). The first is abandoned to his distress in a last movement of pity, the latter
-who is not the last man- awakens and leaves, without turning back to what he leaves behind him.
He burns his text and erases the traces of his steps. His laughter then will burst out, directed toward
a return which no longer will have the form of the metaphysical repetition of humanism, nor,
doubtless, "beyond" metaphysics, the form of amemorial or a guarding of the meaning of Being, the
form of the house and of the truth of Being. He will dance outside the house, the aktive
vergesslichkeit, the "active forgetting" and the cruel (grausam) feast of which the Genealogy of






According to Raymond Aron, "Sartre's Marxism, coming just after the war,
arrived too late: by what sort of aberration did he insist upon confusing 'socialism
that was coming in from the cold', revolution from above, and the accession to power
by the party thanks to the presence of the Red Army, with revolutionary humanism or
the realization of man by the revolution?"1 Indeed, as existential Marxism came on
the French intellectual scene, it also seemed too late since structuralism had already
marked its presence. This perhaps indicates a reason for which postmodernist writers
have consciously distanced their work from Sartre's. A self-professed return to
existentialist thought would in any case be at odds with Sartre's position. That is, if
Sartre were to adhere to his own philosophy, then he would expect that those who
were to follow him should be 'imaginative' enough to approach the definition of their
world, their history, in different terms and through different means. Furthermore,
the events of May '68, and those more recent such as 'the fall of the Berlin wall',
made clear to all intellectuals, philosophers, and writers that Marxism, as today's
philosophy, has lost all credibility, and that we have to find an alternative philosophy
capable of defining our existence. Is postmodernism such a philosophy? The answer
is equivocal.
In one sense, and especially when viewed from an existentialist perspective,
postmodernism appears more as an attempt at innovation than at philosophising. This
is displayed in its heterogeneous and eclectic approach to theorising, philosophising,
and deconstructing. Its authors have each taken the individual task of illuminating,
through some 'innovative' method, the misconceptions of past approaches to
philosophy, and to the definition of human ontology. They have taken upon
themselves to 'undo' what the Western philosophical tradition had heretofore
established, but in so doing they claim that what is actually new is this very process
of undoing, and refuse to give any other message to their followers than: "Sapere
aude! (Dare to know!)"2 With this sentiment, Foucault wrote a series of histories
designed to establish the 'madness' of our times, as well as the necessity for each of
us to 'create' ourselves through the knowledge of the forces that have come to shape
our society, psyche, and sexuality. Lyotard quite clearly establishes the postmodern
condition on 'disillusionment' with the present in his political writings, and urges the
individual to be wary of intellectuals who do little but legitimise oppressive power
structures. He poses as the philosopher-King, and suggests that we should be
doubtful of 'meta-narratives' and ought to learn to think and act for ourselves
independently from intellectuals and members of their ilk. Of these postmodernists,
perhaps Derrida is the closest to existentialist philosophy, for he takes to heart the
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project of deconstruction of language as a means of knowing and interpreting texts in
terms of their a-historical content. With Sartre he shares the belief that "we cannot
control what those who follow us will make of our actions,"3 hence we cannot
choose to be read as we may have thought we ought to.
As established in Chapter I of Part HI, Sartre's critique of Hegel's idealism is
based on the nature of the latter's use of the 'dialectic'. In Hegelian dialectic a
resolution is established at the end of the opposition, whereas for Sartre a second
negation takes place. According to Sartre, freedom is not achieved within society,
within being, but outwith all social and political context. Sartre's philosophy implies
the existence of a permanent rebellion, a standpoint which continually breaks with the
established order. Existentialism rebels against the very structure of social existence,
against labour, and against nature as such. It affirms, more so than any other
philosophy, the distinction between the human and the machine. From a historical
viewpoint, it resembles the Humanist outrage at science, its disbelief that Prometheus
has become a mere stone.4 Postmodernism is not far from expressing this very fear.
In fact, it is this fear of having become totally reified that postmodernists express, for
they reject Marxism and Hegelianism on the basis that both philosophies demand that
individuals become subject to matter. The very need to create the self expresses the
fear of being reduced to a product of a 'creation'. This fear of losing power over the
machines humanity has created leads one to think that it is grounded in a more
insidious and latent fear, i.e. of having occur to them what has already occurred to
God. It seems that in humanity's recognition that it killed God, its Creator, it is now
afraid of becoming victim of its own machines, its own creations.5
However, if freedom resides solely in imagination, and is socially expressed
solely through words, then what of life? Is one to be oppressed everywhere and in
every activity wherein a given interaction with nature is present? What of those who
do neither reading nor writing: do they not experience freedom in a social context,
rather than simply through some form of imaginative escapism? In postmodernist
writing there are some answers which do not break away from the existentialist
position. It is often alluded to, if not clearly expressed (Lyotard and Baudrillard),
that Western individuals today live in a post-industrial society in which the 'ideal
situation' demands that all be 'literate', and that physical labour be replaced by white-
collar paper pushing and through the computer screen. Sooner or later, the 'ideal
situation' will be reached, and our dependence on machines will grow to the extent
that our societies will operate solely on language. Freedom in this society cannot rely
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any longer on such philosophies as Hegelianism and Marxism, for they belong to a
past age of toil and self-affirmation through matter. Today's action and self-
actualisation occurs in and through language.
This position appears plausible if one attaches to Hegelianism a Marxist
dialectic. That is, insofar as Marxist dialectic has been defined by Sartre as
materialism and fetishism, thereby indicating how Sartre, through his view of
freedom as imagination, has read Marx, and consequently read Hegel through this
reading of Marx. Yet for Hegel, self-actualisation, and hence synthesis, is not a
process that is embedded in material life, nor is it a process that necessarily
'objectifies' or 'reifies' the Other, as individual, of society. The realm of matter is of
high importance for Hegel, since he believes in the actualisation of freedom in the
present in terms of self-determination and self-positing, a realm which demands a
certain amount of self-objectification. However, for Hegel, the other as means
toward actualisation can also be, in the first instance, a concept, a function and a
thought. According to Hegel, a writer is as much of a social and political subject, as
an active being, a legislator, or a fire-fighter, because all action commences with
thought. However, unlike Sartre whose definition of action is attached to non-
material sphere, Hegel believes that the ultimate freedom consists of thought
implemented through the will as action in-the-world. What's more, this position is
also shared by Marx. In Theses on Feuerhach, Marx states very clearly that "the
chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the
thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of
contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively;"6 and
that Feuerbach, "wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but
he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity."1 Marx also states in
The German Ideology that "this mode of production must not be considered simply as
being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a
definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a
definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their lives, so they are."8
Postmodernism's misinterpretation ofMarx is identical to the existentialist reading of
Theses on Feuerbach made by Kostas Axelos, who suggested that "Marx wanted
sensible objects to be superior to ideal objects; but he did not grasp human activity
itself as problematic activity."9
Similarly, for Derrida, the importance of language in bringing about the
actualisation of subjectivity through the process ofAufhebung, is exemplified in its
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capacity to go through the individual, that is through the tympanum, the ear-drum.10
Language, therefore, has a physical dimension, one which enters the body but does
not alter it, and thus it can be a medium through which an actualisation of action
(praxis) is established, an action which alters only thought, and not the physical
body. Here lies the Sartrean emphasis on the expression of individual subjectivity
through action, while not adversely affecting the possibility of the Other to acquire
freedom and self-knowledge, i.e. by never forcing the Other into a process in which
subjectivity has to go through the material world, and hence become objectified. This
implies that in effect, as mentioned above, Hegel, according to Derrida, conceives of
self-actualisation through objectification, a conception which loses sight of the very
implication of Derrida's understanding ofAufhebung, i.e. to maintain and transcend.
However, for Hegel, this understanding ofAufhebung would imply that one element
has been left in suspension (maintained), and thereby made obsolete (transcended) by
the Other. This equally implies that there was no change in the nature of either, but
only that the position of one has been supplanted by the other. By contrast,
according to Hegel, Aufhebung is a process which cannot maintain either the one or
the other because it has to alter both. Aufhebung is an on-going process of
becoming, of evolution, through which the individual reaches in self-determination a
new mode of being, and hence new possibilities for becoming.
In this reading of both Marx and Hegel, postmodernists maintain the Sartrean
triad of imaginative process, i.e. 'constituting, isolating and nihilating', and as such
their understanding of freedom is based upon what Hegel calls "dialectic as a negative
movement,"11 rather than a synthesis. According to such a theory, the individual can
never be reconciled to freedom-in-the-world, but must always seek to break away
from social existence. Postmodernism thereby appears as an anti-social ideology
which seeks to establish the primacy of the individual over society. Its claim that it
expresses an effort to champion justice of the one against the many is in fact
unfounded, for it seeks to explode the very idea of justice, allowing a subjective and
purely individualist, often violent, practice of 'justice' to emerge. However, in so
positing itself, postmodernism has acquired wide appeal with minority groups; and in
effect, although indirectly, specific social injustices committed against women and
minorities have since gained a hearing, and have benefitted significantly from the
movement. This is where adhering to postmodernism is most nebulous, for it raises
the question of where to draw the line between the establishment of a fairer society on
the one hand, and the threatening effects of the weakening of social ties and the
promotion of social and political atomism, on the other. In its own way,
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postmodernism effectively posits the first moment of negation needed in a dialectic,
but falls short of paving the way toward a 'synthesis' because it proceeds to undo
what it has so far achieved, i.e. it 'nihilates' instead of 'yields'. In its capacity to
reconcile rather than separate, to allow evolution rather than regression, clearer self-
identification and self-actualisation rather than objectification and reification, Hegelian
philosophy remains important for the manner in which we view ourselves as social
beings, and as subjects in our own right. If interpretation is preferred to
deconstruction, self-knowledge to self-creation, and actuality to imagination, we may
find far more fulfilled individuals in society whose actions would not seek to nihilate,
but to build a world in which individuals may eventually treat each other as subjects
in themselves, while remaining in touch with their world, their existential space.
The existentialist reading of both Hegel and Marx is disturbing, for in this
refutation of their theories the postmodernists commit more than an intellectual error,
they equally posit their theories as essentially fallacious, discounting them as
impracticable and lacking in any profound value. In positing the present as post-
industrial, they are also discounting these theories' applicability to the understanding
of contemporary society. More disturbing is the fact that with the absence of
philosophies attempting to define the manner in which individuals become capable of
expressing, through a chosen activity, their subjectivity in society, the postmodern
narratives, with their eclectic and inaccurate use of past traditions, plunge modern
perception into chaos. The message they relay, stating that subjectivity is non¬
existent, and that we are only subjects in so far as we can act, has the capacity of
promoting both a sense of desperation and an urgent need to act. Such a combination
can only turn into a will-to-power which seeks confirmation achievable primarily
through violence. In societies whose biggest problem is crime, postmodern critiques
can only maintain belief that this is our epoch, our world. However, what happened
to the social conscience of the writer, the critic, the philosopher? As with Sartre, the
Humanists and Romantics who preceded him, postmodern writers seek first and
foremost the affirmation of their own personal subjectivity through the act of creation.
However, unlike the Humanists and Romantics, they no longer depend on God or
divinity to define their personal self-worth; they are their own absolute-subject, and
are so insofar as they are able to narrate the history of their present. What is needed
however, is a true expression of social conscience, one that existentialism has failed
to maintain in its embrace ofMarxism, and which remains lacking in the postmodern
ideology.
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Postmodernism thereby appears as an intellectual movement much in the
Platonist tradition, sharing its concerns with the Humanists and the Romantics. It
seeks implicitly to maintain distinctions within society, basing them on the 'quality'
of the creative mind, and the intellectual capacity to perceive the ideal as opposed to
the real. It, therefore, cannot help but appear elitist. However, its elitism has a more
dangerous twist: it is devoid of any Platonist social duty, and hence its telos does not
include the wish to lead the 'disadvantaged' towards a more accurate understanding
of the power of creation. Rather, it appears as a self-indulgent and self-serving
practice, which at best remains incomprehensible and hence neutral, and at worst
promotes the development of anti-social sentiment and anarchy.
With all this, however, one is left with the question whether the world is
indeed operating entirely according to the postmodern perception of freedom and
subjectivity, or whether there are examples of the type of freedom that is implied in
Hegel's system, as well as this dissertation's interpretation of it. To conclude this
thesis, I will try to address this question in a highly schematic manner by considering
the current debates regarding the future of the development of the European Union
(EU). So far, it has been widely argued that the institutional proposals regarding the
possible shape of the EU, as it has been fostered by Jacques Delors and the rest of the
Euro-federalists, seems to be based on principles that are essentially antiquated.
These include the belief that a) the nation-state is obsolete; b) that a United States of
Europe would be like the USA; c) that a federal EU is needed to defend European
interests against the U.S. and Japan; and d) that federalists stand for peace and
progress, whereas those who defend national sovereignty are old-fashioned
nationalists who live in the past.12 Literature abounds on the impossibility of a
federalist Europe, due to its multi-national, heterogeneous, multi-linguistic, and
diversified social, economic and political structure. However, what these criticisms
equally indicate, is that the proposed principles upon which a social, economic and
political union can be based carry with them the stigma of the old 'establishment', i.e.
the old belief in the establishment of a super-power that is meant to override the
interests of all nations -and citizens- involved. This standpoint betrays the "old-
fashioned terms about the international system and the world balance of power"13
held by the Euro-federalists. It equally mirrors the traditional Hobbesian 'liberal'
idea, stipulating that the raison d'etre of political institutions lies in their capacity to
protect against invasion (military or monetary), and to maintain absolute control (save
for the right to put the citizen's life in danger) over the functioning of society. This is
a type of society that would certainly deny any form of subjectivity (self-
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determination) which would affect the citizens of the states, and which constitute the
latter's social and political body, as much as it would world peace. In the face of
such a potentially adverse form of identity-deprivation, as is suggested by the Euro-
federalists' proposed EU, protests and violent upheavals would most certainly
follow. Examples of such stirrings can be witnessed in the rise of neo-fascist parties
in Italy demanding the division of the country into two regions, north and south.
Neo-nazi dissident movements in Germany take physical action against guest
workers, asylum seekers, and southern-looking individuals. In France, the
parliament is 'rationalised', i.e. it exercises no control over the executive, while the
prospect of mass immigration plus the sense of lost national identity has led to riots
all over the country and the possibility of a neo-fascist president.14 Indeed, these
appear as a mild reaction in comparison to what may ensue given the establishment of
such a European Federal State.
However, this does not need to be so. According to Alan Sked, there are
possibilities to achieve a united Europe, but without the oppressive federalism
espoused by Jacques Delors. After all, the EU has not been fully ratified by all
nations concerned, and much is actually being done to reach concensus. Changes put
forward by Sked suggest an alternative set of priniciples on which the institutional
proposals can be based, and which greatly enhance the execution, at least in principle,
of the project of a united Europe. These principles include the need to protect and
increase individual freedom, not only of the nation, but also of the nationals. This
can be done by creating fewer possible layers of government, preserving flexibility of
structure, guaranteeing human rights, peace, as well as national sovereignty. Sked
seeks to propose a system in which individuals are able to preserve their national
identity, and merge voluntarily (through the method of active democratic participation
in local and municipal governments) with the forward attitude of a united Europe. In
the quest for lasting peace and cooperation, these principles equally demand that
politicians, on the national and European level, be prepared to reject the positing of a
united Europe in terms which qualify it as aspiring to achieve an imperial or
superpower status. Sked's proposal suggests that the EU be governed by a
parliament which is based upon agreed legislation operating as a common forum. Of
the structures that are of the highest importance to individuals and nations alike, is the
EU Court of Justice, which has already dealt with significant cases affecting nationals
within their own country. Such a system will give access to individuals or groups to
present their cases independently from the social and political constraints present in
their particular country, and thereby receive a fair hearing which may overturn
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decisions made in the latter's courts.15 This judicial process is of great importance,
for it allows the representation of groups, such as the IRA in Britain, or the Basque
Party in France, whose concerns are not heard in their own country, often leading
them to resort to violence and terrorism. Recognition of the social and political
identity of such groups is therefore important, since individuals obtain identity, self-
consciousness and subjectivity within their chosen group.
A thorough discussion of the workings of the EU is not necessary at this
point, it suffices to say that the principles put forth by Sked help illustrate, to a certain
degree, that the Hegelian theory of the state has validity and applicability in today's
political arena. Individuals, like individual nation states in the EU, need to
acknowledge a common legislation, a common purpose and direction in order to be
able to participate in the definition and determination of the country they wish to
inhabit. The EU appears as a collection of nations, resembling to a large degree
Hegel's corporations. The democratic system in these countries would ensure the
participation of all concerned, a fact that has been clearly demonstrated in the use of
referendums. Furthermore, the Executive cannot change legislation without the direct
acquiescence of the member states. Also, both the Hegelian state and the EU would
be headed by a president whose decisions would reflect the common will of the
citizens, as made clear by their official representatives. Unlike the Hegelian state,
however, the European Court (the equivalent to which is not available in Hegel's
state) would ensure that justice is meted out to minorities whose rights are being
compromised by the ideological and/or cultural prejudices of their country. Within
this framework, the EU would provide alternative means to the achievement of
individual/group representation which would satisfy, to a great extent, the need for
recognition of identity and difference. This would equally signify a greater form of
political liberty which occurs because the political sphere necessarily expands when
taking into account the diversity inherently present in the nature and structure of the
EU. Because nation-states, like Hegel's, depended solely on the 'myth' of a
'common' and 'homogeneous' identity, their constitutions were based upon criteria
that often appeared oppressive of religious, ethnic and ideological minorities. The
EU may do away with this 'myth', and may operate in a manner that will seek the
achievement of synthesis between needs and beliefs.
In the national and international debates surrounding the main issues of the
achievement of a united Europe, one cannot escape the opposition present between
those who reject it according to a 'postmodernist' critique, and those who seek to
237
maintain it through a 'modernist' argument. The postmodernists reject the idea
because they believe that the individual is incapable of achieving freedom in and
through the political arena. Freedom in this world is itself an illusion, and all one can
aspire to is to be able to create from nothingness an identity that is of his/her own
making. The modernists, on the other hand, argue that freedom is only actual when it
is real, i.e. that a united Europe would be capable of maintaining the freedom of its
citizens if it is able to maintain its status in the world as a formidable economic and
imperialist power, one that posits the identity of its citizens in and through material
means. This opposition provides us with the bi-polar definitions of freedom, i.e.
freedom as Spirit, and freedom as absence of physical restraint. Postmodernism uses
a Sartrean dialectic which cannot reconcile the individual with the phenomenal world,
while the modernists continue to invest in instrumental reason which concentrates on
achieving freedom in and through the material world, and therefore cannot reconcile
the world with the individual as a being whose essence is thought. Both standpoints
go to extremes which prove socially, economically and politically problematic. By
advocating human rights and the precedence of the individual to the community, the
postmodernists deny individuals their need for a communal identity. Similarly, by
defining human teleology in terms of material acquisition, the modernists alienate the
individual from a sense of human compassion and friendship present in society, and
therefore from a sense of human identity. Both standpoints are able to provide the
individual and society with one sense of accomplishment. The postmodernists
provide self-creation, and the modernists self-affirmation, but neither provide self-
determination. Freedom as self-determination remains unfulfilled, because both
extremes posit the self as pure determinism, the one spiritual and the other material.
Postmodernism cannot posit itself as an acceptable alternative to modernism, i.e. as
an ideology seeking to promote a less materialist and fetishist way of identifying the
self, because it is caught in the snares of its own limitations. It too has to contend
with the social atomism and elitism underlying its founding principles.
The problems posed by a united Europe are helpful in bringing forth issues
that have not been discussed in the West since the creation of the nation-state, hence
since the 19th century. It is unsurprising that questions of identity, nation,
territoriality, and the future are being dealt with daily, and are no longer put aside as
superfluous or secondary to the functioning of the economy, as was the case in the
last century. I should like to add that it is highly unlikely that a federalist Europe,
such as reviled by many, would come into being, and the reason for this would be
simply because the collective, i.e. the majority of individuals in each European
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nation, would directly (referendum), or indirectly (violent riots and neo-fascist
behaviour) make their will heard. This is possible because contemporary society,
although branded oppressive and limiting by its postmodern critics, reflects the
essential changes that have taken place since the Humanists sought freedom in terms
of the overcoming of social oppression in and through religion. The notions of
identity, difference, freedom and subjectivity have all been identified and are made
distinct. They are now viewed as essential to the nature and value of life itself.
Recent political developments point to the possibility that there exists a strong need to
overcome our bi-polar understanding of human nature and its purpose through
synthesis. For this reason, we will not need to wish for the Hegelian Prussian state
to return, but will actively fashion a social and political matrix that is able to provide
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